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Regional Engagement in Peacebuilding in Africa:
Perspectives and Challenges

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Your Excellences,

Invited senior military officers

Ladies and gentlemen

Let me start by thanking the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) and the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation for asking me to give this extremely important lecture, which is aimed at the promotion of global justice, peace and respect for human rights. The lecture series, I understand, was instituted in 2013 as part of the programmes lined up for celebrating the 10th anniversary of KAIPTC. Today's lecture is the fifth. The earlier speakers are Ellen Margreth (2013), Staffan de Mistura (2014), Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas (2015), and Karin Landgren (2016). These are men and women of global substance; they are colossus and movers of our modern world most especially in the field of international peace and security. Asking me to join these eminent personalities in delivering this lecture is a great honour done me and the University of Ibadan which I serve as a Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies. While Annan is one of Africa's most outstanding gifts to the global community, Hammarskjold spent the best of his tenure as the UN Secretary General serving Africa. He died in the process.

Today's lecture is taking place at KAIPTC: an institution established to celebrate the excellence of Kofi Annan. I salute all those that brought the Centre to what and where it is today. It emerged the best institution in sub-Saharan Africa in the

2017 annual global ranking done by the Launder Institute at the University of Pennsylvania on the Global foreign policy and international affairs Think Tanks.

I will not delay us here with a list of Kofi Annan's achievements as a UN Secretary General but would simply limit myself to three key issues relating to today's lecture. The first is that in April 2000 our honoree issued a Millennium Report, entitled "We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century", calling on Member States to be committed to an action plan for ending poverty and inequality, improving education, reducing HIV/AIDS, safeguarding the environment and protecting peoples from deadly conflict and violence. This Report later formed the basis of the Millennium Declaration adopted in 2000. He championed the global doctrine of "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) in 2005. The doctrine is a set of principles designed to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to provide norms to guide answers to these questions. He persuaded the United Nations to establish the UN Pecebuilding Commission on 20 December 2005. That Commission is today a reference point to a global community that is tired of dealing with conflict issues using the instrumentality of military force. More problems are today dealt with through peacebuilding. Today's lecture affords us the opportunity of taking a critical look at the emerging pictures in Africa.

Kofi Annan's Africa must also celebrate our second honoree: Dag Hammarskjöld. He was the UN Secretary General during Africa's decolonization process in the late 1950s and early 1960s. His lifetime was that of a man obsessed with the goal of making Africa regain all it lost under colonialism. As one of his biographers, Kaj Falkman reported, Dag Hammarskjöld spent his early life imagining the UN becoming "the engine for the new African states' development to modern societies"¹. He was a true friend of Africa² who amongst several other things contributed significantly to the establishment of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA).

In his line of duty, Dag Hammarskjöld visited 21 African countries trying to assess their needs and shape their vision for international cooperation. In his words, the trips made him 'both wiser and more humble, as well as less prone to generalize, since the [countries] had many different problems, attitudes and traditions'³.

¹ Kaj Falkman (ed.), *Att Föra Världens Talan: Tal och Uttalanden av Dag Hammarskjöld* ('Speaking on behalf of the world: Speeches and statements by Dag Hammarskjöld'). Stockholm, Atlantis, 2005.

² For a comprehensive study of this issue see *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, Volume 11, Number 1 2011 <http://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajcr/issue/view/8278>

³ Ibid. p. 42

He achieved a lot for Africa but I will call attention to just three of the landmark cases. The first was his constructive intervention in the Congo crisis. The country became independent on June 30, 1960 without any coherent strategy on how to forge a healthy working relationship amongst its ethnic groups. Five days later, there was mutiny in the country's army resulting in the attack of some Europeans and Congolese. Rather than work with the government of Congo to deal with the issue, Belgium sent its troops into the country under the guise of protecting the Europeans there. On July 12 1960, the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba, approached the United Nations for the international assistance to stop the Belgian invasion.

With reference to the UN Charter, Dag Hammarskjold interpreted the action of Belgium as an invasion of a sovereign African state. He summoned the UN Security Council, which passed Resolution 143 (1960) on July 14, 1960 asking Belgium to withdraw its troops from Congo. This led to the historic United Nations Operation in the Congo (Operation des Nations Unies au Congo, or ONUC), which lasted from July 1960 till June 1964⁴. The UN Secretary General personally made four trips to the Congo in connection with the UN peacekeeping operation. He lost his life during the fourth. He is no more but Africa owes him a great deal of gratitude for this.

Carried away by the euphoria of the support provided by the UN for halting the Belgian invasion, Congo requested the UN Secretary-General to extend the mandate of ONUC to include providing support to the government to fight the emerging secessionists in the country. Hammarskjold set a global standard for the UN by refusing to be dragged into what he termed the internal affairs of Congo. He considered the secessionists in Congo to have the right to ask for their own independence from the independent Congo as latter had done of the Belgians.

The point made above is that Hammarskjold did a lot for Congo. It is unfortunate that he could not complete the good work he started in that country. He was killed in a plane crash. He would probably have done more at stabilizing Congo and preventing that resource-rich African country from cascading into the security nightmare that it has now become for Africa and the rest of the world.

⁴ K. Nkrumah, *The United Nations in the Congo: A Quest for Peace*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962; J. Boulden, *Peace enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia and Bosnia*, (1st ed.) West port, Connecticut: Praeger, 2001; K. A. Spooner, *Canada, the Congo Crisis and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-1964*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009; E. M. Davis, "The United States and the Congo, 1960 – 1965: Containment, Minerals and Strategic Location", Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Master of Arts degree in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky, 2013; D. Robarge. "*CIA's covert operation in the Congo, 1960 – 1968: Insights from newly declassified documents*", *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 58, No. 3, September 2014

What is the third reason for celebrating this great friend of Africa called Dag Hammarskjold? It is that the latter part of his tenure as the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), was committed to putting the UN Security Council under a great pressure to seek means of upholding the principles of the UN Charter and safeguarding human rights in the Union of South Africa. He wanted to put an end to apartheid in South Africa. Towards attaining this goal, he held six different meetings with Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd in South Africa. He did not achieve much⁵ in this direction but succeeded in galvanizing the interest of African states to continue the struggle. To this extent he could be said to have contributed significantly to the political transition witnessed in South Africa in the early 1990s.

The foregoing presents Dag Hammarskjold as the father of peacebuilding in Africa. It is interesting to note that the government and good people of Sweden have continued in this tradition by supporting peacebuilding projects across the African continent. The country currently contributes to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. Several African scholars, including Ibadan colleagues, benefit from the training programmes and fellowships organized by Swedes institutions. Several African non-governmental organization also get their funding from Sweden. I can also speak authoritatively on this matter as the immediate past Board Chairman of the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) – a regional non-governmental organisations that received substantial funding from Sweden. KAIPTC ranks amongst the African institutions that derive some of their funding from the Swedes.

It is interesting to note that the 2013 Kofi Annan-Dag Hammarskjold lecture, delivered by Ellen Margreth, was on “Peacebuilding in Africa: Perspectives and Challenges”. The topic is almost the same with mine which is “Regional engagement in peacebuilding in Africa: Perspectives and Challenges”. The two lectures are on “peacebuilding”. What has simply been added to the 2013 title to produce mine is “regional engagement”. By this is meant how the African Union and the sub-regional organisations in Africa (RECs) contribute to the peacebuilding processes in the African continent. This kind of intervention is rooted in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

The need to strengthen this approach to ensuring global peace and security is emphasized by a number of reviews done on UN operations most especially in 2015. These include the work of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) of June 2015 on the current state of UN peace operations⁶;

⁵ See Tor Sellstrom, “Hammarskjold and apartheid South Africa: Mission unaccomplished”, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Volume 11 Number 1, 2011 pp. 35-62

⁶ See UN, Uniting Our Strengths for Peace – Politics, Partnerships, and People: Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2015), <http://futurepeaceops.org/project/uniting-our-strengths-for-peace-politics-partnerships-and-people-report-of-the-high-level-independent-panel-on-united-nations-peace-operations-2015/>

the 2015 review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture⁷ and a Global study on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security⁸. All of these reviews suggest that past efforts are not sufficient for dealing with the emerging security threats in the modern world. They called attention to the need for more emphasis on peacebuilding activities.

In dealing with issues relating to regional engagement with peacebuilding in Africa, the critical role of the UN Peacebuilding Commission must be underscored and the point must be made that Kofi Annan was the prime force behind the establishment of the Commission in 2005. The lesson provided to the world in this respect is that a conflict society does not automatically return to sustainable peace at the end of a peacekeeping operation. What is attained at the end of such a mission is what Galtung called “negative peace” (namely the peace secured through the use of force). What keeps a society on the other hand is “positive peace” (the peace secured through the removal of the root causes of conflict) and that is what peacebuilding efforts try to provide. What is required here is to work towards removing the root causes of conflict.

Understanding Peacebuilding

The use of the term “peacebuilding” was popularized by the former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali in his widely cited “An Agenda for Peace” published in 1992. In it, the term was defined as “action to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” A number of scholars and policy makers have refined this definition in different ways. For example, Reyhler and Paffenholz observed that the:

... aim of peacebuilding is to transform conflicts constructively and to create a sustainable peace environment. Transforming a conflict goes beyond problem solving or managing a conflict. It addresses all the major components of the conflict: fixing the problems, which threatened the core interests of the parties; changing the strategic thinking; and changing the opportunity structure and the ways of interacting...The term peacebuilding refers to all the efforts required on the way to the creation of a sustainable peace zone; imagining a peaceful future, conducting an overall needs assessment, developing a coherent peace plan, and designing an effective implementation of the plan⁹.

⁷ See <http://reliefweb.int/report/world/challenge-sustaining-peace-report-review-un-peacebuilding-architecture>;

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ZIF_kompakt_PBA_Review.pdf

⁸ For a summary of the outcomes see

<http://www.lse.ac.uk/WomenPeaceSecurity/pdf/2016/0310UNWomen.pdf>

⁹ Luc Reyhler and Thania Paffenholz, “Preface”, in Luc Reyhler and Thania Paffenholz (eds.), *Peace-building: A field guide* Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001 p. 12

In his own work, John Paul Lederach argues that the term "peacebuilding" involves a wide range of activities that both precede and follow formal peace accords. Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage or a condition. It is dynamic social construct"¹⁰

It is my goal in this lecture to look at peacebuilding from three related angles. I see it as (i) a mandate of the United Nations and by implications continental and regional organisations (ii) a task that policy makers must accomplish and (iii) a thing that citizens must practice on daily basis in whatever society they find themselves.

Critical Questions in Peacebuilding

This paper approaches issues of "perspectives to peacebuilding" from three angles namely (i) when to do peacebuilding – sequence (ii) how to do peacebuilding - approach and (iii) who to do peacebuilding - actors.

Sequence: The emphasis here is on time element in peacebuilding. This takes us back to the ripeness debate in peace and security study¹¹. When is a conflict ripe enough for intervention? At what time should peacebuilding be done? The "when" perspective has three aspects: (i) should the intervention come at the latent stage of the conflict in the form of preventive diplomacy involving putting in place diplomatic, economic development, social, educational, health, legal and security measures addressing potential sources of instability and violence? (ii) should the peacebuilding come during the violent conflict with a view to reducing its adverse effects on the population? Or (iii) should it be done after the cessation of hostility in the form disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, reconciliation and rebuilding governmental, economic and civil society institutions.

Approach: What should be the issues in the peacebuilding engagement? Several scholars, institutions and agencies have suggested different approaches to peacebuilding. Time would not permit a review of these approaches here. It is more useful to go straight to the model favoured by this paper. It is the approach recommended by James Notter and Louise Diamond in which attention is called to three types of peacebuilding: (i) political peacebuilding, (ii) structural

¹⁰ Paul Lederach, "Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies", Washington DC: US Institute for Peace Press, 1997 pp. 84-85.

¹¹ See Jeffrey Z. Rubin, "The Timing of Ripeness and the Ripeness of Timing," in Louis Kriesberg & Stuart J. Thorson (eds.), *Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts*, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991, pp. 237-246; Marieke Kleiboer, "Ripeness of conflict: A fruitful notion?", *Journal of Peace Research*, Volume 31 Number 1, 1994 pp. 109-116; Landon, E. Hancock, "To act or wait: A two-stage view of ripeness", *International Studies Perspectives*, Volume 2 Issue 2, 2001 pp. 195-205.

peacebuilding, and (iii) social peacebuilding¹². For our context, political peacebuilding has to do with putting in place a political and legal system supportive of sustainable peace and development. On the other hand structural peacebuilding has to do with managing the structure of the society in a manner that could ensure inclusivity whether at social, economic, political or gender level. Social peacebuilding on the other hand has to do with building or rebuilding relationships at the different strata of the society. It has to do with connecting people.

Actors: Who should carry out the peacebuilding activities and who should benefit from it? This question “who should do the work” calls attention to the role of four possible actors or stakeholders: (i) intergovernmental organisations such as the UN, AU, ECOWAS etc (ii) governmental organisations (iii) non-governmental organisations, (iv) and (v) individuals. Inclusivity is the golden rule of any effective peacebuilding project. It must be done in a manner that benefits everybody across the different strata of the society and should not exclude anybody.

Peacebuilding in Africa: Perspectives

Our preferred approach in this lecture is to look at peacebuilding in Africa as an activity to be done in the entire life cycle of a conflict – pre-conflict, conflict and post conflict. It should not be something done only in post conflict situations. It should not be an afterthought but a deliberate policy of intergovernmental, governmental and national organisations as well as non-governmental agencies. The focus is on political, structural and social peacebuilding with emphasis on the role of stakeholders at regional and sub-regional levels. However, the point has to be made that peacebuilding is not something actually done by the AU at Addis Ababa; it is not what ECOWAS does in Abuja. It is something that has to be done at the grassroots level. Hence, the role of national stakeholders would be factored into our analysis. In this context, peacebuilding must be done in a coordinated manner that integrate all stakeholders but must have an inclusive national ownership and done within realistic time line.

It is necessary here to acknowledge the centrality of the UN Peacebuilding Commission as our global framework of analysis. Before the Commission was established, the global community was stuck in a discourse where military robustness was treated as the only or most important benchmark for success in international peace and security. In other words, the Commission emerged from

¹² James Notter and Louise Diamond, *Building peace and transforming conflict: Multi-track diplomacy in practice*, Occasional Paper Number 7A, Washington DC: The Institute for Multi-track Diplomacy, October 1996 pp. 4-7

the frustrations witnessed by the world from the rising number, cost, complexity and unforeseen consequences of UN peacekeeping operations around the world.

However, the idea of having the Commission does not mark the end of peacekeeping but among other things sees the latter as just a phase in bringing peace to a divided society. Peacekeeping brings an end to a state of hostility while peacebuilding pursues the objective of long term peace and development in the society. In this context, the objectives of the UN Peacebuilding Commission include the responsibility to:

- bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;
- focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;
- provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations,
- develop best practices, help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and,
- extend the period of attention given by the international community to post conflict recovery¹³.

Flowing from the foregoing is the position that peacebuilding could be done at three levels in Africa (the regional, national and local levels). The regional approach, which is the focus of this lecture, has to do with the interventions of the African Union often in partnership with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

Our strongest justification for regional approach to peacebuilding is that most of the violent conflicts in Africa are cross-border in nature and impact. Today's conflict actors have supporters in communities across sovereign borders. Such support comes from shared ethnic identities and value systems. The free flow of surplus arms and light weapons support a healthy relationship between different levels of conflict actors.

¹³ Sarah Hearn, Alejandra Kubitschek Bujones, and Allischa Kugel, *The United Nations "Peacebuilding Architecture: Past, present and future"*, New York University: Center on International Cooperation, May 2014, http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/un_peace_architecture.pdf

This Responding to the situations compels different forms of regional response mechanisms with each of them encapsulating some important policy documents and public statements. Four of these mechanisms are:

1. The African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA);
2. The African Union Post Conflict Reconstruction Framework;
3. Agenda 2063: The Africa we want
4. Silencing the Guns by 2020

[1] African Union Peace and Security Architecture: APSA is based on the principle of "African solutions to African problems". This refers to the commitment of African leaders to taking the lead in dealing with the conflicts in Africa as different from the past tradition of waiting for outsiders to do the job. The key components of the peace architecture of APSA consists of a (i) Peace and Security Council, (ii) an African Standby Force, (iii) a Continental Early Warning System, (iv) a Panel of the Wise and (v) an AU Peace Funds.

All of these components, including the African Standby Force (a peacekeeping institution) are all aimed at building peace in Africa. However, I will limit my discussion to two of the components, which are most directly related to peacebuilding objectives. These are (i) the continental early warning system which is expected to regularly monitor the conflict situations around the continent for timeous interventions and (ii) the panel of the wise which is expected to lead the non-adversarial conflict interventions using negotiation, conciliation, or mediation methods. Where the two systems are efficiently operational, there is supposed to be less violent conflicts around the continent.

Operationally, the early warning system of the African Union is dependent on the early warning system of the RECs. The RECs collect their EW data from the member states, process them and share them with the AU at the continental level. The RECs also have bodies that look like the African Unions Panel of the Wise. For example that of ECOWAS is known as the Council of the Wise (CoW).

[2] AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy (PCRD)

A major shortcoming of APSA is that it does not have strong provisions for post conflict peacebuilding. The peace agreements ending many of the conflicts are only interested in making the belligerents end their hostilities. More often than not the root causes of the conflicts are not attended to. Hence, many of the violent conflicts in the continent continued to have negative impacts on socioeconomic development despite the peace agreements ending them. To fill this gap in Africa's peacebuilding efforts, the AU had to develop its policy on post-conflict reconstruction in 2006 based on some provisions of APSA and the experience gained in managing crises in Africa since the time of the Organisation of African

Unity (OAU). The policy has contributed significantly towards building peace in post conflict states across Africa. The benefitting states include Central African Republic (2006), Liberia and Sierra Leone (2009), Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi (2010), and Sudan (2011). The post conflict reconstruction needs of these countries were assessed and some interventions were carried out within the limits of the resources available to the AU.

[3] Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want

Beyond APSA and PCRD, the AU commits the African continent to a number of special intervention projects and programmes such as NEPAD, Africa Peer Review Mechanisms and the like. But the most ambitious peacebuilding agenda of the continental body is encapsulated in a document tagged "Agenda 2063: The Africa we want". The core aspiration of this document on Africa's next 50 years is that by 2063 African countries will be amongst the best performers in global quality of life measures in terms of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights and rule of law; ethical practices, economic soundness, and environmental safety. The realization of this goal is to be pursued by Africa and her Diaspora¹⁴.

[4] "Silencing the Guns by 2020"

While celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the Organization of African Union/African Union in May 2013, African heads of state adopted a landmark declaration now known as "Silencing the Guns by 2020". By this the African leaders committed themselves to breaking the vicious cycle of violent conflict to which many African countries are trapped. Specifically, this initiative targets ensuring that the future generation in Africa does not witness the burden of violent conflicts now prevalent across the continent. With a view to attaining this goal, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) at its 649th meeting held on 16 January 2017 considered the Draft African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by the year 2020. The AU Commission has also published the APSA Roadmap 2016-2020 as a strategic step towards building on the achievements and challenges resulting from the implementation of the 2013 initiatives.

Regional Milestones

The foregoing shows the efforts being made by the AU, supported by the RECs, in walking the talk of "African solution to African problems". A lot has been done towards accomplishing the objectives of the initiatives. The boldest of the efforts is probably the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This peace mission had to be initiated by the AU when it became obvious that the UN would not help Africa in dealing with failed state syndrome in Somalia. The mission has succeeded, amongst other things, in taming the Al Shabaab that has made the country ungovernable for quite some time. It also continues to provide guidance

¹⁴ For a copy of this document see <http://archive.au.int/assets/images/agenda2063.pdf>

on capacity building, and sensitization of communities in countering violent extremism as part of the larger strategies of rebuilding the country. Though Al Shabaab is still active, AMISOM and Somali forces have been able to recapture majority of the occupied territories. Is this sustainable? The answer is a categorical "NO". There is no peace to keep in Somalia. The rebels in the country has an elastic capacity for trouble making and the AU does not have the financial resources for an indefinite peacekeeping operation in the country. I foresee the AU winding down AMISOM soon.

AU's success stories in Somalia so far are as significant for Africa as the Regional Cooperation initiative for the elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA) deployed by the AU to counter the operations of the Lord Resistance Army in Northern Uganda and other neighboring countries like south Sudan, DRC, CAR etc. The influence of the RCI-LRA has limited the activities of the group in the region with some of its leaders absconding from the theater of operations.

The regional body also supports the ongoing operations against the Boko haram in the Lake Chad Basin Commission area by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF). The AU has also continued to prevent post election violence around the continent by deploring observer missions to every country conducting elections in the continent. Through these missions several completion conflict situations have been arrested with the support of RECs. The AU has continued to intervene in Member States at risk of conflict or coming out of conflict using a number of strategies deriving from its toolbox that include the continental early warning system, the Panel of the wise, Special Envoys, and ad hoc mediation panels. These innovations and creative problem solving initiatives are made possible by the support from the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and different bilateral partners.

The Challenges of Peacebuilding

The foregoing shows that Africa is never found wanting in drafting sound policy documents. However, the nature and consequences of the crisis situations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Somalia, Sahel/Mali, South Sudan, Burundi, Guinea Bissau, Libya among others suggests that Africa has problem translating the ideas in these documents to actionable outcomes. It is one thing for the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to claim to have good intentions and some capacity to end the problems; it is another to see the capacity being demonstrated in situations of nagging problems. In other words, APSA, PCRDR, Agenda 2063, Silencing the guns by 2020 cannot translate themselves into any peaceful outcomes except Africans leaders have the political will, strong institutions and resources for driving the processes.

All of these frameworks and a few others were put in place because there are too many conflicts in Africa to be managed. These problems include border conflicts, secessionist and separatist conflicts, major episodes of national violence (riots, massacres, etc.), home grown terrorism, and proxy wars against the interests of the developed world in Africa. Africa lacks much of what it takes to manage these kinds of violent episodes. Hence, while new problems are being added to the list the old conflicts are not getting away but rather their scales are being expanded. Hence, the problems in Congo that Dag Hammarskjold spent his entire tenure as the Secretary General of the UN trying to manage is still there today and indeed in an escalated dimension¹⁵. Nigeria fought a civil war from 1967 to 1970. The separatist agenda of the Biafrans that fought Nigeria at this time is still much active in the country today. Two groups drive it: (i) the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and (ii) Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Few years ago, I published a paper on the Dagbon crisis in Ghana¹⁶, which dates back to the 1960s. The crisis is still there today. In other words, the challenge of peacebuilding in Africa is quite daunting.

The emerging picture in the continent, most especially with the implementation of APSA and its related structures by the RECs is a mixed grill. The most coherent of the stories are embodied in the mediation and conciliation efforts around the continent. At the continental level, the role of the AU at promoting dialogue in Burundi and South Sudan has continued to meet with failure. Innocent lives are still lost in the country with little hope for the future. In the West African sub-region, the ECOWAS Commission succeeded in facilitating the Mali Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of March 1, 2015 that preserves the national sovereignty of the country, its territorial integrity, secular and republican nature of the country as stated in the country's constitution. The AU, UN, ECOWAS and the EU have been working together for the implementation and this and other related peace agreements. But Mali is today a country still at war.

The 2016 Conakry agreement and the mediation efforts of ECOWAS in Guinea Bissau are yet to end the political deadlock in the country. The country has remained in political paralysis since August 2015. The AU has continued to push the parties to the crisis in Burundi towards a dialogue. But the work is not producing any serious results. The situation in South Sudan is not different. Stopping the spiral of violence in the country has proved very difficult to achieve.

¹⁵ Kevin Dunn, *Imagining the Congo: The international relations of identity*, London, Routledge, 2003.

¹⁶ Isaac Olawale Albert, "From 'Owo crisis' to 'Dagbon dispute': Lessons in the politicization of chieftaincy disputes in modern Nigeria and Ghana", *The Roundtable: Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 97 No. 394, 2008 pp.47-60

Let me throw some pebbles in the pool as a way of calling deeper attention to some of the challenges of peacebuilding in Africa. The first case to be cited is how the AU and ECOWAS have poorly responded to the Boko haram crisis in the Lake Chad Basin, most especially Nigeria. The crisis started in Nigeria in 2002 and became a classical example of an African homegrown terrorism in 2009. We wrote our first paper on this problem in 2004¹⁷. The focus of the paper was on how the politicians in Borno state were arming criminal gangs, known then as "ECOMOGs", to kill and harm their opponents. Their political godfathers later abandoned them. Some of them later joined another round of boys that were being radicalized by Muhammed Yusuf, the founder of the Boko haram movement. They were taught to believe that western civilization is responsible for the social, economic and political problems around them. Our paper warned about the impending problems but the lessons were not taken.

Our paper could have been taken as an early warning system by Nigeria and those truly interested in early warning system in Africa. The federal government did not see any need to come in with any peacebuilding plan. Even when Yusuf was killed in 2009, not much came from the FGN. No comments from ECOWAS or AU. The UN was quiet. While CNN reported the problem to show that a global terrorist threat existed in Nigeria, Al Jazeera reported the excesses of the Nigerian security system in dealing with the Boko haram members.

When Boko haram started to kill in different parts of northern Nigeria, there was no meaningful ECOWAS or AU intervention. Instead all African countries tightened their border security most especially against Nigerians. As I travel round the continent, I asked academic colleagues and friends working with NGOs to tell me why Nigeria did not receive any help. The first answer is that Nigeria never asked for it. The second is that Nigeria is too big to be assisted. A Senegalese colleague told me "No country in West Africa can intervene in a Nigeria's conflict as Nigeria did in Liberia and Sierra Leone". He was referring here to the financial and human commitments of Nigeria to ECOMOG operations.

However, military intervention is not the only available option for providing assistance to Nigeria. APSA and the ECOWAS conflict management frameworks provide for an early warning system and a Panel of the Wise (for AU) and a Council of the Wise (for ECOWAS). As Nigeria battles Boko haram, the question asked by students of peace and conflict studies is "where is the Panel of the Wise promised by the African Union and where is ECOWAS Council of Wise". This question would

¹⁷ Isaac Olawale Albert and Nathaniel D. Danjibo, "Borno: Fitting the designs of political elite", in Adefemi V. Isumonah (ed.), *Participatory Democracy and Good Governance in Nigeria*, Ibadan: Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies, 2004, pp.19-37.

continue to be asked in the context of what President Ben Bella considered to be the core function of the AU's Panel of the Wise. He said:

Our common wish is that wherever we may be called on to intervene, the Panel of the Wise will be prepared to lend its interlocutors the benefit of the ancestral African values of wisdom and dialogue, and ensure that peaceful solutions prevail, regardless of the nature of the crisis or conflict. This is an essential element for any effective enterprise aimed at resolving peace and security issues arising in our continent, and also an important step for the essential work of reconciliation, be it at national level or between countries in disagreement¹⁸.

ECOWAS Council of the Wise operates like the AU Panel of the Wise. The philosophical inspiration for establishing and framing the system was drawn from the age-long tradition of the elderly in the society ensuring that law and order does not breakdown. The typical African Council of Elders does not wait to be invited to intervene in a conflict. Once it notices a problem it quickly moves in to help the parties resolve their differences.

Unable to get strong support from the AU to deal with the Boko haram crisis, Member states of the Lake Chad Basin decided to form a Multinational Joint Task Force for dealing with a problem that was gradually making their part of the world perpetually unsafe. It is indeed a good initiative that the rest of the continent must learn from. The intervention enjoys the support of the AU but it ought to have come earlier in the cycle of the Boko haram crisis. Even now, the intervention faces a number of operational challenges due to mutual suspicion by the participating countries of Nigeria, Cameroun, Chad and Niger. This notwithstanding, the Boko haram crisis has started to show signs of abatement. Some post conflict reconstruction projects are ongoing in the North east of Nigeria and the other countries. To what extent are the AU and affected RECs participating in these projects?

If the big size of Nigeria is the reason for the country's inability to get support from regional bodies in Africa whether militarily or through the mediation for dealing with the Boko haram crisis, what should be said about the small size the Gambia whose problems were not attended to by ECOWAS and AU until it was almost too late?

¹⁸ A statement President Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria cited in T. Murithi and C. Mwaure, "The Panel of the Wise", in U Engel and J. Gomes Porto (eds.), *Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting norms and institutionalising solutions*, Surrey: Ashgate Publishers, 2010 p. 81

Yahya Jammeh's Gambia was a time bomb that every student of peace studies saw coming. It was a disaster waiting to happen. The only difficulty was that nobody knew when it would happen and in what magnitude. The Gambian leader who came to power by a coup in 1994 was in power for over 22 years during which he had a fierce reputation for locking up, torturing or executing his critics. But nobody was ready to dare the Gambian leader until he lost the December 1 2016 election to the opposition leader, Adama Barrow. This triggered weeks of tension in Gambia as Jammeh threatened not to hand over power to the opposition leader. He left office only after West African leaders deployed troops to Gambia that were poised to use military force to oust Jammeh. The troops are still in the country trying to stabilize it.

Why did it take ECOWAS and AU so long to tame Jammeh? If the big size of Nigeria was the problem with building peace around the Boko haram crisis, was the small size of Gambia also a threat to peacebuilding in Africa?

Another issue that should be critically underscored in this kind of paper is the ongoing xenophobia in South Africa. The AU is yet to come up with a framework for responding to the issue. The analysis of it by scholars and the opinions about it in the popular media is misleadingly reductionist. The situation is better understood if we replace the term "xenophobia" with "insider Afrophobia". By this is meant the hatred of Africans by fellow Africans. This is to be contrasted with "outsider Afrophobia" which refers to the hatred of Africans by outsiders. Africans do not hate non-Africans but fellow outsiders. Evidence on this abounds around Africa beyond the shopworn discourse on the xenophobia in South Africa.

In South Sudan, economic migrants from Uganda, largely petty traders, battle xenophobia. They are harassed by the police, arrested and serially brutalized. They are accused of taking local jobs. Kenyans face a similar problem in South Sudan. Some of them get killed. On the other hand, Kenya hosts a large number of South Sudan refugees. No discrimination against them and no effort by Kenyans to abuse the South Sudanese in their midst. What makes the experiences of the Kenyans so unique is that Kenya served as a mediator and guarantor in the 2005 peace deals that led to the 2011 Comprehensive peace agreement, which paved the way for the 2011 referendum.

However, the foregoing does not necessarily make Kenya a country of saints when it comes to the issue of Afrophobia. The Somali Kenyans, constituting about 6% of the Kenyan population, are constantly under security threats. Despite the collective mantra that all Kenyans are equal, the Somali Kenyans are treated like second-class citizens since the 1960s. The situation is worse since the war against Al Shabab. Those in charge of the counterterrorism operation against the Al-Shabab often visit their angers on the Somali-Kenyans. They are randomly

arrested and detained in inhumane and degrading camps and sometimes told they are not Kenyans¹⁹. The Liberian crisis and the ivorite crisis in Cote d'Ivoire all had to do with discrimination against "outsiders". The Janjawid crisis in Sudan is a form of xenophobia. The Arab group and its leadership are believed to be pursuing the agenda of wiping out African tribes in Darfur. We are calling attention to this problem just to show that we have more problems of peacebuilding in this regard than we seem ready to acknowledge. African leaders must find a good solution to the problem of insider Afrophobia to get the rest of the world to treat Africans well outside the continent. Africans cannot hate themselves and expect the rest of the world to love and respect them.

Those engaged in either xenophobia or Afrophobia must be condemned. If Africa must integrate freedom of the African peoples must be guaranteed. But the continent cannot deal with the problem through the prevailing simplistic and monocausal understanding of the situation. There is the need to get closer to those responsible for the problems to understand their perspectives multidimensionally. Why do they do what they do? What do they want? The answer we get would enable African leaders to package actionable solution to the problem.

Trust is needed for making sense of any peacebuilding work. A major challenge to peacebuilding in Africa is that the African leaders that are supposed to be driving the process are not trusted by the people. These leaders have a weak link with the people in terms of the processes bringing them to office. Some promote horizontal inequality with state power by working exclusively for their ethnic or religious groups. Some steal state resources meant for improving the living standards of the people. In the process, they damage their personal credibility. Once the personal credibility of a leader is doubted by the people, it becomes difficult for such a leader to have a regime with sound institutional credibility. How then can they be relied upon to drive the regional peacebuilding agenda?

There are two basic strategies for dealing with trust issues that African state officials face in conflict prevention and management. The first is for these state officials to come terms with the fact that they are not trusted and start doing something about the problem. The second option is for African state officials to show interest in being linked with the society through civil society organisations doing peacebuilding work. It is unfortunate that African state officials hardly appreciate the work of CSOs. The CSOs rely on foreign agencies to fund their

¹⁹ Ahmednasir Abdullahi, "Kenyan Somalis are treated like second-class citizens", Daily Nation (Kenya), April 12, 2014; Jason Patinkin, "Somalis in Kenya face mistrust", The Christian Science Monitor, June 17, 2014; Malkhadir Muhumed, "Cracking down on Nairobi's Somalis", Aljazeera, 22 April 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/04/cracking-down-nairobi-somalis-201442012628685801.html>

projects. Even when invited to peacebuilding meetings African state officials hardly come except some roles are carved out for them to make speeches at opening and closing ceremonies. They are hardly ready to be part of the constructive engagements with the people through the CSOs. Most CSO organisations doing peacebuilding work in Africa face this problem. It borders them much as some of their interventions require state support most especially at implementation stages.

This lecture would be incomplete if it says nothing about the decision of African countries to exit from ICC. The position of some African states, including Sudan, South Africa and Burundi, is that the ICC is an imperialist court bent on demonizing and hunting African leaders. Kofi Annan considers this position to be dangerous; it would achieve nothing other than enabling the mounting heinous crimes in Africa to go unpunished. He acknowledged the fact that nine of the 10 cases taken to the court involved former African rulers but observed that the court has also opened investigations in Georgia and is conducting preliminary examinations in Afghanistan, Columbia, Ukraine, Iraq and Palestine. He punctured the argument that African leaders were dragged to ICC with a view to humiliating them. He observed that "Of the nine investigations on the African continent, eight were requested by African states. Six African states referred their own situation to the ICC, and African states voted in support of the UN Security Council referrals on Darfur and Libya"²⁰. According to him, "Kenya was the only case in Africa opened independently by the court, but it enjoyed the enthusiastic support of a majority of Kenyans. They wanted justice for the 1,300 people killed and hundreds of thousands displaced in election-related violence...ICC remains the continent's most credible court of last resort for the most serious crimes ... [It] does not supplant national jurisdictions; it only intervenes in cases where the country concerned is either unable or unwilling to try its own citizens"²¹." The outcome of a study in Kenya supports Kofi Annan's position that Kenyans were not opposed to the intervention of the court in the election violence in their country. It observed that "the ordinary Kenyans aren't as convinced that the ICC is biased against Africa as some African leaders would have us believe. That's what we found by conducting a public opinion survey in 2015. And here's what's most significant: Kenyan victims, who suffered or witnessed violence in their country, are far less likely to believe the ICC is biased against Africa"²².

²⁰ Patrick Wintour, "African exodus from ICC must be stopped says Kofi Annan", The Guardian (London), 18 November 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/18/african-exodus-international-criminal-court-kofi-annan>

²¹ Patrick Wintour, "African exodus from ICC must be stopped says Kofi Annan", The Guardian (London), 18 November 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/18/african-exodus-international-criminal-court-kofi-annan>

²² Tessa Alleblas, Eamon Aloyo, Goff Dancy and Yvonne Dutton, "Is the International Criminal Court biased against Africans? Kenyan victims don't think so", The Washington Post, March 6, 2017,

One is also struck by the argument of African leaders on this matter. The argument is not that African leaders did not commit the crimes that took them to ICC. It is that only African leaders with such criminal records are taken there. This kind of argument can only be coming from a continent that is probably not prepared for the promotion of global justice, democracy and respect for human rights. ICC prosecutors only intervene in what is considered as “gravest” or most violent conflict situations in which it has jurisdictions; it is a court of last resort when political leaders fail to deal with international crimes in their respective countries. The more African leaders are alive to their responsibility of dealing with such issues at domestic level, the more ICC would have to look elsewhere for those to try at Hague. The point one is trying to make by circumlocution here is that ICC is probably not the problem; the problem is that African leaders are not doing enough to build peace in Africa. If things get better, the world would stop demonizing the continent and its leadership.

There are two other challenges of regional peacebuilding in Africa that must be underscored by this presentation. These are the poor treatment of women issues in peacebuilding and the problem of getting sufficient financial resources for executing peacebuilding projects.

There is a plethora of empirical evidence pointing to the fact that men’s experiences in conflict situations are different from men’s reality. Poor acceptance of this reality makes women and girls the worst sufferers of every Africa conflict. Their social, economic and political conditions are often worsened by every conflict. During the conflicts, they are subjected to sexual violence, widowed, have their children forcefully conscripted into fighting forces, and displaced sometimes across international borders without any meaningful support services. Yet, they are excluded from peace processes in terms of participation as peacemakers or envoys and inclusion of women’s issues in the peace agenda. This issue needs to be given better attention by the AU and RECs as part of their larger agenda of making the African continent to become more peaceful. The entry point to such intervention is the UNSCR 1325, which underscores the need to engender conflict management processes around the world.

The last and yet the most important issue to be raised in this segment of the lecture is the financial problems associated with regional peacebuilding in Africa. AU lacks sufficient funds for doing all it promises to do. The RECs face a similar problem. To this extent, the regional peacebuilding in Africa is donor dependent. Only what can be funded from outside Africa is done. This weakens the ownership of the projects and the processes for implementing them. Though some of the

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/06/is-the-international-criminal-court-biased-against-africans-kenyan-victims-dont-think-so/?utm_term=.d21328123d0b

donors have shown flexibility in their support regimes, the fact remains that the present system around Africa is unsustainable and adequate for a continent that seeks to “silence guns” in 2020.

Options for the Future

Africa should be inspired and not discouraged by the challenges mentioned above. It should imagine the entire world going through a compelling process of transformation. It is in this context that the UN Peacebuilding Architecture was reviewed in 2015. The lesson here is that a lot of more efforts must be put into the implementation of peacebuilding agenda globally. The first thing to realize in this context is that peacebuilding is not necessarily what the UN does in New York; what the AU does in Addis Ababa or what ECOWAS does in Abuja. It is about collaborative efforts at touching the grassroots people. It is about sustainable development. Hence, what should concern us here is how global and regional organizations are able to motivate African leaders to prevent future crisis, manage the ongoing ones creatively, and put in place sound structures and mechanisms for post conflict peacebuilding. The end game is what we see and feel at the grassroots level.

In other words, we need a more nuanced approach to the discussion of our subject matter. What do we see on the ground in different parts of Africa and what do they tell us about the quality of peacebuilding across the continent? Africa is an interesting paradox: a continent blessed with vast human and material resources but the poorest of the continents of the world.

Across the African continent, people see increasing cases of youth bulge and unemployment; we see increased violent extremism over religious, ethnic and economic issues; we see cases of African politicians that profess democracy but are not willing to live by its tenets of transparency and accountability. We see many young Africans turning to situational and career criminality largely because they see too little hope around them. We see a frightening dimension of brain drain to the developed world by professionals. Those with less attractive qualifications literally swim across the Mediterranean to southern parts of Europe. They overstay their visas around the world. Those left within the continent become cannon fodders of armed conflicts. What people see around Africa is that the African Union and the RECs in Africa have more work to do at making Africa become a peace haven.

The point made above is that peacebuilding is about sustainable peace. It is not about misleading political rhetoric or idle political gerrymandering. What roles should the African Union and the six RECs in Africa play for making it possible? What supportive roles can other regions of the world, most especially, the EU play at making it possible? In answering these questions, one is guided by the five core

issues coming out of the reviews done by the UN in 2015. It is that the peacebuilding agenda in Africa, like the rest of the world, should be guided by the following emphases: (i) Support to basic safety and security (ii) political processes (iii) provision of basic services (iv) restoration of core government functions and (v) economic revitalization²³. The five core activities could be carried out in the three cycles of a peacebuilding process: at the pre-conflict level (preventive diplomacy), during the conflict, and at the post conflict level.

Support to basic safety and security: The AU and RECs must play a more meaningful role at putting in place structures that lead to the reduction of tensions in Africa. The first responsibility here is the activation of the Standby Forces promised by the AU and RECs. There must be the development collaborative frameworks for controlling the flow of illicit arms that goad groups into taking up arms against the people. The other issues to be addressed include mine action, protection of civilians; disarmament, demobilization, reintegration; strengthening rule of law and initiation of security sector reform. The second responsibility here is to strengthen the capacity of the African Unions Panel of the Wise and ECOWAS Council of the Wise to be able to secure ceasefires in situations of existing armed conflicts.

Political processes: Peacebuilding efforts in Africa would fail unless the AU, RECs and African national leaders give attention to addressing governance challenges crucial to their implementation. These include the conduct of credible elections, inclusive political and economic systems, transparency and accountability by leaders, more responsible response to the problem of climate change and environmental resource governance, gender equity, youth development, and education. In Kenya, for example, the country's electoral commission has a lot to do at winning back the confidence of the people. There is a great deal of mistrust in the country as the electoral body work towards the August 2017 elections. One of the urgent tasks before the Commission include having to clean up the voter register to remove nearly 80,000 duplicate voters from the election register²⁴.

Provision of basic services: To have sustainable peace in Africa, the people must be assured of basic social services such as water and sanitation, health and education. The return of displaced persons to their communities must be guaranteed.

²³ See UN Peacebuilding Fund, "What is peacebuilding", <http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/what-is-peacebuilding/#fn-1937->

²⁴ Mark Anderson, "There's been an element of mistrust", The Africa Report, No. 88, March 2017 pp. 40-41

Restoration of core government functions: This challenge is more evident in societies coming out of violent conflict. These include Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Somalia, the Gambia etc. To what extent have peacebuilding efforts worked in these countries in terms of restoration of basic public administration and public finance? These post conflict countries are largely driven by donors, most especially the UN and are therefore not sustainable. How ready are African leaders to take the front seat in driving the peacebuilding efforts of their country? For example, nobody can build peace in post-Jammeh Gambia as the newly elected President Adama Barrow who was overwhelmingly voted for by the people of his country. Now that the former President, Jammeh, has been removed from power and ECOWAS seemed to have slightly stepped back, the country is considered to be "virtually bankrupt"²⁵. Barrow must rise to the occasion of fixing the economic problems. The other problems he needs to attend to as a way of restoring democratic governance to the Gambia include high rate of youth unemployment, justice for victims of Jammeh's dictatorship, freeing the press, pursuing political and security sector reforms in the country²⁶.

Somalia is now blessed with a popular President, Mohammed Abdullahi Mohammed, who was swept to power on February 8 2017 on a campaign of "change". There is a high expectation from his regime, which has set for itself the agenda of making Somalia to be great once again. But his country is bedeviled by a long list of state building tasks that could backfire for the new leader of the conflict-prone country²⁷. His election was the people's reaction to the increasingly unpopular former president, Hassan Sheikh Mohammad. To make a difference, the new regime must fight corruption, invest more in defeating the Al Shabaab jihadist group, and pay thousands of Somalian public servants that have not been paid for almost a year. He must deal with the looming famine resulting from the severe drought in the country. He must finalise work on the country's constitution which would amongst other things provide actionable power sharing formula amongst the rival clans and political groupings in the country. Only few of these tasks would be achieved for him by any regional body; he is responsible for fixing his country.

Economic revitalization: The present state of the African economy is not such that can support a continent willing to silence guns by 2020. For now, there is a very high rate of youth unemployment across the continent. The African economy is too much dependent on the developed world: the US, Europe, and Asia (most

²⁵ Sheriff Bojang Jr, "Dawn of hope, justice and empty coffers", *New African*, March 2017 pp. 12-14

²⁶ Sheriff Bojang Jr, "Dawn of hope, justice and empty coffers", *New African*, March 2017 pp. 12-14; Boubacar Boris Diop, "After Jammeh", *New African*, March 2017 pp. 16-17

²⁷ Ilya Gridneff, "Mohammed Abdullahi Mohammed", *The Africa Report*, No. 88, March 2017, 16-17.

especially China and India). Trade between and among African states is very limited mainly because the countries are not linked by good network of roads, railways and infrastructure. African economic systems also lack diversification, productivity and well-functioning institutions. This situation must positively change in the spirit of AU's mantra of "African solutions to African problems". What is needed in this context is for the continent to set its own economic development agenda and drive the process by mobilizing and redistributing domestic resources based on some long term goals that reflect African ideals, values and aspiration. At regional level, four issues have to be given priority attention. These are skills development, intra-African trade, industrialization and free movement of people and goods.

The economic benefits of Africa's natural resources hardly flow through to the people and this explains the restiveness in some parts of the continent. Worried by the threatening effect of this problem on the goals of peace and security in Africa, Kofi Annan approached David Cameron in March 2013 to use Britain's chairmanship of the G8 to end what he called "unconscionable" practices of companies exploiting Africa's vast reserves of natural resources and giving too little back to the continent. Drawing from the Africa Progress Report²⁸ produced by the Africa Progress Panel which he chaired on how to promote sustainable development in Africa, Kofi Annan observed that "Africa loses twice as much in illicit financial outflows as it receives in international aid...It is unconscionable that some companies, often supported by dishonest officials, are using unethical tax avoidance, transfer pricing and anonymous company ownership to maximize their profits, while millions of Africans go without adequate nutrition, health and education".

However, there is too little African development partners can do to help Africa when African leaders themselves are not committed to transparency and accountability. Commenting on this issue, Kofi Annan said:

There is no substitute for public scrutiny in developing effective and equitable policies. African governments must rise to the challenges posed by fiscal policy, tax reform and the development of industrial policies. They must manage their countries' oil, gas and mining resources efficiently and share revenues fairly...For too long, African governments have been responding to externally driven transparency agendas. They have been following, not leading. And it is time to change this pattern. .. African governments should adopt legislation that requires companies bidding for concessions and licences to fully disclose their beneficial ownership. They

²⁸ See Africa Progress Panel, Equity in Extractives: Africa Progress Report 2013, http://www.africaprogresspanel.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/2013_APR_Equity_in_Extractives_25062013_ENG_HR.pdf

should institute transparent systems of auctions and competitive bidding for concessions and licences, as well as tax regimes that reflect both the real value of their countries' natural resource assets and the need to attract high quality investment.

With a lot of money accruing to African government coming from the foregoing, more enormous opportunity would be created for the African peoples to live more peacefully with one another. This would enable the government to invest their natural resource revenue in people, generating jobs and opportunities for millions in present and future generations?

Conclusion

I will conclude this lecture by asking a number of questions for us all to answer: How do we empower the AU and RECs in Africa to become more effective in peacebuilding? How do we deal with the issue of insider Afrophobia, which is now emerging as a serious threat across the continent? How do we manage the ongoing problem of lethal irregular migration to Europe through the Mediterranean? What can we do towards ensuring peaceful elections in Africa? How do we make the governance system in Africa to be more inclusive and by so doing reducing the chances of violent conflict across the continent? How do we curb corruption, which offers the biggest obstacles to unleashing the potential of Africa's new generations? How do we mainstream gender and youth development into our peacebuilding agenda? How do we get African states to establish a more organic relationship with civil society organisations? How do we get African business to be interested in funding peacebuilding? How do we keep alive discourses on peacebuilding in Africa? How do we make conflict prevention the core strategy for building peace in Africa?