Annual Review of Peace Support Operations in Africa

2016

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<td>AFD</td>
<td>Alliance of Democratic Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission in Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>AISA</td>
<td>African Institute of South Africa</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>APSTTA</td>
<td>African Peace Support Trainers Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUPSC</td>
<td>African Union Peace and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCCPA</td>
<td>Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution Peacekeeping</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFPCI</td>
<td>Coordination of Patriotic Women of Cote d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNC</td>
<td>National Coalition for Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMICCI</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Cote d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMPABB</td>
<td>Ecole de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin Beye</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDRE PSTC</td>
<td>Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Peace Support Training Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRCI</td>
<td>Forces Republicaines forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>Integrated Command Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPSTC</td>
<td>International Peace Support Training Centre</td>
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### Acronyms

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>National Defence College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization for African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKTC</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Training Centres</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNRRC</td>
<td>National Programme for Reintegration and Community Rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilians</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCI</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECs/RMs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC RPTC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Cooperation Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender Based Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>Training Centres</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCEs</td>
<td>Training Centres of Excellence</td>
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<tr>
<td>T/PCCs</td>
<td>Troop/Police Contributing Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFP</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOAU</td>
<td>United Nations Office to the African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operations in Cote d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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Africa is an important contributor of peacekeepers and a major theatre for United Nations (UN) and regional peace support operations (PSOs). According to the 2015 report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (also known as the HIPPO Report), about 62.5 percent of UN missions and 87 percent of all uniformed UN peacekeepers are located in Africa. The HIPPO report further indicates that more than 80 percent of the annual peacekeeping budget is also spent on missions in Africa. Undoubtedly, these statistics make the centrality of Africa for PSOs more evident, particularly when organizations like the African Union (AU) and its Regional Economic Communities are also conducting missions on the continent. The continent currently hosts nine of the sixteen UN missions worldwide and two missions by the AU in Somalia and the Economic Community of West African States in Guinea Bissau. Some of the current UN missions in Africa include the United Nations Mission in Liberia, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur, the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire, and the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan.

In spite of Africa’s dominance in both UN and regional peace support operations, there are few publications that serve as a one-stop reference material for policy-makers, academics, practitioners, trainers, students, and others interested in understanding the operations and activities of the various missions in Africa. It is in this light that I see this volume which seeks to provide a critical understanding and explanation of existing and past PSOs in Africa as a very bold endeavour by the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) to capture for posterity the operations of the various missions on the continent. The book looks specifically at the background to the missions, their mandates, operational issues and challenges, the mission statistics, exit strategies, and the policy dimensions of the missions. Lessons learned and best practices based on the critical analysis of empirical data are also provided to inform the planning and management of future operations.
Foreword

The 2016 maiden edition of the *Annual Review of Peace Support Operations in Africa* is intended to inform strategic and operational policymaking on PSOs as well as enable academics, trainers, and students of peace and security studies access information about these missions.

I therefore congratulate the editors, contributors, and reviewers for this excellent piece of work and commend the KAIPTC executive management and its partners for making this publication possible. I hope that all who read this book will have a better insight and understanding of how existing and past missions in Africa were and are being operationalized.

Air Vice Marshal Griffiths Santrofi Evans,
*Commandant*
*Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)*
INTRODUCTION

Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from traditional to multi-dimensional peace support operations (PSOs). Currently, PSOs constitute a perennial feature of international affairs and involve multiple actors, including the United Nations (UN), regional bodies and other multilateral actors. The contexts for intervention as well as the composition and mandates of the missions are diverse. Historically, Africa’s role in peacekeeping can be traced to the 1960s crisis in the Congo. Since then, the continent has continued not only to contribute immensely to PSOs, but it has also continued to serve as a theatre for such operations. A mention of a few will suffice: the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), and others.

This volume seeks to provide a critical understanding and explanation of existing and past PSOs across the continent. Further, it analyses the background to the missions and their mandates and how they are operationalized. The volume is intended to inform sound policymaking and enable students of conflict and security studies access information about these missions.

The sixteen chapters in the volume reflect the diverse nature of these missions and their challenges and successes. The thematic chapters also seek to bring the broader issues of peace and security in Africa into perspective. Section One, for example, considers the impact of emerging security challenges, such as terrorism and other transnational organized crimes in Africa and their consequences on peace operations in Africa. It also undertakes a study of the changing nature of peace operations in Africa, tracing the various generations of peacekeeping on the continent. It looks beyond the protection of civilians’ mandate, as issued by the UN Security Council, and examines the guidelines and policies that the UN has adopted over the years to operationalize this mandate.
Section Two gives an overview of past missions in Africa with a focus on Burundi and Liberia. Chapter Four of this section highlights the successes, challenges, and lessons learned from both African Union (AU) and UN missions, and prospects toward resolving the political crisis in Burundi. Chapter Five chronicles the various peace missions in Liberia while exhorting the country’s government to maintain the ongoing peace processes in the face of the UNMIL drawdown.

Section Three studies current missions in Africa. In Chapter Six the author argues that the Ivoirian crises was met with swift regional and international responses and in spite of several challenges, the mission has contributed to restoring peace and assisted in post-conflict recovery processes.

In Chapter Seven, the authors identify the hostile security environment, the persistent violation of ceasefire and peace agreements, the splintering of armed groups, human rights violations, weak state institutions, and the lack of cooperation from the local population as some of the challenges confronting the mission in Mali. They suggest that these have impacted on MINUSMA’s effectiveness in executing its mandate. Chapter Eight undertakes a review of AU and UN-mandated peace operations in Darfur, with a focus on the ongoing AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur. Chapter Nine posits that the world’s youngest country has suffered major setbacks to its political, economic, and protection agenda. In this chapter, the authors trace the history of South Sudan and the local security dynamics and developments that have led to a greater emphasis on the UN Mission in South Sudan’s protection mandate.

The author of Chapter Ten offers a review of AMISOM’s mandate, operations, and exit strategy, and puts forth that the AU is at a crossroads regarding the future of its interventions. Furthermore, UNSMIL’s peacebuilding efforts have been hampered by ideological divisions and the institutional crisis resulting from competing claims of legislative legitimacy, exacerbated by varied external interests. The author in Chapter Eleven therefore concludes that such divisions will continue to pose a challenge to the mission in its peacebuilding efforts and recommends an increased collaborative approach with key actors such as the AU in restoring peace to Libya. Chapter Twelve proposes that missions have contributed significantly to building peace in Guinea-Bissau, however the challenges facing the country require systemic reforms in the security, governance, and economic sectors to ensure long-term stability.

Section Four offers an in-depth analysis of the policy dimensions of PSOs. In this vein, Chapter Thirteen provides an overview of women in PSOs in Africa through an analysis of the evolution and current situation of women’s participation in PSOs in Africa and further highlights some challenges to women’s participation in peacekeeping and implications
for enhancing women’s participation in present and future PSOs in Africa. The fourteenth chapter of this book makes a case for an enhanced partnership with the AU and RECs if the UN is to address African peace and security problems effectively. Chapter Fifteen highlights the need for a systematic approach in dealing with the training requirements to meet current trends in PSOs in Africa. The final chapter looks at the development of the African Standby Force (ASF) vis-a-vis the future of PSOs in Africa. It further looks at the capability of the ASF to respond to security threats in Africa.

It is the expectation of the editors that this first volume will achieve its aim of being informative, providing policymakers with options, and practitioners with a further understanding of their roles within the complex peace and security environment in Africa.

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SECTION ONE

OVERVIEW
Fiifi Edu-Afful

Abstract

This chapter discusses the ebb and flow of empirical aspects of peace operations, specifically the interface between the changing nature of regional security and peace operations in Africa. This chapter considers the impact of emerging security challenges to peace operations in Africa with the aim of stimulating discussions on the changing security landscape and its intended and unintended consequences on peace operations in Africa. While primarily descriptive, the article posits that the rising spate of transnational organized crime in the post-9/11 era are leading factors that explain the changing nature and character of regional security in Africa.

Introduction

Since 1945, there has been a proliferation of multilateral regional and sub-regional organizations, many with an explicit desire or responsibility to build peace and security. Several of these were established across the globe in the decades immediately following the Cold War, namely the African Union (AU), the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization of American States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization of the League of Arab States, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Inasmuch as many of these regional organizations were established primarily for economic purposes, a security dimension has gradually gained importance as a way to bolster stability, avoid conflict, and promote collective development.¹

The United Nation’s (UN) High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations highlighted in its 2015 report the linkages between changing regional security contexts and conflict. Likewise, various local, national, regional, and international security policy documents have highlighted the threat posed by emerging regional security challenges to peace operations in Africa. Indeed, many of these documents establish the current regional security threats in Africa and most of these have been captured in national security/defence documents. Although there are some differences in the terms used, perceptions of the main security threats are remarkably similar in most of the countries. They include pandemics, organized crime, economic instability, corruption, state failure, and natural disasters. In spite of all these identified threats, the debate about the nature of regional security challenges has not been commensurate with the threats to peace operations in Africa.

In this chapter, I sift through available empirical evidence about the changing nature of Africa’s regional security and how it has impacted contemporary peace operations on the continent with a view to separating myth from reality. The main objectives of the chapter are twofold. First, following a brief historical overview, the chapter analyzes the nature of regional security threats in Africa, basically tracing their roots to the political, social, religious, and economic makeup of the African state. Second, it examines the changing security environment in Africa and its consequences on the current peace operations on the continent which are significantly different compared to peace operations taking place elsewhere on the globe. The chapter argues that the rapidly changing security environment calls for the proactive and resolute engagement of regional organizations in all peace operations on the continent with the added responsibility of helping to address the complex security challenges.

Contextualizing regional security

Over the past two decades, international discourses on regionalism and regional security have generated some useful exchanges between practitioners and international relations experts. Whereas some have defined the concept on a geographical basis, others have used notions like legitimate statehood, sovereign equality, and the non-use of force, among others. The concept of regional security in the case of Africa has evolved over the decades. Regional security in the past has been treated as being synonymous with

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2 In the absence of a clearly accepted definition, peace operations, for the purpose of this chapter, are defined as internationally authorized, multilateral, civil-police-military efforts aimed at preventing, limiting, and managing violent conflict as well as rebuilding after conflict ends.

The Nature of Regional Security Threats and their Impact on Peace Operations in Africa

National and global security. As regions are made up generally of nation-states, there is always the temptation to extend the meaning of national security to the regional context, even though the set of variables shaping the regional security differ from those influencing national security. Buzan (2003:44) defines a regional security complex as: ‘a set of units whose processes of securing and un-securing are interdependent at such an extent that the security problems of the component units cannot be analyzed or solved separately one from another’.  

Since the end of the Cold War, regionalism and regional security cooperation have been a growing feature of world politics and global security discourse. Regional and sub-regional organizations play an increasingly important role in securing peace and security throughout the world and have engaged in peace operations in a manner that was inconceivable only a few years ago. A number of technical, political, and socioeconomic factors account for this new dynamic. Apart from the revenues that accrue to individual peacekeepers and troop and police contributing countries, there are other benefits such as training opportunities and practical experiences of soldiering, and platforms for showing a country’s military or diplomatic status within the international system, among others. A disaggregated analysis can be initiated to assess the trajectory of Africa’s continuous security challenges within the past two decades which could be legitimately described as turbulent in many ways. From the escalating intrastate conflict in the Central African Republic, Mali, and South Sudan, to the high numbers of unconstitutional changes of government that preceded the 1980s, Africa has had its share of crises.

Arguably, the post-9/11 era and the onset and consequences of global terrorism, rapid increases in transnational organized crime, and democratic uprisings have also compounded the situation. In spite of this turbulence, regional organizations have reconceptualized security issues. Given this function, the security of people, communities or states has become, to a very large extent, ‘a function of the security of the flows across borders, of the securities of all of those flows of persons, goods, capital, energy,

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5 The distinction between regions and sub-regions is sometimes blurred. While sub-region is understood as geographically distinct sub-areas of continents, regions are perceived as political and imagined constructs shaped both by local countries’ concepts of identity and connections, and by the way outsiders view and react to them. This chapter uses the two terms interchangeably.
information, whether it be digital or otherwise, that flows across nations, regions, and the globe.’7

The regional view of the landscape of security threats in Africa with respect to peace operations extends well beyond the use of unconventional warfare tactics by numerous armed groups in their operations; it encompasses religiously-motivated extremist movements, and loose networks of violent armed groups, most of which do not have a common motivation, shared agenda or centralized leadership. For contemporary peace operations on the African continent to understand and cope with the changing regional security landscape, it would require a multifaceted and nuanced approach whereby interventions on the continent would seek the partnership of regional and sub-regional organizations to nurture an all-inclusive response to the increasingly complex threat environment.

**Growing threats to security in Africa**

An important factor behind the emergence and the growing complex security threats in Africa has been the weakness of states. The extent to which instability in Africa is displayed can be understood in the nature of the post-colonial African state. State weakness combined with overlapping ethnic groups across porous borders makes the case of instability in one country a major threat to other neighboring countries, a situation that often times requires regional solutions to domestic problems. Aning (2007), discussing Africa’s growing complex security threats, argues that the regional and international security challenges facing Africa could be grouped into old and new challenges.8 While the old security challenges are mainly characterized by recurrent armed conflict, military and political adventurism, ethnic divisions, and illegal exploitation of natural resources, the new security challenges consist of issues such as health epidemics, massive migration, terrorism, and other transnational organized crimes. On the other hand, Ayangafac and Cilliers (2011) use the state-centric diagnostic tool to describe Africa’s complex security challenges.9 They argue that Africa’s growing security threats is as a result of the size of the continent, the diversity of its people, local dynamics, and the strategies and interests of local actors.10

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10 Ibid.
Among the two approaches, Ayangafac and Cilliers’ (2011) approach appears useful for the empirical analysis below, mainly because using the old and the new dichotomy does not present the true picture of the situation. Besides, their state-centric lens presents the best approach. Table 1 shows the nature of identified regional security threats in Africa, which can be grouped under two broad areas: potential regional security threats and traditional security threats.11

Table 1: Traditional and Potential Regional Security Threats.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional Security Threats</th>
<th>Potential Regional Security Threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Ethnicity of Ethnic identity</td>
<td>• Drug trafficking and organized crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Natural resources</td>
<td>• Terrorism and insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Bad governance</td>
<td>• Religious extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Corruption</td>
<td>• Piracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Territorial/border disputes</td>
<td>• Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Political and economic crises</td>
<td>• Cyber threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maritime disputes</td>
<td>• Health pandemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Climate change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Youth bulge, unemployment and underemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Illegal migrants and refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Environmental degradation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Small arms proliferation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sexual exploitation and abuse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation, 2015.

Different authors and practitioners have expressed varied opinions on the changing nature of regional security and its intended or unintended impact on current peace operations in Africa. While some consider the new threats as really new, others are of the opinion that what are being classified as new security threats are not new after all.12 For instance, some argue that issues of terrorism, health pandemics, and political and economic crises have been a recurrent threat to regional peace and security. Meanwhile, some practitioners and authors have agreed in principle that from the post-colonial period, several African countries have experienced one of these threats in one way or

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11 Many of these so-called potential regional security threats are neither new nor particularly traditional. Illegal migrants and refugees as well as the narcotics trade are some examples that have long existed. Much of the potential regional security threats have been shown to be much more contemporary, transnational, and increasingly global in nature and structure than the traditional security threats.

the other. Map 1 categorizes the prevailing peace operations in Africa and the possible potential threats to the survival of such modern peace operations.

Map 1: Peace Operations in Africa and Potential Regional Threats.

Regardless of the categorization, it is clear that security threats to modern peace operations in Africa are growing in spite of improvements in the general security situation on the continent. Most practitioners on the field have attributed the rising threats primarily to ‘failing states’ and the weak policing of national borders. Although it has been argued that the general security situation has improved considerably, states in which governance is weak and contested still have to contend with such difficulties. It is generally in such countries that peacekeepers have to deal on a daily basis with irregular armies and non-state armed insurgent groups. Besides, some of the old challenges have not gone away; they still remain in varying degrees and numbers on the continent. The emergence and rise of what has come to be known as ‘Africa’s new security challenges’ remain the major security threats to peace operations. Significantly, these ‘new’ and evolving threats are not completely new to the continent in themselves; rather, the

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threats have gained prominence in recent times as a result of the significant scale that they are beginning to assume, their effects on the region, and the consequential effect on the many peace operations on the continent. The combined effect of all these makes them worrying factors. The nature, scope, and dynamics of these new threats would certainly shape the way and manner in which peace operations are executed on the continent now and in the future.

**Pandemics**

Pandemics are another ‘potential’ security threat facing peace operations in Africa. Apart from individual physical health challenges, the health issue that poses the greatest risks to peace operations is communicable diseases. These diseases have the propensity to spread quickly through mission areas and surrounding communities. Examples of pandemics (including Dengue infections and Lassa fever), the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD), H1N1 influenza, HIV-AIDS, H5N1 influenza virus, and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome with its associated coronavirus, serve as a stark reminder of the global vulnerability of peace operations to these health risks. The spread of such diseases is not controlled by international borders; at least, the cases of the EVD and H1N1 have clearly demonstrated the devastating nature of such diseases on both conflict and post-conflict countries. It is well established that the world is immensely more interconnected today than it was some years ago and this makes the spread of certain diseases easy. Events in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Mali in 2014 and 2015 have now highlighted the widely held view that the emergence and reemergence of pandemics constitute a major risk not only to peace operations but also to the communities that host such missions globally. This is even more the case when peacekeepers are perceived as potential ‘vectors’ of the spread of infectious diseases in local communities.

The catastrophic damage of the EVD forced the United Nations Missions in Liberia to extend its eventual exit by another year and negatively affected the remarkable gains that UN peace operations had achieved previously in Sierra Leone. Although areas such as the security sector, governance, rule of law, gender, environment, development, and social indicators had been improving prior to the outbreak of the EVD, the crisis became a major threat to macro-economic stability, human development and poverty reduction. In 2014 alone, economic growth slowed to 6.0 percent compared to the

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*Davies and Rushton (2015), op. cit.*

original projection of 11.3 percent. Similarly negative percentages (-2.5 percent) were recorded for Gross Domestic Product growth while inflation was revised upward from 8.8 percent to 10 percent. The advent of these worrying statistics as an aftereffect of the emergency restrictions imposed in the wake of the EVD outbreak portrays the devastating impact of the spread of the virus on the Sierra Leonean economy. Likewise, the damage in Mali, though limited, also derailed the mission’s effort to establish peace and lay the foundations for the establishment of sustainable development.

**Organized crime**

The impact of organized crime on modern peace operations has been clearly highlighted in recent UN documentation and received a lot of attention from the Security Council. A 2012 statement by the president of the Security Council illuminates how transnational organized crime was destroying the consolidation of peace and security in countries emerging from conflict. These crimes, be they piracy, drug trafficking or natural resources pillage, have seriously affected countries such as Liberia, Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Guinea-Bissau which are being supported by peace operations led by either the UN or regional economic communities. In addition, the nexus between transnational organized crime and peace operations has grown considerably following the end of the Cold War. Armed groups that used to be funded purely by state actors now fund their own activities, mainly through the illegal exploitation and theft of natural resources within their operational contexts. The blood diamonds phenomenon in Sierra Leone and the illegal timber exploitation in Liberia demonstrate how rich natural resources like diamond and timber could fund and resource the activities of spoilers and politico-economic linchpins to derail the activities of peacekeepers.

The same analogy could be made to the role of transnational organized crime in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and how the activities of such armed groups, local and foreign, impeded UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s drive to achieve sustainable peace. For such groups, the US$1.25 billion profit per year from the exploitation of natural resources and wildlife is enough basis to ensure that peace operations do not succeed. As Hansen (2014) notes, the profits that accrue


Ibid.


Ibid.
from some of these illegal activities has changed what he refers to as ‘the motivational incentive of rebel groups from political to criminal-economic motives’. Transnational Organized crime thrives in countries where the institutions of state are weak, rule of law cannot be enforced, and where criminal networks drive the national economy.

The surge in organized crime in mainly mission environments is a function of weak local institutions, the failure of local security authorities to effectively defend and protect their territories against crime, the lack of economic opportunities, and unemployment. The examples of Guinea-Bissau and Mali clearly demonstrate how the lack of capacity of state security apparatus fuses with political instability, drug trafficking, and other organized crimes. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the UN Office for West Africa have collectively described Guinea-Bissau as a state that provides an appealing and permissive environment for organized crime, especially drug trafficking. A 2013 UNODC report, for instance, is categorical that politicians and soldiers have been drawing revenues from the drug trade and the country has degenerated to the point where dissenters to the trade are either kidnapped or killed. However, in addressing the potential threats that such organized crime poses to peace operations, the point to stress is how most UN and AU peace operations do not have the requisite mandates to explicitly combat organized crime, let alone the right type of capabilities and resources to do so.

**Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferation**

The illicit flow, proliferation, stockpiling, and circulation of small arms and light weapons, although not a recent phenomenon, remains one of the most immediate regional security hindrances to peace operations on the continent. The sophistication of the weaponry available these days and the ease with which people gain access to them present a worrying situation. These weapons do not only trigger conflict but also fuel all the major destabilizing incidences of rebellion, armed robbery, terrorism, money laundering, organized crime, natural resource pillage, and drug trafficking in Africa. As has been noted by Aning, Okyere, and Abdallah (2012), and Lamptey (2012), the proliferation of arms and weapons that followed the conflict in post-Qaddafi Libya has held several destabilizing repercussions for peace missions in Sahelian states; namely,

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Mali and the Central African Republic, and also the Darfur region of Sudan. For instance, activities of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) against the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has been fuelled and sustained by the huge caches of arms that inadvertently found their way to the northern part of Mali. As of July 2015, about 42 peacekeepers had been killed in Mali since the mission started in 2013.  

**Terrorism**

Within the last decade, it has become obvious that apart from small arms proliferation, drug trafficking and other transnational organized crimes, terrorist groups and networks have made inroads into most mission environments, exploiting the many ungoverned spaces and the structural weaknesses of these post conflict states. Notwithstanding, peace operations will continue to function in areas where the activities of terrorist are ripe. The potential cost of terrorism in North, West, East, and Central Africa is not hard to fathom, especially considering the carnage and violence that has characterized the activities of these terrorist groups. Moreover, the sheer number of attacks from terrorist, insurgent groups, and religious extremists in mission areas has called into question the capacity of peacekeepers to fight terrorism. What is even more worrying is the sophistication of tactics and approaches which have evolved over time. Consistently, the incidences of attacks have overshadowed the kinds of intervention being undertaken by these peace operations. For example, it is estimated that over 3000 African Union Mission to Somalia personnel have lost their lives since the commencement of the mission, a figure that has been highly disputed by the African Union. Likewise, extremist groups in the northern part of Mali have waged consistent campaigns against troops serving under MINUSMA. All these attacks are a stark reminder of the negative impact that these asymmetric threats have on the ability of multilateral peace operations to function. Meanwhile, the UN, through its High-level Independent Panel on UN peace operations...
operations, has effectively admitted that the ‘lack of specific equipment, intelligence, logistics, capabilities and specialized military preparation’ hampers the ability of UN mandated missions to tackle such violent extremists.29

### Drug trafficking

Closely linked to the issue of terrorism, insurgency, and religious militancy is the issue of the drugs trade. Drug trafficking has continued to be one of the most lucrative sources of revenue to insurgents and terrorist groups on the continent. Arguably, the drugs trade in the Sahel represents the most potent threat to the activities of MINUSMA in a region well known as a haven for smuggling networks and illicit activities. A 2011 UN assessment report establishes that ‘terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, have begun to form alliances with drug traffickers and other criminal syndicates’.30 While the initial suspicion was not clearly proven, recent events in northern Mali have demonstrated that revenue derived from this illicit trade is helping terrorists to acquire sophisticated weaponry not only to fight the peacekeeping mission but also as payment for fighters’ wages.31 Continuing instability around the Sahel Region, coupled with the lack of effective border control, fused with the network of traffickers, all present severe threats to the security of MINUSMA and other peace operations in Africa.

### Conclusion

There is no easy way to present the impact of these various so-called ‘new’ threats to peace operations in Africa, especially when the context is so fluid. The evolving regional security threats and peace operations in Africa converge at a certain point in the mission cycle, not only because more often than not they share the same operational environment, but also obviously because they operate from uniquely different objectives, philosophies, and approaches. Though the concept of peace operations mostly requires that there be some peace to keep, as conflict in Africa becomes more and more convoluted with ever-changing security threats, peace operations must evolve in tandem. As Hansen (2014) notes, ‘peace operations are not primarily a crime fighting tool’, neither can they be conceived primarily as a counter terrorism activity, nor be used to solve all the regional security threats in Africa.’32 Nevertheless, as the boundaries between regional security threats and peace operations in Africa remain, any attempt to attain sustainable peace

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31 United Nations Secretary-General, op. cit.

and prevent further destabilization of the continent must take cognizance of all the traditional and potential security threats.

Regional security in Africa has become a priority not only in peacetime, but also during and after conflict. Given the limitations of UN peace operations and their inability to attend holistically to all conflicts at the same time, it has become imperative for the UN and regional organizations to share tasks, and also for the UN to cede some of its functions to the smallest, lowest, and least centralized authorities at the regional level to advance their ideals and restore global order. The ability of regional authorities to respond to the large number of crises and violent conflicts and the challenges that this poses to peace operations demonstrate the commitment and greater responsibility that these regional security communities have assumed. Besides, the examples of peace operations in Africa have demonstrated that with the necessary operational guidelines and sophistication, they can play an important role in making the operational environment less hospitable for spoilers.

References


Today’s concept of peacekeeping goes beyond just the interposition of military personnel to observe truces agreed upon by belligerent parties in a foreign territory. Prevailing multidimensional approaches suggest that peacekeepers need to satisfy the immediate requirements of ensuring stability in the conflict theatre as well as the transformative long-term goal of building stable peace and development. This brings confusion when evaluating the various conceptual and operational dimensions of peacekeeping in today’s practice. It is difficult to determine if peacekeeping doctrine today allows for the engagement of peacekeepers in ongoing conflicts or to be deployed only when hostilities has ceased. While the United Nations (UN) adheres to the latter proposition, it has often felt that there is always an initial need for peace enforcement, which will later create the conditions for peacekeeping. Such efforts have involved not only the African Union, but also other key actors such as regional economic communities, regional mechanisms, and the European Union (EU). The participation of the UN and these regional bodies has also led to the deployment of different peacekeeping models in Africa. The authors argue that while these models appear ad hoc, they are highly responsive to the changing dynamics of conflict in Africa.
The initial optimism that accompanied the evolution of peacekeeping in the late 1940s\(^1\) was eclipsed as the years progressed. Different setbacks at both the conceptual and operational levels contributed to the diminished optimism. In particular, these setbacks involved the complex conflict terrains and the mass atrocity crimes that undermined missions such as the United Nations (UN) Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda and the UN Operation in Somalia II in the early and mid-1990s. According to the UN,

> These three high-profile peacekeeping operations came under criticism as peacekeepers faced situations where warring parties failed to adhere to peace agreements, or where the peacekeepers themselves were not provided adequate resources or political support. As civilian casualties rose and hostilities continued, the reputation of UN Peacekeeping suffered.\(^2\)

These missions were prompted by the moderate successes of earlier peacekeeping that raised expectations of the UN to deploy beyond its capacity.

Many of the setbacks stem from factors that have prompted the ways in which peacekeeping has evolved. First, peacekeeping no longer preserves its ‘sacred’ identity; it was originally conceived and designed, according to what we call the Hammarskjold and Pearson peacekeeping model to respond to inter-state conflicts, especially in the Sinai, Cyprus, and the Golan Heights between the 1950s and the 1970s. Today, there are various peace operations in the world carrying the tag of peacekeeping which scarcely uphold the principles that underpin the peacekeeping model as was originally designed to resolve conflicts.\(^3\) Second, beside the UN which was the original custodian of and primary actor in peacekeeping operations, a plethora of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral bodies have assumed prominent roles in the delivery of peace operations, acting in diverse capacities and interests, either with or without prior UN authorization and mandates. These extra-UN entities and their ‘peculiar’ approaches to peacekeeping have, to a large extent, contributed to the changing landscape of peacekeeping.\(^4\) Third, admittedly, the nature of armed conflicts to which peacekeeping was originally designed

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\(^1\) The first two peacekeeping operations deployed in 1948 by the UN were the UN Truce Supervision Organization and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan.


The Changing Nature of Peace Operations in Africa

has changed rapidly to include not only state parties but also sub-state and non-state actors such as militias, rebels, and terrorist networks whose combative tactics follow no conventional rules of armed conflict as prescribed by international humanitarian law and international human rights law. These factors have influenced greatly the current peacekeeping architecture and practice.

The fundamental principles of consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of force, though still respected in UN peacekeeping operations, have been the source of most controversies over peacekeeping.\(^5\) Today, terminologies such as multidimensional peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace operations have surfaced, presenting varying interpretations of peacekeeping principles beyond what sufficed previously as just deploying military troops to observe peace agreements between belligerent parties in a foreign territory.\(^6\)

However, in recognition of these rather complex realities, the UN has undertaken a number of measures aimed at adapting peacekeeping strategies to the changing landscape of contemporary armed conflicts.\(^7\) Notably, the *Brahimi Report* led to some reforms, including the adoption of ‘robust’ rules of engagement to allow peacekeepers to function as effectively as expected in conflict theatres. The report notes,

> United Nations military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate. Rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers.\(^8\)

Surely, this statement reflects an admission of a weakness in the principles that underpinned peacekeeping operations, especially as the context of conflicts has changed, and peacekeepers no longer enjoy stable peace agreements for effective operations in conflict theatres.

### Peace Operations

While some experts have articulated the evolution of peacekeeping in ‘inter-generational’ terms in which Cold War international politics represented a significant


\(^7\) See Chapter 2 on the Nature of Regional Security and Impact on Peace Support Operations in Africa in this volume

milestone\textsuperscript{9}, other observers have put forward a perspective that reflects responses to a regional conflict dynamic that is not entirely based on the three fundamental principles of peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{10} Such perspectives involve regional actors whose initiatives at stabilizing conflict situations often lay the conditions for UN peacekeeping missions. The involvement of these regional actors, coupled with their different doctrines of engagement, partly explains why the use of the term ‘peace operations’ is more preferable to the term ‘peacekeeping’ when it comes to the African context.

Many experts are guided by certain key characteristics in defining peace operations. The definition provided by Paul Williams is most succinct: ‘Peace operations involve the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel (police and/or military), with a mandate to:

- Assist in the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process.
- Serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements.
- Enforce ceasefires, peace agreements, or the will of the United Nations (UN) Security Council in order to build stable peace.’\textsuperscript{11}

Accordingly, peace operations are described as entailing UN, UN-authorized, and non-UN operations, which may range in numerical strength from small observation and security sector reform missions of up to 50 personnel to multidimensional operations involving several thousands of soldiers, police, and civilians.\textsuperscript{12} Often, these operations are usually authorized through different legal regimes (mandates).

For instance, actions that undermine or pose threats to international peace and security (or involve the commission of mass atrocity crimes) have attracted peace enforcement measures such as humanitarian interventions\textsuperscript{13} and/or responsibility to protect actions\textsuperscript{14} in the past. These are informed by UN Security Council resolutions that are instigated within the realms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Peacekeeping, on the other hand,

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid. p 2.
focuses more on the pacific settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{15} However, in today’s peacekeeping operations, UN mission mandates are often framed around Chapter VII principles, ostensibly to protect civilians.\textsuperscript{16} Regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and others like the European Union (EU) are permitted under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to take both peaceful and enforcement measures to maintain regional peace and security, albeit with authorization from the UNSC. With the active participation of the AU, the EU, and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in peacekeeping, especially in Africa, it is clearly observed that peacekeeping roles and strategies now assume the range of principles enshrined in chapters VI, VI, I and VIII of the UN Charter.

**Peace Operations in Africa**

Africa has had more than its fair share of armed conflicts since the 1960s. Significantly, many of these armed conflicts have caused devastating effects, mainly to civilian populations to which the international community could not turn a blind eye. This has prompted the UN and the AU, including other regional actors to establish peacekeeping presences on the continent. Even though many of the missions in Africa were guided by the three UN peacekeeping principles (consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of force), other missions have evolved in response to different conflicts, prompting different approaches to peace operations in Africa.

**UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa**

There are presently nine UN peacekeeping missions in Africa (illustrated in Table 1). All the missions have Chapter VII mandates, which means that peacekeeping troops can take ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians and the mandates in all the missions. Even though some of the missions are in the drawdown phase, especially the United Nations Mission in Liberia, and the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire, they still have strong military presence. The strong military component in these missions is seen as necessary to preserve the full implementation of the peace agreements and the missions’ mandates. The dominance of the military components suggest that conditions in the mission areas are still fragile.


### Table 1: UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Missions in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Size (Military: Police: Civilian)</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Main Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)</td>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>2007-2015</td>
<td>14585:3169:845</td>
<td>UNSCR 1769 (July 2007, Chapter VII)</td>
<td>POC, and monitoring the border with Chad and The CAR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


| The DRC | 2010-2015 | 18649:1090:840 | UNSCR 1925 (July 2010 Chapter VII) | POC, stabilization, and peace consolidation |

9. United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)


Source: Authors’ compilation with data from UN peacekeeping operations.\(^\text{17}\)

These missions (as seen in Table 1) combine full characteristics of second and third generation peacekeeping practice: they are integrated in terms of merging the short-term objectives of the missions and the long-term peacebuilding and development goals of the host countries. Similarly, the missions are multidimensional because they seek to address multiple functions such as security, and political and social reconciliation, while attracting the international community to support economic growth. They also have robust mandates that allow peacekeepers to switch from the minimum use of force to the use of force in case the conflict dynamics become hostile to the missions and the host populations.

Despite these characteristics, a certain phenomenon is beginning to emerge with some of the multidimensional peacekeeping missions in Africa. The phrase ‘stabilization mission’, unknown in previous UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, has since 2010 become part of the nomenclature given to new multidimensional peacekeeping missions such as the Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2010,

the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic in 2013, and the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali in 2014. As noted by Muggah, ‘the turn to stabilization within the United Nations is comparatively recent’. Even though the 2008 UN Capstone Doctrine treats stability and security as goals in peacekeeping operations, there was no explicit mention of stabilization. Similarly, the report, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping* scarcely advocated for stabilization operations within the UN system. In much the same way, *An Agenda for Peace* which was produced in 1992 by the UN also avoided the term stabilization. Therefore, the key question is why has stabilization become a key feature in recent UN peacekeeping operations? It seems that as the dynamics of conflicts shift more toward asymmetric warfare, stabilization will become the future trend of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Beside these peacekeeping missions, there are six other UN political and peacebuilding missions (listed in Table 2) that are spread across various locations in Africa.

### Table 2: Other UN Missions in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa</td>
<td>Since 2013</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. United Nations Elections Observation Mission for Burundi</td>
<td>Since 2005</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. United Nations Office for West Africa</td>
<td>Since 2002</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s compilation.*

These missions (listed in Table 2) are relatively small in size. They are deployed outside the auspices of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, but still carry out essential tasks toward the maintenance of peace and security in the region.

### European Union Peace Missions in Africa

The European Union (EU) is one of the major financiers of the African Union (AU). In 2004, the EU dedicated a special funding facility named the African Peace Facility to support peace and security initiatives in the region. This was within the framework of

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the EU-Africa partnership which covered areas such as capacity building, peace support operations, and early warning.\textsuperscript{20} The facility supports the operationalization of the different elements of the African Peace and Security Architecture. Notwithstanding its huge financial contribution to the AU, the EU also engages in direct peace operations in the region.\textsuperscript{21}

As at 2015, the EU had deployed nine operations in different locations in Africa (listed in Table 3). Whereas many of these operations have focused on national initiatives, others are regionally focused and have sought to address the fragile conditions affecting distressed regions in Africa. Notably, the operations are seen as part of the international community’s effort to create stability and overcome terrorist networks and transnational organized crimes in Africa.\textsuperscript{22}

Table 3: EU Peace Operations in Africa (ongoing as of 2015).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. EU Military Advisory Mission in The CAR</td>
<td>Since 2015</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali</td>
<td>Since 2014</td>
<td>Police and Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. EU Training Mission in Mali</td>
<td>Since 2013</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya</td>
<td>Since 2012</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. EU Capacity Mission in Niger</td>
<td>Since 2012</td>
<td>Police and Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. EU Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building</td>
<td>Since 2012</td>
<td>Police and Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. EU Military Mission to Contribute to Training of Somali Security Forces</td>
<td>Since 2010</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. EU Naval Operations Against Piracy</td>
<td>Since 2008</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Within the peace operations context, these missions (as listed in Table 3) are viewed as addressing specific/specialized elements and/or dimensions of peace operations but are conducted in delegated capacities. For instance, most of the EU missions with national focus are mainly aimed at building national security institutions (such as the military and police). They involve training of personnel, capacity building and technical advice to support security institutions and rule of law, which are key components of the security sector reform and protection of civilians mandates of the AU Mission in Somalia, and the UN missions in The Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, and The DRC. The EU missions with regional focus, especially in Mali, Niger, Libya, and Somalia have provided the additional impetus of creating regional stability and mitigating terrorist operations and transnational organized crimes within the Sahel Region and the respective maritime domains of Somalia and Libya. More especially, the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya is a full civilian capacity which started operations in 2012, but has operational links with a counterpart military mission in the form of the EU Naval Force on the Mediterranean, established in 2015.

African Peace Operations

Africa’s role in peace support and peacekeeping operations dates back to the 1960s. By 2015, the region was hosting eight UN peacekeeping operations. The AU deployed or endorsed the mandates of peace operations in Darfur, Somalia, The Comoros, Mali, and The CAR between 2004 and 2015. Within the same period, the AU authorized deployments against the Lord’s Resistance Army in East-Central Africa, and Boko Haram in West Africa. These African-led peace operations involved an average of 30,000-40,000 uniformed personnel engaged as peacekeepers per annum. Additionally, African contributions to uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations had increased from 10,000 personnel in 2003 to over 35,000 personnel per annum in 2013. Majority of these personnel serve as peacekeepers in missions deployed in Africa. Even though there are still more African peacekeepers serving in missions outside Africa, it is encouraging to

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have more African peacekeepers deployed in the region to resolve their own conflicts. Walter Lotze observed that four different models of AU facilitated peace support operations exist in Africa.\textsuperscript{25} It is also argued that even though the AU has established the African Standby Force (ASF) which was to integrate the five regional standby forces for mission deployment in Africa, the various AU missions have been deployed differently from the original ASF concept.\textsuperscript{26} Table 4 illustrates the various models under which Lotze categorized African peace operations.

Table 4: African Peace Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deployment Model</th>
<th>Semblance with Established Models</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Current Status</th>
<th>Mandate Type</th>
<th>Main Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECOMIB Mission in Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB), 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td>ECOMIB 850 police personnel support</td>
<td>Regional Peace and Security Mechanism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (2014)</td>
<td></td>
<td>IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (2014)</td>
<td>Regional Peace and Security Mechanism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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\textsuperscript{25}ibid. p. 2.
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN approach and created by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007</td>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>Chapter VII?27</td>
<td>Regime Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN Security Council (Resolution 2182 (2014) ) gave the AU permission to continue its mission in Somalia until 30 November 2015</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Example also include ECOWAS Military Observer Group deployments in Liberia and Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Example also include ECOWAS Peace and Security Mechanisms</td>
<td>Dissolved</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\*\*UN Security Council Resolution 2182 (2014) authorized the African Union to continue its mission in Somalia until 30 November 2015. It is envisaged that a robust UNSC Resolution will be adopted should the UN decide to deploy peacekeepers in Somalia in the future.*
4. AU-authorized coalitions | Coalition-driven | Regional Task Force (RTF) for the Elimination of the LRA28 (2011) | Operations still active in four LRA affected countries: Uganda, The CAR, The DRC, and South Sudan | Authorized coalition | Counter-insurgency operations


Model 1 follows the ASF original concept in which the RECs as well as the regional mechanisms are responsible to build peacekeeping capabilities that will stand ready for continental-level deployment should the need arise. In this regard, African-led International Support Mission in Mali and UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic were built around the RECs initiative as dictated by the ASF concept. Model 2 reflects a deployment where individual troop and police contributing countries deployed their capabilities directly to the AU without going through the RECs. This approach tended to follow the UN practice of peacekeeping where individual member states are approached by the UN to contribute their capacities to a mission. The modified AU missions in The Sudan (deployed in 2004) and Somalia (deployed since 2007) are classical cases of this model. Model 3 makes use of individual countries with key strategic interests in the conflict situation. Often, the supposed regional hegemon tends to play the lead role in this type of deployment. Nigeria’s lead role in ECOWAS Military Observer Group deployments in Liberia and Sierra Leone, South Africa’s lead role in the AU deployment in Burundi in 2003-2004, and the lead role of Tanzania in the democratic enforcement mission by the AU in The Comoros in 2008 are examples of AU lead-nation peace operation deployments. A more recent development is Model 4 where a coalition of countries affected by trans-border threats is authorized by the AU to build joint capabilities to counter the threat through joint initiatives.

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28The UN Secretary-General released a report on 20 May 2013 asserting that between 1987 and 2012, the LRA was ‘responsible for more than 100,000 deaths, that from 60,000 to 100,000 children are believed to have been abducted by the rebel group, and that 2.5 million civilians have been displaced as a result of its incursions’. See the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2016). Central Africa: Lord’s Resistance Army. Available at: http://www.globalr2p.org-regions/central_africa_lords_resistance_army (Accessed: 11 November, 2016).
Recent examples include the Regional Task Force for the Elimination of the LRA and the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram.\[^{29}\]

The various AU peace operations models (as indicated in Table 4) illustrate how the AU has adapted and deployed its conflict resolution mechanisms with respect to specific conflict situations. Even though this approach may be at variance with its own established framework of the ASF, the various deployments are not counter productive to the ASF. Rather, they reflect ad hoc attempts to seek resolution to conflicts where the UN or the international community may show little interest.\[^{30}\]

**Conclusion**

The spread of many conflict spots across Africa since the 1960s has prompted the establishment of peace operations in the region. Multiple players such as the UN, the AU, the EU, and the RECs have operated at different levels using their respective peace operations mechanisms to deploy peacekeepers in missions in Africa. Whereas most UN peace operations seemed multidimensional in scope, deployments by regional organizations tend to focus more on specific dimensions such as peace enforcement, and delivering technical support to both national and regional peacebuilding initiatives. However, in spite of the complementary roles of the various actors in peace operations, their lack of integration gives the impression that they are operating independently of one another.

Even though the evolution of peace operations has proceeded along three distinct generational phases, four different deployment models have characterized the African approach to peace operations. This entails the UN-troop Contribution countries approach, as well as a mixture of ASF multi-faceted models that incorporate robust mandates to tackle transnational terrorism and insurgency threats in the region. Therefore, it seems though that whereas the UN may be unwilling and/or unable to deploy peacekeepers in supposedly active war zones in the region, it may give authorization to the regional bodies to undertake peace operations that may later be adopted as UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations peace operations. This approach may be in direct support to the principle of subsidiarity, where it is encouraged that regional actors take initial steps in the peaceful resolution of regional disputes. It may also be a conscious effort by the AU to build its own architecture for peace operations in the region. Either way, the AU has the advantage of building its capacity to respond rapidly to crises on the continent as it assumes a more dominant role in peace operations in the region.

\[^{29}\]Lotze, W., 2015, op. cit., p. 2.

References


Abstract
The changing nature of conflicts over the years precipitated the need to include in United Nations (UN) missions’ mandates a specific protection of civilians (PoC) clause. Though the UN left it to specific missions to define and carry out the mandate to the best of their ability, the absence of clearly defined operational guidelines created an initial disconnection in some missions between the theory and practice of protecting civilians. This, coupled with the continuous changing nature of conflicts and lessons learnt from the field, resulted in the UN developing operational guidelines to assist missions in carrying out the PoC mandate. Using data from informal interactions with serving and previous peacekeepers, particularly the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, this chapter examines the viability of guidelines and policies that the UN has adopted over the years to operationalize this mandate and whether these policies are addressing the identified challenges or chasing a moving target.

Introduction
Over the years, civilians have suffered the greatest casualties in armed conflicts. Actors of armed conflict have continually subjected civilians to numerous atrocities. These attacks against civilians have been manifested through deliberate killing; attacks against civilian objects such as schools and healthcare facilities; impeding the provision of humanitarian assistance; sexual violence; forced disappearance; torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; the recruitment and use of children; attacks against journalists and human rights activists; and a failure to hold accountable those...
who perpetrate or instigate violations and to provide support, justice, and redress to victims.¹

The primary responsibility to protect civilians in any arena falls within the jurisdiction of the host state. However, many states have been unable or unwilling to offer the needed protection for their citizens. This, coupled with failures in past peacekeeping missions, propelled the United Nations (UN) Security Council to issue an official protection mandate in 1999 authorizing the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone to ‘afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’.² Since that time, the UN has continued to issue mandates authorizing missions to protect civilians against imminent threat, often with a number of geographical and operational caveats to ensure that the mission undertook its mandate within its capabilities and operational areas (Holt et al. 2009).

The 2009 Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict identified five core challenges, determined after ten years of operationalizing the mandate, that missions encounter in carrying out the protection mandate: ‘enhancing compliance with international law; enhancing compliance by non-State armed groups; enhancing protection through more effective and better resourced United Nations peacekeeping and other relevant missions; enhancing humanitarian access; and enhancing accountability for violations.’³ Subsequent to this report, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Services (DFS) developed guidelines to guide missions in operationalizing the mandate.

This chapter examines the guidelines and policies that the UN has adopted from 2009-2015 to operationalize the protection of civilians (PoC) mandate. While the focus transcends this mandate as issued by the UN Security Council, this discussion occasionally considers the challenges that missions have encountered in trying to understand and implement it and the extent to which UN guidelines and policies have addressed these challenges. It is worth noting here that the African Union has also developed Draft Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians in African Union Peace Support Operations which do not

deviate much in spirit and letter from the UN guidelines and are thus not discussed in this chapter.⁴

The Protection of Civilians Mandate and Its Operationalization

The PoC Mandate

The failure of both state and non-state armed actors to uphold the tenets of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, international refugee law, and domestic criminal law in conflict has caused civilians extensive atrocities in this century (Durch & Giffen 2010). This failure has been a challenge for UN peacekeeping missions, especially in areas where there has been little or no peace to keep. This need to ensure the protection of civilians in the conflict arena led to the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999) with regard to the Sierra Leone crisis, which specifically authorized protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. Since that mandate was issued, subsequent missions have received similar mandates. There are currently sixteen UN missions across four continents of which eight have specific POC mandates.⁵ A typical UNPoC mandate reads as follows:

[The Mission] shall, from the adoption of this resolution, have the mandate, in this order of priority, working in close cooperation with the Government […] in order to:

(a) Ensure the protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any of the parties engaged in the conflict.

(b) Contribute to the improvement of the security conditions in which humanitarian assistance is provided, and assist in the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

(c) Ensure the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment.

(d) Ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel.

(e) Carry out joint patrols with the national police and security forces to improve security in the event of civil disturbance.⁶


In the absence of a clear and coordinated vision of the PoC mandate, missions initially interpreted it to the best of their understanding, while offering varied ad hoc strategies and approaches to PoC. It is in this context that peacekeepers on the ground referred to the PoC mandate as an ‘impossible or non-implementable mandate’ on two grounds: the ambiguity of the mandate language and the disconnect between the limited resources available to implement the mandate and the high expectations of local populations and the international community with regard to civilian protection. Many peacekeepers believe that ‘the absence of a clear, operationally-focused and practical concept’ for PoC by DPKO contributed to the disparity between expectations and resources.

DPKO and DFS responded to this absence of a practical concept of PoC by formulating guidelines in 2010 to assist missions in drafting their PoC strategies. The outcome, known as the Operational Concept, sought to use existing lessons and experiences from implementing PoC mandates as a basis to derive a common understanding of the implementation of the PoC mandate in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and to address the core challenges identified in the Secretary-General’s 2009 Report.

The Operational Concept underpinned and upheld the principles of UN peacekeeping, which include the consent of the host government and the main parties to the conflict, impartiality and the non-use of force except in instances of self-defence and defence of the mandate. In as much as the UN mission is carrying out activities to ensure the protection of civilians, the mission must always realize that the primary responsibility to protect civilians falls within the remit of the host nation. The mission is to assist the host nation in carrying out this responsibility to enable the government enhance its sovereignty as a state through asserting its authority, protecting those within its territorial borders and focusing attention on rebuilding the nation and its institutions.

The operational concept presented a three-tier approach to address the PoC mandate in mission areas:

**Tier 1: Protection through political process.**

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8 Interview, UN Peacekeepers during a training program on protection of civilians held in December 2014 in Accra, Ghana.

9 DPKO/DFS, op. cit.
Tier 2: Providing protection from physical violence.

Tier 3: Establishing a protective environment.

The three tiers are not to be considered mutually exclusive and are to be addressed simultaneously in accordance with the mission’s mandate and available resources. Progress or lack of it in one tier can have rippling effects on the other tiers.

**Protection through political process**

Every UN mission’s main role is to support the implementation of any peace agreement or existing political process in its host country. The sustenance of peace through an effective peace process may be the greatest contribution that any mission can make toward protecting civilians in a host country. An effective peace process can be achieved through the provision of offices to the parties in the peace agreement; facilitation of the political process through mediation; support to reconciliation processes, and continuous and active liaison with the host government, the parties to the peace process and their respective command chains and the international community.

To cite one example, the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) provides logistical support to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) government in the form of airlifts to remote or conflict areas in the event of any outbreak to which it must respond. This support is offered in accordance with the mission’s conditionality policy, which requires that the Commanding Officer (CO) of the country’s troops have no record of human rights violations, especially against civilians. If the CO is found to have committed human rights abuses, the mission will not offer needed support to the national army until the CO is replaced. 10

**Protection from physical violence**

Considered by many as the only element needed for PoC, the greatest yardstick by which any UN mission is measured with regard to protecting civilians is its ability to protect them from any form of physical violence. It is therefore necessary that missions include in their efforts action plans to not only prevent but also deter and, where necessary, respond forcefully to situations in which civilians are under threat of physical violence. This requires an increase in the involvement of uniformed peacekeepers and must be coordinated with intense political engagement with all parties of the conflict.

10 Interviews, MONUSCO mission personnel, Kinshasa, June 2011.
In order to provide protection against physical violence, missions are to adopt a four-phase system of assurance and prevention, pre-emption, response and consolidation. The first phase is meant to build the confidence of local populations and assure them of the mission’s intent to protect them—mainly through routine and passive measures. In the DRC, as part of its protection strategy, MONUSCO has appointed some members of the community as Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) and deployed them in over 70 locations in country’s eastern region where fighting is most intense. These CLAs liaise with and facilitate communication between communities, the UN and local authorities and serve as an early warning mechanism. Their presence in communities assures civilians that the mission has a system in place for them to express their concerns.

Using the DRC system as an example, MONUSCO, in collaboration with the CLAs should be able to pre-empt potential attacks on civilian populations and establish contingency plans to avert them. However, if contingency plans fail and an attack becomes eminent, the mission, in collaboration with the national authorities (unless they are also a contributing factor to the attack), must respond using the most appropriate means to avert harm to civilians. Its inability to deploy this pre-emptive measure or response mechanism is considered as a failure that could breed mistrust within the community toward the mission. The UN mission in DRC has often faced similar situations as the country’s road networks and terrain continue to obstruct the mission’s ability to carry out its protection mandate, resulting in attacks against civilian populations.¹¹

Establishing a secure environment

This tier emphasizes the support needed to establish environments that enhance the safety and rights of civilians. It comprises three main elements: promotion of legal protection, facilitation of humanitarian assistance and advocacy, and support to national institutions. Essentially, this tier builds on established PoC legal frameworks and principles to provide a protective framework that is spearheaded by national authorities. In order to secure their environments, missions must work toward an understanding of and compliance with approved legal frameworks, especially with regard to mandated tasks such as human rights monitoring, child protection and sexual and gender-based violence, in addition to advocating and securing access for humanitarian assistance when the need arises.

In some missions, for example, conflicts between cultural, traditional and religious practices and some legal statutes have made advocacy for and adherence to international humanitarian law and human rights laws very problematic. A peacekeeper in Darfur

¹¹ Ibid.
shared the story of a young girl who was sexually abused. Her abuser offered to marry her and her family consented as the marriage was considered traditionally to have redeemed her honour in the society, even though she was a minor by legal definition. If the abuser had not come forward, the honour of the girl and her family would have been tarnished. In such situations, it is difficult for a mission to offer a fully secure environment as no legal action or punitive measures can be taken against perpetrators once they obtain redress from traditional channels.\textsuperscript{12}

As mentioned earlier, these three tiers are not singular entities and must be addressed in a holistic manner to maximize effectiveness.

**DPKO/DFS Policy on PoC in United Nations Peacekeeping\textsuperscript{13}**

Four years after the Operational Concept was published, the DPKO/DFS reviewed it to address the changing dynamics of threats against civilians and released an official policy on PoC in April 2015.\textsuperscript{14} This new policy is intended, among other things, to provide a conceptual framework, guiding principles and key considerations for missions when implementing their PoC mandates. The need for this policy resulted from the gaps that the Operational Concept presented to the various UN missions.

The new policy begins with a definition of who a civilian is and offers elements of a typical current PoC mandate. A civilian, per the policy, is defined as:

Any person who is not or is no longer directly participating in hostilities or other acts of violence ..., unless he or she is a member of armed forces or groups. In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered a civilian.\textsuperscript{15}

In past interviews\textsuperscript{16} with some troops, there was some confusion over the definition of who a civilian is, especially if there was no means to determine whether a person aiming a weapon at a peacekeeper was a self-protecting civilian or a member of a rebel group.\textsuperscript{17} However, the new definition makes it clear that when in doubt, missions, especially the police and the army, should consider all persons civilians and offer them protection until their identities can be proven otherwise. While this provision seems politically

\textsuperscript{12}Discussions held in Accra with a peacekeeper from the United Nations/African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur in December 2014.
\textsuperscript{14}DPKO/DFS, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{15}DPKO/DFS (2015, April), op. cit.
\textsuperscript{16}These interviews were held between 2011 and 2012.
\textsuperscript{17}Focus group discussions with United Nations Mission in Liberia troops in 2011.
apt, it poses an operational and tactical challenge as members of rebel groups can be mistaken for civilians and admitted into camps for refugees and displaced persons, thereby endangering their lives. There is therefore a need for missions to have good information management systems to enable them act decisively in obscure situations. The mandate language\(^\text{18}\) has evolved over the years and though it may vary slightly between Security Council resolutions, it most often reads:

**Establishment of the PoC Mandate**

“...decides that the mandate of [name of peacekeeping operation] shall include the following tasks … protection of civilians.”

**Authorization to Use Force**

“Acting under Chapter VII ... Authorizes [name of peacekeeping operation] to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capabilities and areas of deployment, to protect civilians under [imminent] threat of physical violence, without prejudice to the responsibility of the host Government.”

Although the policy reiterates that the primary responsibility for PoC rests with the host nation, it highlights that the PoC mandate should be considered by authorized missions as a priority mandate. This prioritization should reflect in decisions regarding how they allocate and use available capacities and resources to implement their mandates. The policy however cautions missions against working outside their areas of deployment and capacities, while acknowledging that no peacekeeping force will be able to address all posed threats at all times. Secondly, in as much as the policy insists that the role of missions is to support the host nation to carry out its protection responsibilities, it recognizes that some states are unable or unwilling to protect civilians within their territories. In instances where government forces are the perpetrators of violence, peacekeepers are authorized to step in and take over the responsibilities of protection within their capabilities and within their areas of deployment. This should be done in order to prevent, deter, pre-empt or respond to threats of physical violence in the deployed areas irrespective of the source of threat. Theoretically this is a very clear and precise directive however lessons learnt has shown that implementing this practically continues to be a challenge. United Nations Missions deploy into countries generally in consultation with host governments and thus enjoy their goodwill in the execution of their duties. Therefore, if the mission begins to confront its host or to accuse it

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of violation, this creates room for the loss of this goodwill and the termination of the mission’s welcome.

One key element that this new policy advocates is a coordinated and comprehensive approach to the protection mandate. There are many actors within the mission arena who carry out protection duties and responsibilities. Some of these actors may or may not be directly linked with UN missions and may have different interpretations of how, whom and what to protect. These differences in protection understanding and lack of coordination have, in years past, proven to be conflictual among mission actors.

In order to create a more harmonized approach to protection, MONUSCO has institutionalized working groups to help it coordinate its activities, namely the Senior Management Group on Protection (SMG-P), the Protection Working Group (PWG) and the Provincial Senior Management Group on Protection (SMG-PP). The SMG-P focuses on the support that could be offered by the mission and the national troops for its joint operations and acts as the platform for integrated PoC planning. The SMG-PP focuses on managing and operationalizing PoC at the field level, while the PWG offers technical advice and recommendations on PoC related matters based on information received from the field. It also serves as a secretariat for the SMG-P.19

At the operational level, MONUSCO has multi-sectorial Joint Protection Teams (JPT) which encompass representatives from the UN Force, UN Police, humanitarian agencies, and national authorities. The JPT receives its mandate and terms of operations from the SMG-PP and are charged with collecting information in addition to building relations between key actors and local communities. This is to ensure preventive and responsive action towards the implementation of the PoC mandate.20 The JPT also plays the crucial role of offering a forum for all the actors in the field carrying out protection mandates to interact and coordinate their activities. It further allows these actors to share information and build a level of trust during the discharge of their duties.21

With regards to the Operational Concept that was developed in 2010 and upon which many PoC mission strategies were drafted, the new PoC policy has modified the three-tier approach slightly as follows:

- Tier I: Protection through dialogue and engagement

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20 Ibid.

• Tier II: Provision of physical protection
• Tier III: Establishment of a protective environment

The first tier activities include engaging with actual and potential perpetrators and offering conflict resolution and mediation for parties to a conflict. It also includes interacting with governments and relevant actors to ensure that civilians are protected. Though the name has changed, the focus seems to have not deviated as it still consists of engaging parties to conflict and intervening to ensure civilians are protected. This tier aims to encourage compliance and adherence to international statutes on protection but it does not give missions guidelines on how to ensure compliance as this cannot be enforced by any mission.

The name of the second tier has also been modified but the focus similarly remains unchanged: ensuring that civilians are shielded from physical harm or violence. Thus the role of uniformed components and their use of force to prevent, deter and pre-empt violence must be conducted in a coordinated manner between substantive civilian sections and the military forces. The example of MONUSCO’s JPT may have served as the lesson learnt in re-formulating this aspect of this tier.

The last tier also had its name modified though it still focuses on long lasting peacebuilding targets. A majority of activities under this tier aim towards medium to long term objectives. In order to ensure the long-term objectives are met this tier must be undertaken alongside or in consultation with the United Nations Country Teams. This collaboration with the Country Teams will ensure that once the mission draws down and leaves the country, there will be actors on the ground to supervise and implement designated peacebuilding activities.

Conclusion

The protection of civilians' mandate has been in existence since 1999. The UN has continuously developed policies and guidelines to support its implementation based on lessons learned from the field. All these efforts are aimed at ensuring that civilians in conflict zones receive the utmost protection at all times. The greatest challenge that peacekeeping missions will continue to encounter will be ensuring compliance to the protection statutes by all parties of the conflict. As stated earlier, the primary actor responsible for protecting civilians is the host nation and the mission is charged to assist the host in this regard. However, when the host nation is not complying with the protection statues, getting compliance from non-state actors becomes impossible. Secondly, the disconnection between the expectations of the civilians and international...
community against the actual capabilities of the mission is another challenge that may never be fully resolved mainly because the expectations will always exceed the available capabilities and this new policy indirectly acknowledges this challenge.

The Operational Concept must be acknowledged for the important foundation it laid in conceptualizing PoC in UN missions. However, as the conflict arena continues to evolve and atrocities against civilians become more diverse coupled with the continuous lessons learnt from the field, this new policy document is expected to address some of the lessons learnt. The UN’s new PoC policy tries to address some of the challenges that have arisen from implementing PoC in the field. While it offers some guidance on how to address the core challenges identified—which is commendable however it will be difficult to categorically state if this new policy will address all identified challenges in the arena completely, especially as the situations continue to change. Nevertheless, this policy is still very young and has not been tried and tested yet, there will therefore be the need to allow the policy to be implemented fully before ascertaining if indeed it offers civilians the best possible protection by peace missions.

References


Abstract
Burundi’s numerous conflicts are deeply rooted in political and historical ethnic tensions. Efforts to build peace have included the Arusha Agreement as well as two peacekeeping missions to monitor and support the implementation of the agreement between the warring parties. In reviewing the peace support operations in Burundi, this chapter specifically explores the extent to which the African Mission in Burundi and the United Nations Operation in Burundi have contributed to promoting and sustaining peace in the country. While it highlights the successes, challenges, and lessons learned from both missions, the review concludes with some discussion of the prospects of resolving the recent political crisis in the country in light of the 26th African Union Summit.

Introduction: Conflict in Burundi
Burundi has experienced decades of conflict since gaining independence from Belgium in 1962. The intermittent violent conflicts are rooted in political and historical tensions between the two major ethnic groups—the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority. This can be traced back to 1916-62 when the Belgian colonialists pitted the groups against each other. Many lost their lives following successive crises in 1965, 1972, 1988, and 1991. The last major conflict, which lasted from 1993 to 2005, claimed over 300,000 lives and displaced almost one million people (UNICIB 1996) following the 1993 assassination of the first democratically elected president, Ndadaye Melchoir.
Several assassinations occurred during this crisis, including those of the speaker and deputy speaker of parliament who were killed by army officers with the aim of creating a constitutional void that would necessitate the appointment of an interim president. Cyprien Ntaryamira, the Minister of Agriculture was (contentiously) elected by the Assembly to become a new President and sworn into office in February 1994. Unfortunately, Ntaryamina was also killed along with Rwanda’s President Habyarimana in April 1994 when their plane was shot down. This triggered the genocide in Rwanda that claimed about a million civilian lives, most of whom were Tutsis. By 1996, the Front for Democracy in Burundi and other Hutu militias had almost been alienated and dominated by Union for National Progress—broadly composed of the army and the Tutsi. It is also crucial that the conflict in Burundi is understood from a regional context (Svensson 2008). Therefore, the need for a peace process was not only because of the violence within Burundi, but also the rise of regional humanitarian crisis following the massive influx of refugees from Burundi into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Tanzania. “The refugee camps became breeding grounds for Hutu radicalism and future uprisings’ (Rodt 2011, p. 7). Two major rebel groups were formed in this process: the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) and the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People—National Forces of Liberation (PALIPEHUTU-FNL), each of which have fragmented further since then (Boshoff et al. 2010; Svensson 2008).

As part of securing peace in the country, the Arusha peace talks started in 1998 with the former president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere as mediator. After Nyerere’s death a year later, the former South African president, Nelson Mandela took over. The peace talks culminated in the Arusha Agreement that was signed by the two rebel factions in 2000. The agreement provided for a transition to multi-party government. As part of implementing the agreement, the African Union (AU) deployed a peacekeeping force to Burundi in early 2003 to begin disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating rebel and army forces, and to assist the return of refugees. In June 2004 the United Nations (UN) took over peacekeeping duties which ended in 2006.

Although much of the violence experienced in the early part of the conflict has subsided, there remain unresolved grievances and political instability continues to threaten peace and inter-ethnic cooperation in the country. Violence erupted once more in April 2015 when President Pierre Nkurunziza announced that he would be seeking a third term in office in contravention of the Constitution. The current situation in Burundi which has claimed lives and displaced people, raises grave concern about a potential reversion to civil war. The crisis triggered external interventions which are explored in this review.
Previous interventions aimed at stabilizing Burundi have been explored as part of peace support operations.

**Context of the PSOS in Burundi: The Arusha Agreement**

The African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) were the main peacekeeping missions in Burundi after the 1993-2005 conflict with the aim of securing peace in the country. After a number of informal attempts to end the conflict, a peace agreement was finally reached on 28 August 2000 in Arusha. The Arusha Agreement was facilitated by the late former president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, and subsequently the late former president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela (Hatungimana et al. 2007). The purpose of the agreement was to respond to the root causes of the conflict in Burundi and to reconcile the various groups involved.

The Arusha Agreement consists of a peace accord followed by five protocols that were signed by the Transitional Government of Burundi, the National Assembly, seventeen political parties, and various armed and unarmed political groups.¹ It envisaged a UN peacekeeping force to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and proposed a power-sharing political arrangement between the political and military powers in post-war Burundi, while the ceasefire agreement integrated the former rebels into the larger society (Rodt 2011).

The spirit of the agreement reflected the desire to prevent and address all forms of exclusion and violence among the diverse political and ethnic groups. Yet, its implementation has proven difficult following the current 2015 crisis which undermined the agreement as the ruling party tried to ignore it. According to the former president of Burundi, Domitien Ndayizeye, this threat is beyond just promulgating the third term rule as the ruling party remains determined to expand its control. Nevertheless, the peacekeeping missions in Burundi have contributed to the process of implementing the peace process in the country.

**Burundi Peacekeeping Missions: Successes and Challenges**

**African Mission in Burundi (AMIB): 2003–4.**

The OAU/African Union (AU) involvement in Burundi since the 1993 crisis has been described as ‘one of the AU’s biggest success stories’ (Boshoff et al 2010, p. 69; Rodt 2011). AMIB was the AU’s first attempt to help resolve conflict and promote peace since its establishment in 2002 within the framework of the African Peace and Security

Architecture. Constituted under Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act, AMIB was necessary not only to address the conflict in Burundi, but was also essential in tackling the interconnected violence of the Great Lakes Region. The AU mandated the deployment of AMIB from April 2003 to 31 May 2004. The South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) which was in Burundi since 2001, formed the basis of the advance deployment of AMIB and retained its security function after the UN took over from AMIB. The objectives of the mission would have been fulfilled if the ceasefire agreements had been implemented, and the defence and security in Burundi were both stable and well managed by a clear defence and security structure.\(^2,3\)

**AMIB Mandate**

In line with the objective to promote peace in Burundi, the AMIB was mandated to carry out the following tasks:

- Act as liaison between the parties.
- Monitor and verify the implementation of the ceasefire agreements.
- Facilitate activities of the Joint Ceasefire Commission and Technical Committees for the establishment and restructuring of the national defence and police forces.
- Secure identified assembly and disengagement areas.
- Facilitate safe passage for the parties during planned movements to designated assembly areas.
- Facilitate and provide technical assistance to the Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) process.
- Facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance, including to refugees and internally displaced persons.
- Coordinate mission activities with the UN presence in Burundi.
- Provide VIP protection for designated returning leaders.

AMIB was an integrated mission comprising civilian and military contingents. It had a total strength of up to 3,335 with military contingents from South Africa (1600), Ethiopia (858), and Mozambique (228), as well as an AU observer element (43) drawn from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo, and Tunisia. Although deployment started in April 2003, it was not until the arrival of the main bodies of Ethiopia and Mozambique from September to October 2003 that the force became fully operational (Aboagye 2004, p.11).

\(^2\) Article III of the ceasefire agreement of December 2002 provided that the ‘verification and control of the ceasefire agreement shall be conducted by an African Mission’.

\(^3\) Communiqué of the Seventh Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at Heads of State and Government level.
There have been mixed assessments of the achievements of AMIB in the country because, as some scholars and practitioners argue, its achievements were more symbolic than substantive (Okeke 2014). Although it had its shortcomings, AMIB was a step in the right direction for the AU and its role in facilitating peace in Africa. The AMIB was markedly successful at stabilizing the country and creating an enabling environment for the pursuit of important tasks and objectives, including DDR, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and human rights and economic stability (Murithi 2008; Svensson 2008; Rodt 2011). The AU’s legitimacy as a regional institution in Africa was instrumental to the Arusha Agreements, especially in getting the CNDD-FDD to join the peace process (Rodt 2011). As part of the process to address the humanitarian crisis, the mission established a Civil-Military Coordination Centre to consult with humanitarian agencies on operational requirements (Besada 2013). It is estimated that 95 percent of Burundi was relatively stable when AMIB ended its mission even though some warring parties were destructive during its deployment (Aboagye 2004).

Although AMIB was expected to disarm an estimated total of 20,000 ex-combatants across the demobilization centres (Aboagye 2004), it was unable to because of the following reasons: the inability of the warring parties to agree on issues concerning the restructuring of the national army; the limited number of troops required to safeguard the cantonment areas and the mission’s inability to sustain combatants. Security was a huge challenge because of the following risks and concerns that were identified regarding the deployment of the AMIB mission, including the potential threats associated with the mandated task. The mandate made no provision for enforcement measures and procedures, which limited the rules of engagement and raised the risk of AMIB being sidelined in the conflict between the warring groups. Another threat to security was the limited participation of the warring parties in signing and upholding the ceasefire agreement. This meant that they continued to engage in military confrontation, which affected the participation of the Burundian Armed Forces in the DDR process. Such inconsistencies in security raised concerns regarding the entry criteria for AMIB (Boshoff & Francis 2003).

Limited resources, capacity and funding also inhibited the ability of AMIB to sustain its forces and cater to a large number of ex-combatants. In order to meet the needs of the Muyanye cantonment site, AMIB’s head of mission had to utilize his influence and position to secure more resources from international donors like the World Health Organisation, the German Technical Cooperation, the European Union, and the UN Children’s Fund. By November 2003, the AMIB was able to assemble and disarm 228 members from the CNDD-FDD of Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL
of Alain Mugabarabona (Boshoff and Very, 2010). AMIB also aided the return of Burundian leaders from exile through its special protection unit.

The reluctance of AU member states to provide sufficient financial support to AMIB questioned their commitment to the operationalization of AU peace support operations and confirmed criticisms about the reliability and effectiveness of the implementation of AU peace and security missions and its implementation (Badmus 2015). According to Bogland et al. (2008), the AU’s peace operations faced a ‘triangular area of tension’ and the organization has been unable to bridge the gap between its ambition and its capacity to execute peace operations successfully. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the AU’s ambition with AMIB was to act as a conduit to a larger international intervention. Given that UN missions often take a long time to deploy, AMIB’s rapid reaction capabilities were necessary, not only to provide a buffer to the violence pending a robust international response, but also as part of the efforts to find African solutions to African problems (Svensson 2008). Despite its challenges, AMIB built confidence and paved the way for UN deployment given the UN’s initial reluctance to embark on the mission.

The United Nations Operation in Burundi—2004-07

The UN Operations in Burundi (ONUB) was mandated on 21 May 2004 by Security Council Resolution 1545 (2004). The mission was initially authorized for six months but was extended five times under varying resolutions until 2006 when the Security Council issued Resolution 1719 authorizing the establishment of the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) to succeed ONUB from 1 January 2007. In each resolution, the Security Council reiterated its support for the Arusha Agreement and called on the relevant parties to honour their commitments thereunder. Each resolution highlighted the positive developments made and measures that needed to be taken to fulfil the overall mandate of the mission.

ONUB’s Mandate

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, ONUB’s mandate in UN Security Council Resolution 1545 was, inter alia, to ‘use all necessary means’ to:

1. Ensure and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreements.
2. Ensure the implementation of the DDR programme.

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3. Ensure the promotion, investigation and protection of human rights, with particular attention to women, children, and vulnerable persons.

4. Support the government in carrying out security sector and other institutional reforms.

5. Monitor the illegal flow of weapons across the national borders.

6. Contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process through advice and support.

7. Create an enabling environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid.

8. Ensure the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence without prejudice to the Burundian Transitional Government.

**Personnel - Civilian, Police and Military**

The ONUB mission maintained a total authorized strength of 5,650 military personnel that included 200 military observers, 120 police personnel, 434 international civilian personnel, 270 United Nations Volunteers and 446 local civilian staff. By September 2005, the mission reached its peak strength of 5,665 total uniformed personnel, which included 5,400 troops. ONUB recorded a total of 24 fatalities, including 21 military personnel, one police, one international civilian personnel and one local civilian personnel. The main troop contributing countries were Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa (Jackson 2006).

In its first six months, ONUB consisted of 2,612 ‘re-hatted’ AMIB troops with Carolyn McAskie, as the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). She arrived in Bujumbura from Canada on 25 June 2004 (Murithi 2008). The SRSG chaired the Implementation Monitoring Committee for the Arusha Agreement, which was composed of signatories to the agreement, civil society, the UN, the AU, donors, and the Regional Initiative. Through this committee, the ONUB played an important role in assisting the warring parties to resolve DDR and SSR issues through the Joint Ceasefire Commission. Although ONUB experienced several delays in implementing aspects of its mandate, its mission in Burundi has been presented as a ‘UN success story’ (Boutellis 2015). Yet, today’s crisis in Burundi challenges such conclusion given that the mission did not successfully prevent the escalation of the conflict caused by the varied interpretation of the Arusha Agreement by the warring parties.

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6 Ibid.
The DDR process was launched in 2005 with ONUB and the World Bank Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program providing technical assistance to the National DDR Commission. While the World Bank was instrumental in the funding of the process, ONUB assisted in securing the entire process up until the weapons and ammunition retrieved from about 23,000 ex-combatants were disposed of (Boutellis 2015). In view of the regional dimension to the conflict, ONUB liaised with the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo to fulfill the transborder aspects of its mandate (Boshoff et al 2010).

ONUB helped to secure the electoral process by creating integrated security units to protect political leaders and government institutions in Burundi. It also worked alongside Burundian integrated security units to secure the electoral process, which in turn increased public confidence in the elections (Boutellis 2015). The emergence of former CNDD-FDD rebel Nkurunziza as president in July 2005 concluded the transitional process in Burundi and the emergence of efforts to consolidate peace and development through regular consultation with the elected government and international partners.

ONUB did not operate without challenges. For example, the UN’s political role was not mentioned explicitly. Unlike the AU, the UN struggled with legitimacy in Burundi and had an uneasy relationship with the newly elected Burundian government, which pressured for the drawdown of ONUB and the early departure of McAskie (Boutellis 2015). The political role thus remained with South Africa which had been present in Burundi before AMIB and the UN mission to broker the ceasefire agreements.

The DDR process, which counts as one of its successes, faced numerous challenges related to land disputes and the lack of economic opportunities for combatants useful for helping them reintegrate into their communities. The latter was also attributed to the fact that the National DDR Commission had politicized the process and misappropriated funds that would have been useful to the process (Boutellis 2015).

Politically motivated violence and intimidation was a huge impediment to the ONUB mission. The conflict in Burundi led to large-scale violations of human rights and general impunity. Although considerable improvements in the human rights situations were noticed in the period when a meaningful ceasefire agreement was signed by the CNDD-FDD and FNL, reports suggest that the situation deteriorated. Human rights violations often took place under the watch of ONUB. The Gatumba Massacre of August 2004, in particular, raised severe criticisms among the Burundian population. Even though there was a strong UN Chapter VII mandate to protect civilians from imminent threats of
physical violence, the ONUB Forces had to work alongside the Transitional Government of Burundi, which often meant that their role was restricted, especially when the National Defence Force (FDN) were perpetrators of attacks against civilians. Therefore, the ONUB had to be careful about implementing its mandate in this area. Despite documenting human rights situations in Burundi, the ONUB lacked the required intelligence to launch a more assertive response to human rights violations in the country which could be concluded as hindering its effectiveness in the area (Jackson, 2006).

**Gender Perspectives**

Empirical studies indicated that women were not included in the Arusha peace negotiations, even though they made significant contributions to peacebuilding in Burundi (Ikeora & Okeke 2012). Such exclusions were among the influencing factors for the introduction of the United Nations Security Council resolutions 1325, 1820, and related resolutions. An inter-agency assessment was conducted prior to finalizing the mandates of the mission in line with UNSCR 1325 that calls for the inclusion of women in peacekeeping operations. Although ONUB’s mandate ensured that special attention was given to issues related to gender equality, sexual abuses by UN peacekeepers remained one of “the biggest single sources of public resentment against the mission” (Boutellis 2015, p. 739). This was challenging to the mission as it potentially dented its credibility.

**Exit Strategy**

Peacekeeping transitions are essential in the temporary nature of peace operations and often undertaken with caution to ensure that the drawdown process does not jeopardize peace efforts. AMIB’s exit strategy followed the UN mission as planned, hence the UN’s transition was most crucial. The democratically elected government of Burundi requested the withdrawal of ONUB in 2005. Although this was untimely, the Secretary-General’s 2006 report justified the drawdown on the grounds that ONUB had completed its set tasks and that there was a need to reset priorities as the peace process evolved.7

There was a strong consensus to develop the ‘follow-on structure’ necessary to build and sustain an appropriate level of delivery in crucial areas, including governance, SSR, human rights, and transitional justice (Boutellis 2012). In 2006, Security Council Resolution 1719 authorized the establishment of the BINUB to succeed ONUB from 1 January 2007. Although the mission (BINUB) came with no troops, it had the AU battalion including SAPSD, under the responsibility of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations to oversee the stabilization of peace in Burundi. This arrangement enabled

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a smooth transition from peacekeeping to a more development-focused engagement by the UN (Boutellis 2012). In December 2010, BINUB was replaced by a small UN political mission, the United Nations Office in Burundi, which later closed in December 2014.

**Lessons Learned**

Although AMIB’s entry point was questioned, as indicated earlier, one of the lessons learned from this mission includes the importance of prompt AU intervention, which was a major achievement for AMIB and the multidimensional UN peace mission respectively. AMIB’s initial deployment filled a necessary gap between the outbreak of conflict and the deployment of the UN peace mission, which was, in some respect, the best ‘alternative to a dithering, detached, and disengaged international community’ (Murithi 2009, p. 15; Badmus 2015). Both missions’ simultaneous input in Burundi is indicative of emerging innovative approaches that can be adopted in future peace operations (Okeke 2014).

The lack of resources that AMIB suffered illustrates the jeopardy facing the AU’s efforts to exert greater ownership of peace and security in Africa. Excessive donor dependency, as seen in this mission, is a potential risk for instability. This factor underlines the need for the AU to seek alternative ways to fund and sustain its future peace missions in order to ensure successful future African-led missions.

The integrated nature of AMIB demonstrated the importance of a sound collaboration between the civilian and military contingents for the success of the mission. The AMIB established a Civil Military Coordination Centre in order to liaise and consult with humanitarian agencies and NGOs on the operational requirements of humanitarian delivery.

The anxiousness for the democratically elected government to assert its sovereignty led to the untimely withdrawal of ONUB. This makes it crucial for the UN to be alert to the need to work closely with transitional governments without compromising its relationship with potential successor administrations (Jackson 2006). According to Jackson (2006), it might have been useful to appoint new UN mission leadership after the elections to signal a new beginning with the new political leadership.

There were other issues that undermined the image and legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission. For example, the sexual misconduct of ONUB peacekeepers caused concerns among local people and left much to be desired. This scandal could have been avoided had there been significant and consistent attention from senior management to enforce
zero-tolerance to sexual offences. The accused peacekeepers were suspended pending an official investigation for allegations of sexual misconduct.

### Conclusion: Prospects for Peace in Burundi

The prospects of stability in Burundi today seem dim despite ongoing efforts to sustain peace in the country. Fifteen years after the Arusha Agreement, Burundi seems to have regressed to its post-conflict state with violent political unrest caused by Nkurunziza’s plans to run for a third term against the terms of the Arusha Agreement. His threat to rewrite the constitution for this reason was opposed by many, including the former intelligence chief, Godefroid Niyombare. Nkurunziza has maintained his role as president in Burundi, but many Burundians no longer recognize him as legitimate.

Although different from previous conflicts, many observers fear that the ongoing political unrest could cost Burundi the relative peace that it has managed to achieve. The unrest has claimed lives, displaced over 200,000 Burundians, and raised fears of genocide and a return to civil war. Critics have queried the untimely intervention of the international community and its inability to question Burundi’s democratic credentials. The AU, whose intervention to secure peace in Burundi has been fittingly praised, was criticized for failing to take a principled stand against Nkurunziza’s third term attempt. However, following the escalating violence in December 2015, the AU announced its intention to send 5,000 peacekeepers to protect civilians in Burundi in accordance with a communiqué adopted by its Peace and Security Council (PSC), which gave the Burundian government 96 hours to consent to the African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU).8,9 This was considered a new form of coercive diplomacy for the AU—an approach that would come under scrutiny during its 26th Summit in Addis Ababa held in January 2016.10 At this point, the AU’s intervention was a mere threat rather than an authorized humanitarian intervention. This intended tactic raises a number of questions, including its legality under international law, to the extent that it might contradict Article 53 of the UN Charter11, since the AU did not have the confirmed authorization of the UN Security Council.

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11 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VIII, Article 53, ‘The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state …’.
Though MAPROBU was well-directed to protect civilians and prevent violence from escalating in Burundi, it failed to deploy, primarily because it faced a complex set of challenges. First, the Burundian government rejected it on the grounds that it was a hostile invasion and that most PSC members did not deem it appropriate to send troops without the government’s consent. Second, there was no UN Security Council Resolution to support the mission and the authorization of Article 4(h). Again, apart from the fact that it would have been difficult to implement, the PSC’s threat was weakened by the lack of consistency and clarity created by disunity among its members. Even though the Burundian government rejected MAPROBU, it agreed to the deployment of 100 human rights observers and 100 military monitors from the AU to monitor the unrest in the country.¹²

Conclusions regarding Burundi from the recent AU summit emphasized the importance of continuing the inter-Burundi dialogue under the mediation of the East African Community led by Uganda but with AU support. AU member states considered the deployment of MAPROBU ‘premature’ but suggested that the mission could be reinstated if the Burundian government gives its consent. The PSC decided to appoint a high-level delegation to Burundi to hold consultations with the government and other stakeholders.¹³ The delegation will comprise five heads of state representing Africa’s five regions: Mauritania (North), South Africa (Southern), Senegal (West), Gabon (Central), and Ethiopia (Eastern).¹⁴ Like most, if not all regional interventions, the one in Burundi had the potential to either succeed or fail. Because of their proximity, regional powers have considerable knowledge of conflicts in their backyards. While this can be exploited to support peace processes to succeed, these factors can also enable regional powers to take sides in any conflict. This was the case of the Economic Community of West African States in Liberia when Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso supported Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia whereas Guinea and Sierra Leone were suspected of supporting the United Liberation Movement for Democracy during phase one (1989 to 1997) of the war, and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy during phase two (1997 to 2003) (Jaye 2003).

In view of the numerous attempts to resolve the political crisis in the country, it is clear that the unitary deployment of peacekeepers is not sufficient to resolve Burundi’s

problems which ‘require effective conflict resolution and reconciliation.’ It is crucial that the peace dialogues between Burundi’s government and the international community and other interventions halt the ongoing crisis to forestall further delays with fulfilling the Arusha Agreement.

References


15 Ibid.


Communiqué of the Seventh Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at Heads of State and Government level.


SECTION TWO

Country Case Studies: Past Missions in Africa
PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN LIBERIA

Thomas Jaye and Emmanuel Kwesi Aning

Abstract
Since armed conflict broke out in Liberia from 1989 to 2003, several attempts have been made by regional and international actors to return the country to stability. One of such initiatives was peacekeeping. Peacekeeping at the regional level was implemented through the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) deployment; while the UN also deployed a peacekeeping mission through the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). This chapter assesses the UNMIL intervention in Liberia through the implementation of its mandates, its operational issues and challenges, its exit strategy, and its ability to maintain a secure environment throughout Liberia. It concludes that as the mission is drawing down after stabilizing Liberia, it is the responsibility of Liberians to ensure that the peace process is not rocked by internal tensions.

Introduction
Between 24 December 1989 and 18 August 2003, the West African state of Liberia went through an intractable civil war that led to the death of more than 200,000 people; more than a million were displaced either as refugees or as internally displaced persons, the entire state and societal structures collapsed, and there was decline and deterioration in the socio-economic conditions of those who survived it. It was the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that initially intervened and subsequently, the UN and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)—now African Union (AU)—supported the peace efforts. During the period of the conflict (1989-2003) 13 peace agreements were signed and five power-sharing interim governments were established. The first was the Interim Government of National Unity, which was elected in Banjul, The Gambia in August 1990.
by representatives of Liberian stakeholders. The last was the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), which emerged out of the Accra peace talks.

The armed violent conflict in Liberia can be divided into two phases: phase one began in 1989 and ended in 1997 with the elections of Charles Taylor whereas phase two began in July 1999 and ended in 2003 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra, Ghana on 18 August 2003. In comparison with previous agreements, the CPA was very comprehensive and is justifiably credited with changing the political landscape of the country: in its aftermath, Charles Taylor departed Liberia for exile to Calabar, Nigeria; a new interim government, the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) was formed and after two years in office, it presided over the 2005 elections that brought Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf to power as the first female elected president of an African country.

**PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN LIBERIA**

**The ECOWAS Monitoring Group**

Even though this chapter focuses on UNMIL, it is important to stress that the first peacekeeping operation in Liberia was led by ECOWAS through the ad hoc body, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). ECOMOG operated in Liberia between 1991 when it intervened and 1997 when it withdrew after Charles Taylor was elected through a democratic process. Subsequently, the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) intervened just on the eve of the deployment of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

Between 1989 and 2003, ECOWAS spearheaded several peace talks and brokered 13 peace agreements. These included but were not limited to the following: Banjul (August 1990); Bamako (November 1990); Banjul (December 1990); Lomé (February 1991); Yamoussoukro (June 1991); Yamoussoukro (July 1991); Yamoussoukro (September 1991); Yamoussoukro (October 1991); Cotonou (1993); Akosombo and Accra (1994); Abuja I (1995); Abuja II (1996) and Accra (2003). Then there were the First and Second All-Liberia Conferences of 1990 and 1991 respectively. The point should be made that while ECOWAS is credited for taking the lead in organising these peace talks and brokering the agreements, other groups like the UN, the AU and the Mano River Union played significant roles.

**AU**

The AU established a mission in Liberia in 2004. It has played a major role in Liberia’s recovery in fulfilment of its designated role in the CPA (2003) as one of the guarantors
of the peace process. The AU has closely monitored and contributed to post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts in several areas, including the rehabilitation and construction of primary schools, a clinic, libraries, toilet facilities and hand pumps. It has also established a development cooperative amounting to over US$300,000. The AU monitored two major elections held in Liberia (2005 and 2011) and intervened in the fight against Ebola, deploying AU volunteer health workers alongside West African Health Organisation health workers—over 800 in total—from AU Member States across the continent under the African Support to Ebola Outbreak in West Africa Mission at a cost of about US$37 million. The AU’s major areas of support have been peace and security, elections, national reconciliation, post-conflict reconstruction and development, and gender.1

Under the auspices of its predecessor, the OAU, troops were deployed to Liberia as part of the expanded ECOMOG forces for the purpose of gaining the confidence of the armed factions, particularly the National Patriotic Front of Liberia NPFL, which grew distrustful of ECOWAS.

UNMIL

UNMIL intervened in Liberia against the backdrop of failed and collapsed state and societal structures, proliferation of arms, the need to restore order and rebuild governance structures, and an environment of mistrust between and among armed factions. Hence, throughout its lifespan in the country, UNMIL has largely remained a stabilization force geared at sustaining peace and security in a post-war environment. This is one role that it played effectively and must be given credit for. To achieve this objective, UNMIL’s role was to create an enabling environment for the overall process of post-war reconstruction or peacebuilding. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1509 (2003), refers to the ‘establishment of a long-term United Nations stabilization force to relieve ECOMIL forces, as set out in resolution 1497 (2003)’.2 UNMIL is therefore an epiphenomenon of the Accra peace talks and the CPA that emerged from it. The mission has maintained relative peace and security during its tenure but whether this can be sustained after UNMIL departs Liberia after 30 June 2016 is the responsibility of the Liberian people and government.

Mandates

The legal frameworks for the mandate of UNMIL are outlined in both the CPA and UNSCR 1509. While the former calls on the UN to play a specific role in security sector reform

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1 Interview, AU staff, Monrovia, Liberia, 23 September 2015.
2 UNSC Resolution 1509 (2003), Adopted by the Security Council at its 4830th meeting, on 19 September 2003, p. 2
(SSR) through training of the Liberia National police (LNP), it is the latter (UNSCR 1509) that provides the overarching mandate for the mission. In it, it was agreed that the following broad areas would constitute the mandate of UNMIL:

- Support for implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement.
- Protection of United Nations Staff, Facilities and Civilians.
- Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance.
- Support for Security Reform; and
- Support for Implementation of the Peace Process.

Under these conditions, UNMIL could only support or facilitate the peace process and nothing else. This was never an executive mandate as was the case in both Kosovo and East Timor. According to some observers, such a mandate had implications for the effectiveness of its role in Liberia as it could only intervene narrowly in Liberian internal affairs.³

Mission Statistics

When it intervened in Liberia, it was agreed that ‘UNMIL will consist of up to 15,000 United Nations military personnel, including up to 250 military observers and 160 staff officers, and up to 1,115 civilian police officers, including formed units to assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout Liberia, and the appropriate civilian component’.⁴ After the 2005 elections, troop numbers dropped periodically and dramatically, hence by 1 August 2015, these constituted the mission statistics:

| Police Officers | 393 |
| Formed Police Units | 995 |
| Military Observers | 121 |
| Staff officers | 70 |
| Troops | 3,562¹ |

Now that the mission has come to a close, the above figures will reduce even further (see the section on exit strategy below).

Operational Issues and Challenges

Like other PSOs, the UNMIL intervened in Liberia at a time when the country had just emerged from a violent conflict. There was complete state and societal collapse and

³ Interview, UN staff, Monrovia, Liberia, 23 September 2015.
without external support the NTGL, which was dubbed ‘nothing to give to Liberia’, would find it difficult to move the country from war to peace. Therefore, implementing the CPA was primary but in order to do that, the mission needed to create an enabling environment. In this vein, during the duration of its operations in Liberia, the mission had to address complex security, political, social, human rights and reconciliation challenges and issues.

Security

As one observer put it, one of the most complex challenges faced by UNMIL during its operations in Liberia was security in the narrow sense of the word. According to him, disarming and demobilising armed factions when there was no trust and confidence among them, reintegrating them and undertaking SSR under such conditions was bound to be difficult. As he points out, the mission wrongly assumed that it would only disarm, demobilise and reintegrate 28,000 ex-fighters but when the process was over, the total figure was 103,000 ex-fighters.\(^5\) According to him, this had implications for the reintegration process, which could not be started because the financial resources earmarked for this part of the programme were used for the disintegration and disarmament phase. Regrettably, some of the real ex-fighters did not benefit from this process for two main reasons: the criteria used was liable to corruption as the commanders abused it by ensuring that their relatives benefitted and some of the real ex-fighters were residing in areas that were impassable. Hence, the DDRR programme in Liberia remained an incomplete process.\(^6\)

Similarly, the SSR process in Liberia encountered difficulties for a variety of reasons. Overall, there was too much emphasis on the technical aspect of the process at the expense of its governance aspect. Possibly, this occurred because those implementing the SSR programme wrongly assumed that it was merely a technical quick fix that was limited to training. But SSR is more than this; it is about governance and oversight issues as well. There was also too much focus on the LNP and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), while little attention was paid to other elements of the national security architecture, including intelligence, immigration, fire service and others. This selective emphasis can only be explained by the fact that the LNP provides a frontline security service while the AFL defends the territorial integrity of the country. Public perceptions of both institutions in pre-war years was also very poor, making their reformation a key priority.

\(^5\) Interview, former NCDDRR staff, 24 September 2015.
\(^6\) Interview, former NCDDRR staff, 24 September 2015.
As UNMIL focused specifically on the LNP, it is important to say a few words about police reform in Liberia. According to Liberian sources, everyone in the LNP was told to resign and reapply. Those who applied were vetted and thereafter re-employed from the basic level irrespective of whether the individuals had undergone advanced training before. As one Liberian source stated, the LNP was built from scratch as if there was no police or policing in Liberia prior to the war and UNMIL also wrongly assumed that everyone in the police were recruits of the NPFL who were loyal to Charles Taylor. This led to a loss of institutional memory as well as the skills set required for effective policing such as investigation, report writing and others that support state prosecutor processes.

In addition, in line with UNSCR 1325, there were efforts on the part of the UN and Liberian authorities to recruit more females into the service. To do this, the entry criteria were dropped for female recruits from the regular secondary school certificate to grade 9. The idea was that they would undergo an accelerated education programme so that they could complete secondary school ahead of schedule but many found this very difficult. Further, those that completed the program found it difficult to write reports and this had implications for effective policing. Commenting on the vetting process, Bruce Baker asserts:

> The UN-administered vetting process of the security agencies may have removed 60% of the post-war personnel, but what purpose if the ‘new’ police are allowed to engage in acts of petty corruption, collude with criminals, or use brutality (all of which were repeatedly reported to the author). Traffic police in Monrovia still openly ask for bribes from vehicle drivers; police officers move through the markets taking what they want or demanding money for its return.

Finally, as some donors provided their own trainers, the LNP officers were trained under diverse doctrines by trainers from Jamaica, Sweden, the UK, Norway, Nigeria, Netherlands, Ghana and others. In the process, there was total confusion. For example, the officers were trained to salute in different ways depending on trainers’ home countries, some of which do not require the ‘courtesy’ normally required by Liberian police officers.

Irrespective of these challenges, UNMIL was able to perform its basic mission—stabilise the country. During the course of its stay, several demonstrations and riots occurred.

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7. Interviews with cross-section of security personnel and former police officers, 23-26 September 2015.
8. Interview with cross-section of security personnel and former police officers, 23-26 September 2015.
and its formed police units (FPU) had to intervene to control the crowds. The following constitute examples of such occurrences: student riots in Monrovia (March 2011); community protests at Sime Darby (May 2015) for a missing woman in the company area; workers protest and rioting against poor working conditions at Arcelor Mittal (July 2014); workers’ rights against bad working conditions and low wages at Golden Verulum (26 May 2015); rioting by motor-cyclists both at Red Light in Monrovia (April 2015) and in Ganta (September 2015).

As UNMIL departs Liberia by 30 June 2016, the issue of security constitutes a major concern for most Liberians who feel that their country is not ready to shoulder its security responsibilities. As one observer put it, “if the FPU still had to intervene in the rioting by motor-cyclists in Ganta in September, then when will the Liberian police be able to control such incidents on their own?”10 The point being made here is that if after more than a decade of SSR the LNP cannot deal with such incidents, then there is reason for concern. UNMIL’s departure is inevitable and Liberia must be able to take responsibility for any future security incidents without depending on external forces to maintain peace and security. That said, there will always be some challenges that the Liberian government will struggle to overcome. For example, the burden of policing will continue to be difficult for the LNP because of the perennial issue of underfunding. As Bruce Baker aptly put it, ‘under-funding is certainly the most prominent feature of police discourse [in Liberia]’.11

During its tenure, UNMIL has supported the crafting of the 2011 National Intelligence and Security Act, and draft Police and Immigration Acts. It also supported the process of crafting the Government of Liberia’s Security Transition Plan. As part of the process of decentralising and strengthening the security system, no less than 10 County Security Councils have been established with UNMIL financial support. These councils were conceived and designed to ensure community involvement and to serve early warning purposes.

Social

Social conditions in Liberia remain appalling. Although there is a proliferation of tertiary institutions, the quality of education remains questionable. In many parts of the country, the shortage and quality of teachers remain a concern. Individually, over the years, some UNMIL personnel have taught courses at the University of Liberia on

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10 Interview in Monrovia 22 September 2015.
a gratis basis. As if the situation was not bad enough, in 2014 the country was among three Mano River Basin countries that were struck by the deadly Ebola virus disease (the others were Guinea and Sierra Leone). Ebola did not only expose the poor state of the health system, it also impacted negatively on the economic situation in the country. According to UN reports,

Owing to the Ebola crisis, economic growth for 2014 fell from a projected 5.9 percent to 0.7 percent, a rate projected to continue in 2015. The cumulative loss of output was equivalent to 7.7 percent of the gross domestic product, given that most sectors experienced contraction and investment, while expansion in the extractive and agricultural sectors was suspended. Mining output fell from 4.4 to 1.0 percent and the World Bank forecast for agricultural output growth fell from 3.5 to 1.3 percent in 2014. Tax revenue also declined by 20.5 percent from the pre-crisis projections for 2014.12

Overall, about 4,353 lives were lost, 9,798 people were infected and about 3,035 children were deprived of either one or both parents. Then there was the case of four UNMIL staff being infected with two of them losing their lives in the process. All this occurred between March 2014 and March 2015.13 All of these illustrate the severe impact that the disease had on Liberia and its people, many of whom have long lived below the poverty line. Ebola exposed the poor and appalling state of the health system in all affected countries. In countries emerging from conflict like Liberia, the state must intervene decisively in such sectors by training adequate and competent personnel, and strengthening and improving the infrastructure.

In response to the outbreak of the disease, the UN established the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response on 19 September 2014 which closed on 31 July 2015 after achieving its major objective of ensuring an adequate response to Ebola in these countries. The World Health Organisation led the oversight of the Ebola response process. During its tenure, the mission deployed logistical, human and financial resources to the affected countries. Its staff was concretely involved in case management, laboratory and contact tracing, safe and dignified burials, and community engagement and social mobilization.14

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Politics

Politically, the UNMIL has supervised two successful presidential and several legislative elections and by-elections. By the time of the next general elections in October 2017, UNMIL will have drawn down considerably and this will be a test case as to whether Liberia is really prepared to shoulder its own security responsibility or not.

Human Rights and Reconciliation

During its presence in the country, UNMIL deployed human rights monitors throughout the fifteen counties whom were actively supported by its human rights unit. Local capacity was built in the process as some of these monitors have been Liberians. The UNMIL human rights unit has also worked actively with human rights and civil society organisations; it supported the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as part of its transitional justice remit. The inevitable departure of UNMIL will leave a gap that needs to be filled by the existing Independent National Commission on Human Rights, which, according to observers, is plagued by internal governance weaknesses and capacity issues.15

There is also growing concern over the lack of progress with national reconciliation. Thus far, President Sirleaf has appointed three prominent Liberians to head this process but without much success. The latest is the son of the slain President William Richard Tolbert Jr., William R. Tolbert III. Before him, the Nobel laureate, Leymah Gbowee was appointed but resigned and subsequently, George Weah took the role but had to relinquish it after being elected senator for Montserrado County. Implementation of the recommendations of the TRC has been hamstrung or over-shadowed by its recommendation that President Sirleaf and at least 40 others should be lustrated—banned from participating in politics for 30 years. This has been considered by some as unconstitutional but Liberians are waiting eagerly for the end of Sirleaf’s second term after the elections of October 2017. It appears that there is very little that UNMIL can do to impel the implementation of the TRC recommendations, given its mandate to merely support the process as opposed to undertaking the task itself. But during the TRC hearings, UNMIL monitored the process and provided transport and other logistics so that the commissioners could travel to areas that were ordinarily impassable.16

Inter-mission Cooperation

During the lifespan of the mission, inter-mission cooperation occurred between UNMIL and the UN Missions in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). The missions

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15 Informal conversation with a number of Liberians in Monrovia between 15 September and 3 October 2015.
16 Telephone interview, former TRC Commissioner, 12 July 2016.
shared information on security, politics and other issues relating to the peace process and the stability of the subregion. For example, they exchanged regular situation reports and UNMIL and UNAMSIL even set up joint mission analysis cells. Links were also established among the force headquarters of the three missions effective December 2003. From this date, UNMIL, UNAMSIL and UNOCI force commanders were able to meet on a regular basis to discuss issues related to ‘security developments and threats, contingency planning regarding security threats and the concept of an operational level subregional force reserve’. An inter-mission secretariat was also set up to coordinate these meetings and follow-up actions.

There were joint air patrols along the borders of the three countries. UNMIL and UNAMSIL created their own ‘integral force level reserves’ for rapid deployment into areas where there was no UN military presence while in the case of UNOCI, the force reserve was provided by the French Licorne force. In July 2004, UNAMSIL supported UNMIL to organise a workshop on transitional justice and peacebuilding as part of the process aimed at setting up Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.17

Exit Strategy

As part of UNMIL’s plans to draw down and considerably reduce its presence by 30 June 2016, the mission took a number of steps aimed at ensuring a smooth transition. For over a year, it worked closely with appropriate agencies in Monrovia to map out strategies as part of a transition plan. The most notable and comprehensive of these strategies was the one drawn up by a team comprising the personnel from the government, UNMIL and an external expert. Known as the ‘Government of Liberia Plan for UNMIL Transition’, it covers the period from March 2015 to June 2016 and beyond.

Originally budgeted at $104 million, a re-prioritized budget for the security transition plan came to $38 million. But according to a source that would like to remain anonymous, the Ministry of Finance and Planning had allocated $20 million for the implementation of this plan but has made available $10 million for this purpose.18 As part of the transition process,

It is proposed that, by 1 July 2016, the UNMIL force comprise 1,240 military personnel, including a battalion (700 troops), a support company (55 troops), a force headquarters (40 personnel), six military

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18 Interview in Monrovia, 23 September 2015.
utility helicopters (174 personnel), a level II hospital (87 personnel), transport (44 personnel) and engineering (80 personnel) units, as well as 50 military observers and 10 military police officers, which would remain in Liberia until the withdrawal of the mission.19

In addition, by 1 July 2016, the number of police and immigration advisers was to be reduced through attrition to 226 and the formed police units would be about 400 personnel during this time. These were to be deployed in strategic areas such as Gbarnga, Monrovia and Zwedru and would have the primary task to secure the UN personnel and installations that would remain in the country until the complete withdrawal of the mission.20

Even though the Government of Liberia has been able to allocate $20 million for the security transition, financing the rest of the plan will constitute a major challenge. As one observer put it, Liberia should begin to realise that the international goodwill has shifted elsewhere because the strategic interests of the international community have shifted to other areas, chiefly Syria, Afghanistan, Mali and possibly Nigeria, depending on the activities of Boko Haram. The source also pointed out that depending on the outcome of the elections in Côte d’Ivoire, UNOCI could possibly close down within eight months.21

Overall, there is a general consensus among UNMIL staff and Liberians that the mission has played a critical role in stabilising the country. In this light, it has fulfilled its mission but the incomplete SSR process leaves much to be desired. It has left the impression that UNMIL did not complete its mandate but to reiterate, the mission has had a positive impact on peace and security in Liberia.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, it is important to stress that UNMIL intervened in Liberia under complex socio-economic, political and security conditions. The country had gone through 14 years of war that led to the collapse of the state and entire society and forced more than 1 million people out of their homes either as refugees or as internally displaced persons. There was a proliferation of small arms and light weapons and ex-fighters,
national infrastructure was dilapidated and the economy was contracted. The lack of trust and confidence among and between armed factions was also an issue.

According to an UNMIL staff, UNMIL’s mission to support the peace process by stabilising the country was not an executive mandate. He suggested that UNMIL’s mandate should have included legal and constitutional reform, and reconciliation and security sector review. These are certainly critical areas but UNMIL can do nothing about them now. The mission has stabilised Liberia but what Liberians do with this is an entirely different matter. The SSR process needs to be completed and national reconciliation remains a challenge. Liberia needs to strengthen its human capital if the country must surge ahead in building a stable and peaceful country. As the cited UNMIL staff put it, even though the mission was never given the mandate to do the type of reform required in the security sector, it has been able to give Liberia 13 years of peace and what Liberia does with this after UNMIL's departure is left to Liberians. Successive Liberian governments must therefore ensure that the peace process is not rocked by internal squabbles and tensions that could lead to a relapse into conflict.

References


22 Interview in Monrovia, 1 October 2015.
**Naila Salihu**

**Abstract**

The United Nations Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was deployed in April 2004 after interventions by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and France. The Ivorian crises was met with swift regional and international response due to the diverse international interests in a peaceful Côte d’Ivoire. In spite of the challenges that contributed to relapse of the conflict in the past, and continue to undermine the relative peace and security, the mission has contributed to the restoring peace and the post-conflict recovery process. The mission is set to exit by end of June 2017.

**Introduction**

A multiethnic country with approximately 60 different ethnic groups, Côte d’Ivoire was once known as the ‘African Miracle’ due to its economic growth and political stability in a troubled West African sub-region. The country’s burgeoning economic opportunities attracted large migrant populations from neighbouring countries. In spite of the deep seated ethno-regional cleavages, the first post-independence president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, was able to hold the country together through his paternalistic policies, often referred to as ‘*le modele houphouëtiste*’, characterized by a culture of dialogue, compromise, rewards and punishment, forgiveness, and reintegration. His

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death in 1993 amid the country’s declining economic fortunes gave vent to looming socio-political tensions.

**Figure 1: Map of Côte d’Ivoire.**

Source: UNDPKO, 2015.

A detailed account of the causes of the conflict is outside the scope of the chapter. However, it is illustrative to mention that the politicization of ethnicity and citizenship by successive political leaders, especially the introduction of the concept of *Ivoirité*, were instrumental in plunging Côte d’Ivoire into political crisis. *Ivoirité* makes a controversial distinction between ‘indigenous Ivoirians’ and ‘Ivoirians of immigrant ancestry’. It is argued that the conflict catalyst was the amendment of the Ivoirian electoral code by

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Decree No. 200-497 of 17 July 2000 that requires presidential candidates to be of purely Ivoirian parentage. In the face of ethnic, regional and religious tensions, a failed coup attempt in 2002 resulted in a bloody civil war, splitting the country into a rebel-held north and a government-controlled south. Though the period of active warfare was relatively short, it resulted in over 1,000 battle-related deaths and several civilian casualties.

As part of the peace process, presidential elections were expected to hold in 2005 but were postponed several times until 2010. Crisis arising out of the 2010 elections threw the country into another dangerous curve. The political stalemate aggravated by entrenched social and political tensions led to five months of violence during which armed groups mushroomed across the country, killing over 3000 people and displacing at least a million more internally and abroad. Efforts at a negotiated regional solution by ECOWAS and the AU failed over initial divergences of approach between both organizations. ECOWAS repeatedly condemned the attitude of some members of the AU High Panel on Côte d’Ivoire, notably South Africa, on their perceived lack of understanding and neutrality in the mediation process. However, when the AU deferred to ECOWAS’ political roadmap, a unity of purpose emerged between the two organizations and this was recognized by UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1975.

One noteworthy point is the role of former colonial power, France, in the crisis. Since independence in 1960, France has maintained significant economic, political, and cultural interests in Côte d’Ivoire. It has significant economic investments and a considerable military presence in the country. Based on an existing Defence Pact, French forces could be deployed in times of crisis. This arguably worked as a deterrent against potential coups and military insurgencies during Houphouët-Boigny’s era. It has been argued that the struggle for political leadership in Côte d’Ivoire is related to the actual or perceived protection of French interests which the different Ivoirian political leaders could offer. The interest of France has been a key factor in the Ivoirian political crisis and

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4 It is widely held that the amendment to electoral code was a political strategy to prevent Ouattara from contesting elections. His father is believed to have migrated to Côte d’Ivoire from Burkina Faso. See United Nations (2002), Human Rights Committee Seventy-fifth session 8-26 July, Communication No. 940/2000. Available at http://docstore.ohchr.org/DocsServices/FilesHandler (Accessed: 15 August 2016).


its subsequent resolution. For instance, during Laurent Gbagbo’s presidency especially, the concept of ivoirité was employed under the guise of a ‘second decolonization’ to protect Ivoirian sovereignty from perceived French influence.⁹

The role of France at different stages of the conflict was marked by contradictions in terms of its tacit or explicit support to different sides of the conflict. Events leading to the capture of former President Gbagbo in April 2011 by forces loyal to Alassane Ouattara, with support from UN and French forces, raised questions about the legitimacy and neutrality of the international intervention.¹⁰ In particular, the use of force by UN peacekeepers and French troops blurred the lines between human protection and regime change and cast doubt on the role of the UN in overriding Côte d’Ivoire’s Constitutional Council, and the proper interpretation of UNSCR 1975.¹¹

Using data from policy documents and scholarly articles on the Ivoirian crisis, this chapter analyzes the operationalization of UNOCI’s mandate in three main sections. The first section provides a brief background to the conflict and the context of the mission. This is followed by an analysis of the operations of the mission. The chapter then looks at UNOCI’s overall impact on peace and security as the mission prepares to exit in 2017.

**Context and Type of Mission**

The first international intervention, Opération Licorne, was a unilateral deployment in February 2003 of about 3000 French troops. It was followed by the setting up of the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) with heavy French support to help stabilize the situation in December 2002. Subsequently in February 2003, UN Security Council Resolution 1464 authorized and gave a mandate to ECOWAS and French troops already deployed. The UN also established a small political mission, the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) in May 2003. As the conflict intensified, ECOWAS requested the UN Security Council to strengthen ECOMICI and transform it into a UN peacekeeping mission. UNOCI, a multi-dimensional mission, was subsequently established by Security Council Resolution 1528 (2004) of 27 February 2004. There was initial resistance to the mission by some of the parties to the conflict. Following

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protracted French lobbying, which won over its African members.\textsuperscript{12} UNOCI absorbed ECOMICI (its troops were re-hatted) and MINUCI on 4 April 2004.

Licorne forces were mandated to also support UNOCI, albeit under a separate command structure. Paragraph 11 of UNSCR 1528 expressly authorized them to use all necessary means to support UNOCI in accordance with the agreement to be reached between UNOCI and the French authorities with a focus on specific tasks: contribute to the general security of the area of activity of the international forces; intervene at UNOCI’s request in support of its elements whose security may be threatened; intervene against belligerent actions, if the security conditions so require, outside the areas directly controlled by UNOCI; and help to protect civilians in the deployment areas of their units. This arrangement continued throughout UNOCI’s existence guided by three key provisions to clarify command and control arrangements: Licorne would provide a guaranteed quick reaction force (QRF) in support of the UN Force Commander; on deployment, QRFs would resort under Tactical Command of the UN (sector) commander in whose area they operated; and a permanent liaison structure would be established as early as possible.\textsuperscript{13}

While it is not unusual for peace support missions to coexist in West Africa, the presence of Licorne alongside the UN peacekeepers presents challenges relating to the role of France as an interested party in both the various stages of the conflict and the post-election crisis of 2010-2011. This has also impacted local community perceptions of the mission, a variable that has an important bearing on the outcome of a peacekeeping intervention.\textsuperscript{14} The mission has been perceived differently by the local population deepening on their affiliation to the different parties of the conflict.

**Peace Agreements Signed (2002-2007)**

The dynamics of the Ivoirian crisis are embedded in the politics of the region and that of international peace intervention.\textsuperscript{15} Multiple regional and international actors notably, ECOWAS, the UN, the AU and France, made various efforts to resolve the crisis—ostensibly due to Côte d’Ivoire’s economic centrality in West Africa, the region’s fragile security situation and speculations about foreign involvement. It has been argued that France’s

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid.


apparent lack of impartiality as an international actor opened the door to African-led negotiations and the use of UN and AU sanctions against the Gbagbo regime.\textsuperscript{16} Indeed interventions by regional actors due to their proximity and nuanced understanding of the dynamics often provide some respite solution. Angola and South Africa also took part in mediation efforts.

Several peace agreements were signed and violated by the conflicting parties. The first agreement, known as Accra I, was overseen by ECOWAS in October 2002. This was followed by the Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accord brokered by France in January 2003, which called for the establishment of a government of national unity, among other things. Its extensive focus on power distribution and elections over important underlying issues of identity contributed to the failure of the Linas-Marcoussis Accord.\textsuperscript{17}

After the breakup of Linas-Marcoussis, other agreements were signed, including Accra II (March 2003), Accra III (July 2004), and Pretoria (April 2005). The regional mediation efforts that led to these agreements encountered some challenges as the credibility of regional actors was questioned by both sides of the conflict at different points in time. Notable were perceptions of bias against some West African leaders, particularly Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, who was suspected of supporting the rebels, yet superintended the Ouagadougou Peace Accord in March 2007.\textsuperscript{18} The Ouagadougou agreement was deemed relatively successful because it directly addressed citizenship and restored local ownership to the peace process.\textsuperscript{19}

**Mandate of the Mission**

The primary objective of UNOCI, a chapter VII mission, was to facilitate the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Peace Agreement using all necessary means. Its mandate, as originally stipulated by UNSCR 1528, included:

a. Monitoring of the ceasefire and movements of armed groups;

b. Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration,

c. Repatriation and resettlement; reconciliation,

d. To protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment;

e. Public information and law and order.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{18} Bah, (2010), op. cit.

Over the years, the mandate has been modified and renewed by the Security Council severally to reflect the security and political situation on the ground and the needs of the mission. In 2007, for instance, UNOCI was given an unusual mandate to certify the forthcoming elections. This mandate transcended the electoral processes of election observation and electoral assistance. This was born out numerous factors including the general belief that the certification mandate developed against the backdrop of mistrust plaguing previous electoral cycles. The involvement of the UN was therefore solicited by the parties as a confidence building mechanism. In addition, the UN mandate developed in an ad hoc fashion and was shaped by increasing political polarization and a growing impatience from the international community to hold election which has been postponed several times by the incumbent regime of Gbagbo.

On 25 June 2015, the Security Council extended the mandate of the mission for another year until 30 June 2016. The revised mandate includes protection of civilians; political support; addressing remaining security threats and border-related challenges; Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and collection of weapons; reconstitution and reforming security institutions; monitoring arms embargo; supporting compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law; supporting humanitarian assistance; and protection of United Nations personnel.

### Operationalization of the Mandate

Several factors, including inclusive peace and governance processes, are essential to effective operationalization of a mission mandate. It is noteworthy that the mission was not however, provided with sufficient resources to enforce the peace agreement, to protect all civilians and in some senses played a more traditional interposatory role between the conflicting parties. Recently, local perceptions of issues such as legitimacy have increasingly been used as a basis for measuring a country’s progress towards stability and evaluating implementation of missions’ mandate. The legitimacy of UNOCI has been subject of controversy at different points of the conflict and the post-election crisis. Nonetheless, since its inception, the mission has pursued varied activities and initiatives in implementation of its mandate.

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Politics

Per its mandate, UNOCI supports the political process. In 2014, UNSCR 2162 reinforced the role of UNOCI, especially the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), in supporting political dialogue processes.24 As mentioned earlier the election certification mandate given to UNOCI in 2007 was fraught with some challenges that contributed to the post-election crisis in 2010. For instance, it is argued that UN did not entirely grasp what certification entailed when it initially agreed to play a role in the electoral process, which resulted in major uncertainties surrounding the process itself. These factors both limited and created opportunities for its implementation.25 Hence, UN electoral certification in Côte d’Ivoire did not prevent parties from contesting the election results.26

Recently, especially with the end of the post-election crisis in 2011, the general political climate has improved. The 2015 presidential election, which was seen as critical to sustaining the political process, took place on 25 October 2015 in a relatively peaceful atmosphere. The incumbent, President Ouattara, won a landslide victory for a second term of office with about 83.6%. However, events leading to the election are cause for concern. The two main political groupings; the Alliance des forces démocratiques (Alliance of Democratic Forces, AFD), the Coalition nationale pour le changement (National Coalition for Change, CNC), and several independent candidates were deeply divided. While the AFD participated in the electoral process, the CNC challenged its legitimacy and subsequently boycotted the elections. The CNC was particularly critical of the Independent Electoral Commission, which it argued was unbalanced and unrepresentative based on its perception that nine of the commission’s 17 members were biased toward the ruling coalition.27 The relatively peaceful election does not necessarily guarantee democratic peace and stability, so it is imperative for the government to undertake the necessary political reforms to consolidate peace.28

Security

The presence of UNOCI has contributed to enhancing peace and security in Côte d’Ivoire by making its presence felt and facilitating the implementation of peace in

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25 Ibid
26 Ibid
Côte d’Ivoire. Currently, the UN and other international actors are drawing down as the security situation continues to improve and some modest economic recovery is being made. Some internally displaced people are gradually returning home though a significant number of Ivorians remain internally displaced and refugees in neighbouring countries. Most of these persons are confronted with challenges such as a loss of livelihood and remain highly susceptible to violence from persistent security threats emanating from sporadic attacks, violent crimes, gender-based violence and clashes in border areas, notably Côte d’Ivoire’s border with Liberia. These incidents are often attributed to rogue elements of the Forces Républicaines de la Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), former combatants and dozos (traditional hunters). There have also been reports of attacks by a regional network of elements allegedly financed by people associated with the former government of Gbagbo. These occurred along the borders with Ghana and Liberia, as well as in and around Abidjan, primarily targeting national security forces.

These attacks, coupled with allegations of human rights abuse against Gbagbo supporters and outbreaks of inter communal violence in the north and west of the country, have undermined efforts at national reconciliation and are exacerbating the security situation. For example, in early June 2015, the Liberian Senate began investigations into claims of about 200 well-armed Ivorians being camped in the heavily forested border region. Other threats emanate from Mali-based Islamist militants who briefly took over the town of Fakola, 20 kilometers from the Ivorian border, on 28 June 2015 to enable them stage attacks inside Côte d’Ivoire. A terror attack on a beach resort in Grand-Bassam on 13 March 2016 that claimed twenty-two lives, added a new dynamic to the security situation. The attack was orchestrated by al-Mourabitoun, a group based in northern Mali with affiliation to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Other minor violent incidents have occurred along the Noé border post with Ghana, where a FRCI post was reportedly attacked on 27 December 2015 in the Nougoua village.

These developments have raised concerns about the capacity and resource constraints of national security forces and UNOCI to effectively preempt and combat such occurrences. They have also necessitated increased cooperation between UNOCI and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the governments of Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia in coordinating security activities in affected border areas. The mandates of

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29 KAIPTC Peacekeeping Training Impact Study, (Forthcoming)
31 Ibid
respective missions have been readjusted to allow such cross-border operations. For instance, UNOCI’s mandate encourages inter-mission cooperation with UNMIL and the erstwhile United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. Also, there has been a temporary redeployment of personnel from UNMIL to UNOCI. This was authorized by resolution 1951 on 24 November 2010 to strengthen UN peacekeeping capacity in Côte d’Ivoire in response to security concerns following the first round of presidential elections on 31 October. As both UNMIL and UNOCI are currently in their drawdown stage, armed helicopters and other logistics have been transferred from UNMIL to UNOCI to be used in both Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia along and across their borders to facilitate rapid response and mobility.

**Challenges of DDR and SSR**

DDR and Security Sector Reform (SSR) are essential to long-term stability. With regards to DDR, UNOCI works with national implementing bodies—the Integrated Command Centre and the National Programme for Reintegration and Community Rehabilitation. The mission supports the planning and development of concepts of operations and action plans for the DDR of ex-combatants. It also manages its own logistical support and coordinates with the national and international actors involved in the process. However, delays in disarming and reintegrating former combatants present security risks. For example, in 2013, there were at least 11 demonstrations or disturbances involving disgruntled former combatants. There is a need to provide sustainable socio-economic reintegration options to beneficiaries.

On SSR, there are ongoing efforts to decentralize the process and reinforce democratic governance of the security sector. The national security strategy of April 2014 clarifies the operational arrangements for the reorganization of the security and defence forces. UNOCI supports the National Security Council in the implementation of the strategy to build and strengthen the capacities of local governance and oversight structures, and national defence and security forces. UNOCI works with the UN country team to provide varied capacity building and training for diverse security providers in the country.

Notwithstanding the relative progress, there are challenges due to delays in the implementation of the national SSR strategy. For instance, the expansion of SSR activities

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beyond Abidjan has been slow and there are serious confidence deficits within and between security and defence forces. There is also mistrust between security providers and citizens that stems from mutually negative perceptions and insufficient resources to perform law-enforcement tasks effectively. For example, on 18 November 2014, separate FRCI groups took to the streets in protest over unpaid salaries in Abidjan, Yamoussoukro, Bouaké, Dalia, and other cities. In other instances, protesting security forces broke into FRCI armouries and looted police stations, causing material damage and stealing equipment that included firearms and ammunition. These events undermine the country’s fragile security. Furthermore, remnants of war, such as unsecured small arms and light weapons remain serious threats to security.

**Social Context: Human Rights and Reconciliation**

Human rights and transitional justice are essential to the post-conflict recovery process. There are ongoing efforts at the national and international levels to bring to justice suspected perpetrators of human rights violations during the post-elections crisis, including the trials of former president, Laurent Gbagbo, and former youth minister, Charles Blé-Goudé in The Hague. The trials are not a definitive response to the cry for justice by all victims. There have been concerns about an apparent selective application of justice. Though the ongoing process appears to be targeted at allies of the former Gbagbo regime—former first lady, Simone Gbagbo was put on trial in Abidjan and sentenced to 20 years in jail in March 2015—at least eight members of the Ouattara-backed Forces Nouvelles have been indicted for human rights violations during the post-elections crisis. The report of the National Commission of Enquiry submitted to the government in October 2012 implicated both parties to the post-election crises for gross human rights violations.

UNOCI works with different national and international actors on human rights issues. For example, it has collaborated with the government to equip the National Human Rights Commission, the Truth, Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission and the National Social Cohesion Programme with human, logistic and financial resources to fulfil their mandates. For instance, the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission carried out its mandate over a two-year period. The process involved public hearings of the testimonies of victims of all the Ivoirian crises that occurred between 1990 and 2011.

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Some structures are being established at community levels to promote social cohesion and peaceful coexistence between communities. To overcome the capacity and financial constraints faced by such structures, UNOCI has provided technical support to about 23 committees in West Côte d’Ivoire with monies from the Peacebuilding Fund.\(^39\)

Various UN committees have raised concerns over judicial independence, long pre-trial detention, suspicions of torture carried out by the secret service, women’s minimal participation in public administration, gender-based violence, female genital mutilation and child trafficking. Structural factors like nationality, land tenure and access to natural resources, which contributed to the conflict, persist but some progress has been made in addressing these issues. For instance, on 23 August 2013, the National Assembly amended separate laws on land tenure and nationality, which respectively granted rural landowners an additional 10 years to establish their customary rights to land and simplified the procedures for naturalization.\(^40\) However, there is a need for more reforms such as on nationality laws to address the root causes of the conflict.

**Gender Dimension**

The subject of gender and peacekeeping is well illuminated in this volume in Chapter 13. Females in Côte d’Ivoire are faced with entrenched inequalities.\(^41\) Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) is a critical concern in the post-conflict recovery process. During the civil war, women and girls suffered most from widespread and systematic rape and sexual violence perpetrated by both government and rebel forces as well as mercenaries from neighbouring countries and some peacekeepers. UNOCI like other peacekeeping missions elsewhere have not been devoid of the unending implications of peacekeepers in sexual misconducts. For instance, in 2010, there were revelations that eight young girls had sex with peacekeeping troops from Benin in exchange for food in Côte d’Ivoire.\(^42\)

It is noteworthy that women are not only victims of SGBV in conflict situations. Indeed, in Côte d’Ivoire, women like former first lady, Simone Gbagbo, and groups like the Coordination of Patriotic Women of Côte d’Ivoire, were vibrant supporters of the violent

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\(^39\) UN Security Council (2014) op. cit.
\(^40\) UN Security Council, (2013), op. cit.
\(^42\) Odartey, Mathew, (2016). Dark side of UN peacekeeping - an insult to peacekeeping operations,’ *Daily Graphic*. 26 April,
During the post-elections crises from 2011 to 2013, about 548 incidents of sexual violence were recorded. Therefore, pursuing gender justice to deal with war crimes perpetrated against women and other violations of women’s rights remains a challenge in most peace support operations.

Gender mainstreaming is essential in the activities of UNOCI. Initially, the mission had a small Gender Unit with a staff strength of three which undertook myriad activities, including capacity-building in gender issues; promoting women’s political participation and women’s rights; prevention of SGBV; integrating the specific needs of women in the DDR process and SSR programmes. The unit was closed down and gender issues are now part of the SRSG’s office, with a focal person in every unit to ensure gender mainstreaming in the mission’s activities and programmes.

Due to high incidents of SGBV mostly attributed to armed men, UNOCI and other actors, including the UN Population Fund, and international and local non-governmental organizations, work with the Ivoirian government, particularly the Ministry of Solidarity, Family, Women and Children, to deal with the problem. For example, they worked together to produce a national anti-SGBV strategy was launched in September 2014. The crucial issues lies with adopting practical and effective measures on the ground. Many challenges persist, including entrenched negative cultural beliefs, stigmatization of victims, limited psychological treatment for victims and geographical and economic disparities in accessing health and legal services, large numbers of unreported cases and, above all, a lack of effective protection institutions. In this regard, a multidisciplinary approach to SGBV that includes social, health and legal support as well as economic empowerment, access to funds, and the reintegration of survivors into communities is highly effective. Currently, programmes that aim at reducing SGBV tend to focus solely on women whereas it is important for interventions to incorporate males in order to effect attitudinal change and induce remorse for their roles in the perpetuation of violence during the post-conflict crises.

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45 Aning and Salihu (2012), op. cit.

46 www.unoci.org


While the UN encourages the inclusion of more women in peacekeeping missions for diverse reasons. It is widely believed that certain tasks in peacekeeping environments such as house and body searches, providing escorts for victims/witnesses, and screening combatants at disarmament demobilization and reintegration sites, could be best performed by women. Missions with more women could also make meaningful contact with local communities and marginalized groups as such missions could easily support conflict-affected women who would have difficulty speaking to male personnel. Moreover, increased presence of female peacekeepers could help reduce issues of sexual exploitation and abuse; and promote and encourage the participation of local women and their organizations in post-conflict political processes.\textsuperscript{50} While these essentialist analysis of women roles in peace and conflict process may be true, some have argued forcefully that it may be simplistic to assume that, increasing female numbers in peace operations can challenge an organizational culture such as the masculinist military cultures or make militaries more democratic or gender sensitive.\textsuperscript{51}

In spite of the above given reasons it is discouraging to note that females constitute about 11% of the current uniform personnel of UNOCI. Nonetheless, there is a significant number of females in the civilian component, including the highest level of mission management. It is important to note that increased female representation in peacekeeping should be backed with effective mandates and resources in order to make meaningful impact on the ground.

### Mission Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Initial Strength in 2004</th>
<th>Current Strength (February 2016)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>6240</td>
<td>4475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military observers</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>1380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International civilian personnel</td>
<td>301</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local staff</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Volunteers</td>
<td>137</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source UNOCI Website, February 2016.*

The authorized mission strength has been reviewed and revised by the Security Council on a number of occasions, depending on the political and security situation in the


country and the needs of the mission. At the height of the mission, the UN had about 7,000 uniformed personnel on the ground which went up to 9,792 in 2012 due to the post-election crisis. The mission’s strength is expected to reduce to about 2,000 by the end of August 2016.

**Troop Contributing Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military and Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Chad, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Ireland, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Niger</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNOCI Website, February 2016.*

**Figure 2: UNOCI Deployment Map, 2015.**

*Source: UN DPKO, 2015.*

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Exit Strategy

There is a shift in UN peacekeeping exit strategies from the election-based approach of the 1990s to that of peacebuilding. Even though elections are necessary and often serve as means to end violent political conflicts, they do not always help to sustain peace. Peacebuilding which aims at stability through institution-building and development has become the new criteria for post-conflict peacebuilding. Since its deployment, UNOCI has played a long-term peacebuilding role.

The current exit strategy is based on UNSCR 2226 (2015) though the transition process began in 2013. A complete withdrawal, initially expected by the end of June 2016, was dependent on the security situation and the capacity of the Ivorian government to take over the role of the mission, especially after the October 2015 elections. The mission’s end date has since been revised to 30 June 2017 due to the progress being made toward peace, lasting stability and economic prosperity. This date change was recommended by a DPKO-led strategic review mission conducted from 8 to 20 February 2016. Nonetheless, the transition process needs to be anchored on a comprehensive strategy and an effective resource mobilization plan to ensure that the government and UN country team have the necessary capacity and resources to effectively takeover from UNOCI. An important determinant of a successful exit is local ownership of the peacebuilding process. This is essential to building resilient institutions and local capacities. The UN supports rebuilding of institutions through measures like capacity building and integrated planning, for key institutions like the police, justice and correctional sector. It also supports the efforts aim at inclusive political processes and core government functions such as provision of basic social services. The continued support of the mission in these areas is crucial to build confidence in the transition process. Unlike some conflict situations which saw a complex collapse of state institutions, the situation in Côte d’Ivoire is not so dire. However, it is important to prioritize institutional effectiveness as part of the peacebuilding process.

Overall Impact on Peace and Security

The presence of UNOCI, despite its operational challenges, has contributed immensely to helping the government of Côte d’Ivoire with the peacebuilding process. Some

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significant achievements have been made in the areas of DDR, SSR, national reconciliation, justice and accountability for conflict related crimes and abuses that have contributed to enhancing the overall peace and security climate in the country. However, there remain critical concerns about security and stability as the mission is likely to exit in 2017. The possession of large quantities of unaccounted small arms and light weapons by former combatants who are yet to be reintegrated into society, and illegal natural resource exploitation and smuggling present tangible threats to sustainable peace and security.58

Conclusion

The Ivoirian crisis was met with swift regional and international responses due to diverse interests in a peaceful Côte d’Ivoire. Among these efforts, UNOCI has been involved in diverse programmes in executing its mandate to help restore peace. Despite the noted challenges that contributed to the relapse of conflict in the recent past and continue to undermine peace and security, Côte d’Ivoire is on course in its post-conflict reconstruction and development process. Unlike other conflict theatres in West Africa, institutional structures were not completely destroyed during civil war. Côte d’Ivoire appears to have the institutional and resource capacity to take over from UNOCI. However, it is imperative to adopt a comprehensive exit plan which could be adopted by the government to undertake the necessary structural reforms to consolidate peace.

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SECTION THREE

Country Case Studies: Current Missions in Africa
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE CHALLENGES OF THE UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN MALI

Lydia Amedzrator and Evelyn Avoxe

Abstract
In the aftermath of the March 2012 coups d’état by a section of the Malian army, various institutions intervened to restore order and deal with the precarious security situation in the country. This chapter focuses on the operations of the United Nations Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), discussing three main issues: the context of the mission—cross institutional efforts and what pertained during the transition phase, the several challenges that confront MINUSMA, and existing opportunities that have the potential to enhance the effectiveness of MINUSMA in executing its mandate.

Background
Though plagued by recurrent rebellions since the 1960s, Mali was one of the few West African countries which, since its second military coup in 1991, had not experienced coups d’état. This democratic façade broke abruptly when a section of the Malian army rebelled in March 2012, prompted by the government’s inability to deal effectively with the threats posed to the state by an alliance of separatist and radical Islamist groups. This rebellion culminated in a military coup, toppling former President Amadou Toumani Touré’s regime. Though the coup was orchestrated by disgruntled military personnel (there were divisions within the Malian Security and Defence Forces, especially in the light of an imminent election), it reflected a depth of discontent that transcended all divides in the country. Sections of Malians saw the removal of Touré as an essential
first step to ending widespread systemic corruption within the state as well as halting alleged state involvement in transnational crime and other illicit activities.\(^1\)

During the resultant political vacuum in northern Mali, the separatist National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) joined forces with radical Islamic groups to defeat the military, and temporarily capture and declare the secession of the northern territories of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. However, relations between the allies soon grew adversarial and murky due to tensions based on ideological differences—they disagreed over the installation of an Islamic State.\(^2\) The MNLA, which was in favour of a secular state, was chased out of its strongholds in the north by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). Ansar Dine was allowed to take control of Kidal while AQIM and MUJWA took over Timbuktu and Gao respectively.\(^3\)

Bolstered by their success in the north, these radical groups advanced toward the south, launched attacks on some southern cities, including Konna, on 10 January 2013 and planned to capture the capital, Bamako. To prevent the takeover of Bamako, the speaker of parliament and interim president, Diouncounda Traoré called on France to intervene. This idea of French intervention was favoured by regional leaders such as the presidents of Senegal, Macky Sall; Niger’s Mahmadou Issifou and Guinea’s Alpha Condé and the African Union. France was originally sceptical about allowing French troops to intervene in Mali but welcomed the idea of providing logistical support for an African-led force. On 11 January, however, France intervened unilaterally after facilitating a UN resolution which authorised Operation Serval. With the military support of a 6400-strong combined African force comprising largely of Chadian troops and political support from Algeria and other neighbouring countries, French forces intervened speedily by mobilizing a total of 4000 troops from its bases elsewhere and from ongoing operations in Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, and Gabon.\(^4,5\) Operation Serval succeeded in halting attacks and recapturing territories conquered by radical Islamist groups. The African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), consisting primarily of West African troops was subsequently authorized in December 2012 by UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2085 to support French troops with countering the threats from radical Islamist groups operating in the country. However, AFISMA was not deployed until 1 September 2013 due to several constraints.

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On 1 July 2013, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) replaced AFISMA. Consequently, AFISMA troops were ‘rehatted’ into MINUSMA in accordance with UNSCR 2100.

This case study provides an analysis of MINUSMA’s operations in Mali, focusing on the challenges facing the mission.

Context of the UN Mission

Various institutions and individual countries contributed to stabilizing the precarious security situation in Mali before MINUSMA was finally deployed in July 2013. This section reviews the roles of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), Chad, Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, France, and the UN in peacekeeping in Mali.

The ECOWAS Mission in Mali (MICEMA) was the first force that was planned in 2012 by ECOWAS to respond militarily to the threats posed by the militant groups operating in Mali. It comprised of 4000 troops from eight ECOWAS member states: Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo. However, due to several challenges such as the preference of Malian authorities for a French intervention and the realization that the crisis could not be resolved by ECOWAS member states alone, MICEMA was not deployed. Nevertheless, the ECOWAS and the AU made concerted efforts to help restore constitutional order.6 For example, on 27 March 2012, ECOWAS heads of state and government appointed the then president of Burkina Faso to mediate the crisis.7 This contributed to the signing of a framework agreement for the restoration of constitutional order on 6 April 2012, leading to the transfer of power from the leader of the military junta, Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo to interim President Diouncounda Traoré.8

The security situation in Mali, however, degenerated as the radical Islamist groups that had temporarily captured the northern territories advanced south. Based on calls by Traoré and African leaders for a French intervention, Operation Serval was deployed on 11 January 2013. The intervention comprised of troops from Chad, France supported by Mauritania, Algeria, and the Malian Self Defence Force, while countries like the United States, Belgium, Britain and Canada provided the French troops with airlifts, aerial

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6 See Buyoya, op. cit.
8 Ibid.
refuelling, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance. Operation Serval was able to chase the radical Islamist groups into their hideouts in the north. It succeeded in chasing out the Islamist groups from Timbuktu and Gao but teamed up with the MNLA to carry out its intervention in Kidal. The blowback of the France-MNLA alliance is that this armed group, which has splintered over the period, continues to pose security threats to the current mission, MINUSMA. This situation raised concerns about whether France’s intervention was not a ploy to promote its strategic interests in Mali which include freeing French hostages, protecting its uranium factory in Niger and averting the spill-over effects of the crisis, such as potential security risks attached to the migration of Malians to Europe, particularly France.

Following the gains made by Operation Serval, the AFISMA deployed, authorized by UNSCR 2085 (2012) to counter threats from militant and extremist groups and protect the population. Though the mission lasted only six months, its operation made way for the deployment of MINUSMA in July 2013. The AU however established the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) to continue its engagements as the civilian headquarters of the AU in Mali. MISAHEL is responsible for the implementation of the Strategy of the African Union for the Sahel Region which is centred on three main pillars: governance, security, and development. Meanwhile, MINUSMA's operations are currently being supported by a parallel force, Operation Barkhane, which is mandated ‘within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment, to use all necessary means until the end of MINUSMA’s mandate as authorized in this resolution, to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General’. A European Union (EU) training team has also been engaged to ‘coordinate closely with MINUSMA’ in order to assist Malian authorities in the Security Sector Reform of the country. On the whole, the cross-institutional efforts of ECOWAS, the AU, the UN, and the EU have contributed to the gains made so far in the peace process.

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9 See Shurkin, op. cit.
10 Interview, ECOWAS official, Bamako, Mali 25 September 2015.
Between 1990 and 2015, six peace agreements were signed to deal with the Mali crisis. However, they were only partially implemented, leading to a recurrence of conflict. The Tamanrasset Accord was the first ceasefire agreement signed in Mali on 6 January 1991. It was followed by the signing of the National Pact on 11 April 1992 by the Malian government and the Mouvements et Fronts Unifiés de l’Azawad (Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad) which basically called for the integration of former combatants into the Malian army, the gradual withdrawal of the army from the north, funds to reintegrate combatants into civilian life and compensate victims of the armed conflict, and a special status for northern Mali. Disagreements among the different ethnic groups in northern Mali over the special privileges accorded the Tuaregs in the agreement degenerated into violence among the Songhai, Tuaregs, and Arabs. Consequently, the Accords of Bourem was brokered in 1995, followed by the Flame of Peace ceremony in Timbuktu, at which Malian government representatives symbolically set fire to about 3000 decommissioned weapons to mark the end of the conflict. In 2006, following the third rebellion, the Algiers Accord was reached. Following the 2012 rebellion, two main peace agreements were signed, namely the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement to Presidential and Elections and Inclusive Talks in Mali on 18 June 2013, which paved the way for the holding of presidential and legislative elections throughout the country, and the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali which was signed on 20 June 2015.

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15 SIPRI, ‘Chronology of Key Events in Mali, 1891-present’, available on 16 November 2015.
Figure 2: Peace Agreements.

Source: Authors’ compilation.

MINUSMA Mandates

The 18 June 2013 Ouagadougou Preliminary Accord signed between representatives of the rebel groups in northern Mali and the transitional government paved the way for the deployment of MINUSMA. MINUSMA’s mandate for its first year was to contribute to the stabilization of the country by recapturing the northern cities that were occupied by radical groups and re-establishing state administration, particularly in the north. In 2014, recognizing the return of constitutional order through the holding of presidential and legislative elections and the signing of the ceasefire agreement, UNSCR 2164 reaffirmed and extended the past mandate of MINUSMA until 30 June 2015. This mandate was however revised in June 2015 following UNSCR 2227 (2015) to support the consolidation of the processes for the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the 2015 Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation until 30 June 2016. This current mandate also emphasizes the use of good offices to support the processes for national reconciliation and social cohesion. Outlines of the past and current mandates and details of the staff strength of MINUSMA are contained in Table A and Figures 2, 3, and 4 respectively.
### Table 1: MINUSMA’s mandate.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Stabilization of key population centres and support for the reestablishment of state authority throughout the country</td>
<td>Security, stabilization, and protection of civilians</td>
<td>Ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Support for the implementation of the transitional roadmap, including national political dialogue and the electoral process</td>
<td>Support to the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Protection of civilians and United Nations personnel</td>
<td>Support to the re-establishment of state authority throughout the country, the rebuilding of the Malian security sector, the promotion and protection of human rights, and support for humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>Good offices and reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Promotion and protection of human rights</td>
<td>Protection of United Nations personnel</td>
<td>Protection of civilians and stabilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Support for humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>Support for cultural preservation</td>
<td>Promotion and protection of human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Support for cultural preservation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance and projects for stabilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Support for national and international justice</td>
<td></td>
<td>Protection, safety, and security of United Nations personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacities and areas of deployment, to execute its mandate</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support for cultural preservation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mission Statistics

This section provides statistics of the size and composition of MINUSMA's strength and troop contributors.

Figure 2: Authorized size and composition of MINUSMA (UNSCR 2227, 29 June 2015).

Source: Authors’ Construction with data from MINUSMA website

Figure 3: Current size and composition of MINUSMA (29 February 2016).

Source: Authors’ Construction with data from MINUSMA website
Figure 4: Troop contributions to MINUSMA.

Source: Authors’ compilation with data from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations website.

Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainable Peace and Stability

MINUSMA ranks among the most expensive peacekeeping operations in Africa with a peacekeeping budget of about $600 million, an intelligence unit—the All Source Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU)—Special Operations Forces and sophisticated equipment such as helicopters. However, concerns have been expressed about how these advantages have translated into the effectiveness of the mission. In this regard, this section delves into the nature of the challenges confronting MINUSMA in Mali and the prospects of the mission achieving its mandate.
Challenges

**Interpretation of the mandate and absence of role clarity**

MINUSMA has a self-defence mandate for the protection of its troops, associated personnel and civilians. However, it is sometimes unable to defend itself. The parallel force, Operation Serval, (now Operation Barkhane) has been mandated by the United Nations Security Council ‘within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment, to use all necessary means until the end of MINUSMA’s mandate as authorized in this resolution, to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General’.

Yet Barkhane’s operations are apparently not sufficient to tackle the threats from the armed groups operating in the country. This is because, as a parallel force the French troops can choose their battles and have the opportunity to engage at its own discretion.

**Incompatibility with the terrain**

MINUSMA is operating in a harsh and complex terrain where militant groups employ asymmetric tactics with mobile fighters who now use motorcycles instead of cars in order to avoid easy detection. Other tools and methods include improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide attacks, the laying of mines along the patrol routes of MINUSMA troops, ambushes and shelling of MINUSMA camps with rockets and mortars.

This has resulted in the high fatalities suffered by MINUSMA troops, with 81 killed and several wounded as at 25 March 2016. Similarly, the most hostile northern territory where militant groups are most active is largely desert land and sparsely populated. Hence, although 90 per cent of the UN troops are deployed to the north, they are unable to cover the entire region, leaving the unmanned areas as safe havens for criminals and militants to successfully stage attacks against UN troops and civilians. Meanwhile, MINUSMA troops lack robust military logistics to protect themselves and civilian employees from harm when they drive over landmines and IEDs.

These challenges have raised questions about the relevance and adequacy of MINUSMA’s mandate and capabilities. They have also challenged the aptness of traditional UN peacekeeping doctrine which is hinged on consent of the parties to the peace process and impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of stabilization mandates in such a context.

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20 See Boutellis, op. cit.
Splintering of armed groups

Another challenge is the splintering of armed groups which do not have homogenous interests. During the period of negotiations for the current peace agreement, armed groups fragmented and alliances shifted.\(^2\) While some armed groups have genuine political grievances, others sit at the negotiating table but continue to violate ceasefire arrangements and peace agreements while strategizing to maximize the dividends of the negotiation process. For example, some groups are reorganizing in the Sahel and struggling, ahead of the DDR process, to be stationed in areas that are strategic for drug trafficking. The control of drug trafficking routes is a major interest for some armed groups that are hiding behind political claims. These power struggles among the various armed groups have obstructed communications for peace and contributed to the resumption of attacks in northern Mali.

**Opportunities**

*The All Source Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU)*

To provide a good understanding of the nature of the security threats in Mali, the MINUSMA has integrated ASIFU into its operations. This intelligence unit is believed to have provided ‘unprecedented analytical capabilities to the mission, and supplied the mission with useful weekly, monthly and quarterly written and map products’\(^2\)\(^2\). However, though the ASIFU is a significant innovation for UN peacekeeping operations, it has encountered some practical challenges for instance, the collaboration between African and non-NATO states in terms of information sharing and the inability of some states to participate effectively.

**Gender Dimensions**

Both men and women are adversely affected by the Mali crisis. The crisis, for instance, has impacted negatively on the income generating activities and survival of people in the communities in the north. Cases of violations of women’s rights and sexual exploitation have also been reported.\(^2\)\(^3\) In the Timbuktu region, women’s associations have reported cases of the sexual exploitation of young girls by armed groups as well as by people allegedly identified as members of MINUSMA and Forces armées et de sécurité du Mali (FAMA Forces)\(^2\)\(^4\). It is established that girls seeking to provide sustenance for themselves

\(^1\) See Boutellis, op cit.
\(^3\) Interview, MISAHEL human rights and gender officials, 25 September 2015.
\(^4\) Ibid.
and their families are exploited sexually by the UN and FAMA Forces. Despite these challenges, women have played instrumental roles at the grassroots as members of civil society groups although their representation at the peace table and decision making processes are low. Some women’s groups were marginally represented at the Algiers peace talks but not in the follow-up committee of the Algiers peace agreement. Participation of women in the public sphere is visibly minimal due to cultural and religious beliefs that confine women to domestic roles. Local cultural practices such as female genital mutilation and domestic violence impact negatively on women’s interests and capacities to participate in public life.

**Human Rights and Reconciliation**

Despite the signing of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation by the government and the other conflict parties, the stakes are still high in Mali. Signatory groups have violated the peace agreement and ceasefire arrangements and armed groups have assumed effective military and, to some extent, administrative control over Kidal and other northern towns. Pro-government and anti-government militia groups have sustained attacks and violated the provisions of the peace agreement. The ceasefire violations have led to serious human rights and international humanitarian law violations. For instance, during the occupation of the north by armed groups, there were reported cases of murder, summary killings, floggings, amputations, forced disappearances and other inhuman and degrading treatment. The rights of women especially were violated; they suffered unlawful detentions, rape, sexual slavery and collective forced marriage, forced abortions and public humiliation. However, the almost complete impunity for those who commit these crimes has perpetuated a situation where others continue their attacks knowing that they probably will not be punished.

**Exit Strategy**

MINUSMA continues to stumble in its efforts to contribute to the stabilisation of the country due to the challenges that have been discussed in this chapter. Coupled with these challenges the mission has not been able to fully gain the support of the local population some of whom continue to provide protection and support to the militant groups who are opposing MINUSMA’s operations in the country. These challenges are projected to delay the stabilization of Mali and, in effect, the early drawdown of MINUSMA.

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25 Ibid.
26 Interview, MINUSMA gender officials, Bamako, Mali, September 2015.
**Conclusion and Recommendations**

Breaches of the peace agreements and ceasefire arrangements, human rights abuses and international law violations, and the lack of local support for MINUSMA’s operations continue to impede the mission’s peacekeeping efforts in Mali. To address the challenge that the Mali situation presents to MINUSMA, the chapter offers several recommendations. In the first place, there has to be an honest and effective implementation of the current peace agreement, given that the incomplete implementation of previous peace agreements contributed to the resurgence of the crisis. Particularly, the calls for political reform and reforms in the security sector should be addressed and monitored to ensure a robust security sector which will be able to deal with security threats when MINUSMA eventually draws down. Second, the government should demonstrate greater commitment to the stabilization of the country in a bid to build the confidence of willing members of the armed groups and other stakeholders to cooperate to implement the peace agreement. Third, there is the need to isolate and deal with the radical groups which have refused to cease fire due to their strategic military, economic and political goals. Fourth, the parallel force, Operation Barkhane, has to have its mandate reviewed and its persona restructured as a multinational force to ensure sufficient surveillance of the Sahel region. Fifth, those countries that share borders with Mali should undertake joint border patrols comprising of mixed units of security personnel in order to control illicit criminal activities. Finally, the availability of idle youth who do not have legitimate means of survival provides a ready resource for criminal actors. In order to prevent the expansion of militancy, especially in Mali, there is a need for stakeholders to provide sustainable and attractive economic opportunities for idle youth to prevent them from becoming easy recruits for criminal and militant groups.

**References**


Abstract

Although African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) peacekeepers deployed to Sudan’s Darfur region have striven to restore a modicum of security to the region, peace in the area remains elusive. This chapter interrogates the role of peacekeeping in intractable conflicts by undertaking a review of AU and UN-mandated peace operations in Darfur, with particular emphasis on the ongoing AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The paper identifies the failure of negotiated peace agreements in Darfur to secure the support of disgruntled belligerent factions as a major impediment to the effective protection of civilians and the overall achievement of mission mandates. The author argues for improved relations between the UNAMID and the host government and concludes that the UNAMID’s mandate will be difficult to achieve until belligerent parties’ compliance with current peace accords is secured.

Introduction

The overall security situation in Sudan’s Darfur region remains volatile, defying stringent peace efforts by the African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) over the past decade. Escalating hostilities between government forces and armed opposition movements continue to undermine basic human security, compelling AU and UN peacekeepers to operate in an ongoing war zone. In the wake of ongoing hostilities, intercommunal clashes over land and other natural resources and cattle rustling, hitherto resolved through indigenous processes, have become more rampant, more deadly and more

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Peacekeeping in Darfur

Protracted and are supposedly responsible for 60 percent of current displacements.\(^2\) In the ensuing security vacuum, armed criminality has become commonplace, further worsening the already deplorable security situation.\(^4\) In June 2015, therefore, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2228 (2015), by which it extended the UN-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur’s (UNAMID) mandate until 30 June 2016.\(^5\) The deployment of UNAMID and the preceding African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) became necessary following the eruption of the Darfur crisis in 2003.

**Figure 1: Map of Darfur**

![Map of Darfur](source: BBC)

The conflict is being waged principally between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and a number of armed opposition movements, notably the Sudan Liberation Army faction led by Abdel Wahid (SLA/AW), the Sudan Liberation Army faction led by Minni Minawi (SLA/MM), the Justice and Equality Movement faction led by Gibril Ibrahim (JEM/Gibril), and the Sudan Revolutionary Front. Caught at the centre of this conflict are unarmed civilians, who are subjected to deliberate and systematic human rights violations such as sexual and gender-based violence.\(^6\) In the first quarter of 2016 alone, over 105,000 people were displaced as a result of ongoing hostilities between government forces and...

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\(^3\) Interview, senior UNAMID official, El Fasher, North Darfur, 19 December 2015.

\(^4\) Interview, senior UNAMID official, El Fasher, North Darfur, 17 December 2015.


\(^6\) Ibid, para. 18.
the SLA/AW faction in Jebel Marra. In 2015, the total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) stood at 2.5 million, while those requiring humanitarian assistance was 4.4 million.

As early as 2004, the situation in Darfur was described as ‘genocide’, ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises’ by both the UN and the US. These characterizations were, however, not accompanied by the concomitant wherewithal needed for the deployment of an effective international peace mission to Darfur. Therefore, until UNAMID was deployed in 2007, the tasks of protecting civilians and restoring peace to Darfur rested largely with the AU, which managed to deploy AMIS in 2004 against a backdrop of limited experience and modest capacity.

This chapter reviews the AMIS and UNAMID peace support operations with the view to understanding how successful they have been at achieving the mandates and tasks for which they were established. Particular emphasis is placed on UNAMID as it is the current mission in Darfur. The review is undertaken in four major sections. The first section provides a brief background to the missions. The second section focuses on AMIS. The third section focuses on UNAMID. The fourth and final section provides a brief conclusion of the discussion. Data for this review was obtained through secondary sources and in-depth interviews conducted in December 2015 with UNAMID officials and peacekeepers at the mission’s headquarters in El Fasher, North Darfur, and high ranking Sudanese government officials and security personnel in Khartoum. Major limitations of the research relate to the author’s inability to conduct interviews with civilians and armed factions in Darfur owing to safety concerns.

**Brief background to the conflict**

Since 2003, the Darfur region of Western Sudan has been the scene of one of Africa’s most violent and deadly conflicts. The conflict erupted when the Darfur-based Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) took up arms against the GoS, citing what they termed the political and economic ‘marginalization’ of Darfur. This elicited reprisal attacks from government forces and the government-backed *Janjaweed* proxy militia. If this was the proximate cause of

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the conflict, its root causes lie deeper in the relational dynamics between the peoples of Darfur and Khartoum—the capital city—which de Waal describes as a relationship between a centre and its periphery. This centre-periphery relationship manifests in grievances around identity, and political and economic entitlements. These relational cleavages are exacerbated further by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Darfur, the severe disruption of livelihoods and income opportunities, environmental stresses and strains, endless cycles of retaliatory violence, and the weakening capacity of indigenous mechanisms of conflict transformation such as the *ajaweed* council or traditional mediators, which previously served to contain intercommunal clashes.

### Negotiations and major peace agreements

Three major peace agreements seeking to end the Darfur conflict have been signed so far: the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) of April 2004, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of May 2006, and the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) of July 2011.

**Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement**

The first major diplomatic solution to the conflict was the negotiation of the *Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement* (HCFA) signed by the Government of Sudan, the SLM/A and the JEM in N’Djamena on 8 April 2004. In this agreement, also known as the N’Djamena Agreement, the parties agreed, among other things, to:

- Cease hostilities for 45 days.
- Establish a ceasefire commission (CFC) composed of two high ranking officers from the parties, the Chadian mediation, and the international community to implement the HCFA.
- Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and emergency relief.

While the HCFA provided the basis of the mandate for the deployment of AMIS, its implementation was fraught with multiple challenges stemming, not least, from the inclusion of representatives of the parties to the conflict on the CFC. Moreover,

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violations of the HCFA in all of its dimensions by the parties were commonplace. The agreement, however, provided critical space for broader negotiations to continue in Abuja under the auspices of the AU, which culminated in the signing of the DPA.

**Darfur Peace Agreement**

The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signed in Abuja on 5 May 2006 covers key issues relating to power sharing, wealth distribution, and security agreements. It is significant to note, however, that the DPA was signed only by the GoS and the Zahgawa faction of the SLM/A led by Minni Minawi. The Fur faction of the SLA/M led by Abdul Wahid Mohamed al-Nur and the JEM led by Khalil Ibrahim did not sign the document as they were ‘dismissed as troublemakers and consigned to the role of spoilers’ by the US and AU peace brokers. It was, therefore, not surprising that fighting escalated following the signing of the agreement. AMIS’ glaring inability to deal decisively with the situation in Darfur inspired the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1769 in July 2007, authorizing the deployment of UNAMID.

**Doha Document for Peace in Darfur**

Although key provisions of the DPA were built into the mandate of UNAMID, the accord faced myriad challenges. Notable among them was the rejection of the DPA by major opposition factions. These challenges led to renewed rounds of negotiations sponsored by the Government of Qatar, which culminated in the signing of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) in July 2011. Currently the main framework for peace in Darfur, the DDPD was signed only by the GoS and the Liberation and Justice Movement in July 2011 as it was rejected by the other armed factions in Darfur. The agreement seeks to address the main sources of the Darfur conflict as well as the security and political implications arising from it with key provisions that focus on power and wealth sharing as well as the protection of civilians. Although the DDPD is acknowledged by the UN as ‘essential in addressing the root causes of conflict in Darfur’, progress toward its implementation remains limited as nearly all the armed factions in Darfur are non-signatories. As a UNAMID peacekeeper observed, “there is no peace agreement in Darfur”, leaving UNAMID with no choice but to operate in an ongoing war zone.

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22 Interview, UNAMID Official, El Fasher, North Darfur, 19 December 2015.
AMIS

Mandate and structure

Peacekeeping mandates provide the legal basis for deploying missions to conflict theatres and also serve as important yardsticks for evaluating mission performance. In addition, mandates are signposts that guide the conduct of operations, implying that missions conducted with weak, limited, imprecise or over ambitious mandates are less likely to succeed.23 The initial mandate of AMIS was distilled from provisions of the HCFA, which was ‘highly diluted and compromised to accommodate the concerns of the parties’.24 For example, Article 3 of the agreement provides for the inclusion of representations of the GoS, SLM/A, and JEM as integral members of the CFC, which was mandated, among other things, to ensure the implementation of the ceasefire and to receive, verify, analyze, and judge complaints related to possible violations of the ceasefire.25 As Appiah-Mensah observes, ‘living and working together with the representatives has serious consequences for security, intelligence, and confidence-building’.26 As such, they were seen as informers built into the CFC by some of the agencies on the ground.27

Additionally, the representatives were paid monthly mission subsistence allowances funded out of AMIS’ shoestring budget. Given that the parties persistently violated the agreements, such payments were ultimately counterproductive. Thus, AMIS was increasingly hamstrung by its weak mandate, which had no clear provisions, for instance, on the protection of civilians—at least at the initial stages of the mission. The mandate has been described as ‘restricted’28, ‘inadequate’29 and ‘not robust enough’30, as the mission was restricted to monitoring the terms of the HCFA and protecting itself and the monitors of the ceasefire.

Also, the mission was not well planned. As an observer put it, ‘AMIS was never planned; it just happened.’31 The mission was rushed ‘because of political imperatives and there was little time for proper planning’.32 The absence of a robust mandate, the lack of

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25It is significant to note that AMIS’s mandate did not include the protection of civilians at this stage.
32Ibid, p. 4.
proper planning and limited capacity meant that the future of AMIS became more uncertain by the day. Its personnel strength, comprising of 60 African military observers and 300 military observer protectors, was ‘both too few and too thinly spread’ to alter the situation in any significant manner.  

As a result, the AU expanded the mission in all of its dimensions, resulting in AMIS II on 20 October 2004. AMIS II was subsequently expanded to AMIS IIE in July 2005. In terms of personnel strength, the AU Peace and Security Council decided that AMIS would consist of 3,320 personnel, including 2,341 military personnel—among them 450 observers, up to 815 civilian police personnel, as well as the appropriate civilian personnel. The subsequent expansion of AMIS II to AMIS IIE brought the total authorized strength to 6,171 troops, in addition to 1,560 Civilian Police. The mandate of AMIS II was to ensure compliance with the HCFA as well as to assist in the process of confidence-building, and to contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and the return of IDPs and refugees. The failure, however, of AMIS II and AMIS IIE to achieve their mandates, particularly with regard to the protection of civilians, resulted in a long debate at the UN that ultimately led to the establishment of UNAMID.

Political and military context: Nature of key actors

As noted earlier, the GoS, the SLM/A, and the JEM, core parties to the agreement, violated the terms along every step of the way, making it difficult to consolidate initial security gains. The breakup of existing rebel groupings and the emergence of new splinter groups further complicated the situation. The actions of third-party states also had significant impacts on events and processes in Darfur. Key among them was the antagonistic relationship between President Al-Bashir and Chadian president, Idriss Déby, both of whom have historically engaged in proxy warfare using opposing rebel groups based along their common border to destabilize each other’s regimes.

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37 Ibid, p. 15.
Achievements and challenges

The sense of optimism that accompanied the signing of the HCFA surged with the deployment of AMIS in 2004. AMIS performed fairly well in its first year of operation as it contributed to a reduction in death and destruction on the ground, particularly through the observation, monitoring, and reporting roles which it played.\(^3\) The mission was also hailed, with some justification, as part of ‘the new African renaissance vision of not being indifferent to the causes and impact of devastating conflicts’.\(^3\) AMIS was instrumental in reducing the magnitude of atrocities that characterized the conflict while sustaining the peace till the deployment of UNAMID. For the most part, however, the mission did not proceed smoothly.

A major difficulty encountered had to do with mustering the means to implement its mandate. AMIS was underfunded and this constrained its operational capability. For instance, there were times when the civilian police had only ‘four vehicles for 250 police’, severely restraining their mobility for security patrols.\(^4\) Also, as Alpha Oumar Konaré, the erstwhile chairman of the AU Commission once remarked, “we have soldiers who have been waiting three or four months to be paid.”\(^5\) Thus, AMIS relied ‘entirely’ on the benevolence of extra-continental partners, including the European Union through its African Peace Facility, and the Canadian government, which provided most of the helicopter fleet used during the mission.\(^6,7\)

UNAMID

Mandate and structure

UNAMID was established by UNSCR 1769 on 31 July 2007 to support the implementation of the DPA for an initial period of twelve months. UNAMID had a much broader and more robust mandate than AMIS. The Security Council authorized the deployment of UNAMID under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, implying that it was a robust mission, if not an outright peace enforcement mission. As such, the mission had the authority to use ‘necessary action’ in its areas of deployment to ensure freedom of movement of its personnel and humanitarian staff. This was necessary for the effective protection of

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\(^3\) de Waal (2007), op. cit.
\(^4\) Konare, cited in Kreps, S., op. cit. supra.
civilian populations—a core priority—as UNAMID worked to improve the complex security situation in Darfur. The mission’s mandate, which was jointly determined by the AU and the UN, has the protection of civilians as a core priority. Included in the mandate of the mission are the following:

- To contribute to the restoration of necessary security conditions for the safe provision of humanitarian assistance.
- To contribute to the protection of civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence and prevent attacks against civilians, within its capability and areas of deployment, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan;
- To contribute to the promotion of respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Darfur.
- To implement the DPA.
- To provide a secure environment for reconstruction, development, and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes.

In terms of force strength, UNAMID was to ‘consist of up to 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, and an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,772 police personnel and nineteen formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each’. The current strength of UNAMID is as follows:

- 17,453 total uniformed personnel.
- 14,345 troops.
- 179 military observers.
- 2,929 police (including formed units).
- 811 international civilian personnel.
- 2,601 local civilian staff.

The reduction in personnel strength, as reflected by the figures above, followed the decision of the UN and AU to gradually downsize UNAMID’s military and other capacities in parts of the Darfur region that were considered relatively safe and stable.

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Funding and equipment

Compared with AMIS, UNAMID is much better resourced and equipped to fulfill its mandate. During the field interviews on which this paper is based, however, a number of UNAMID peacekeepers cited challenges that had the potential to undermine effective joint operations, such as inadequate communication equipment, and insufficient helicopters for patrols. Some military personnel complained of low quality or broken contingent-owned equipment, including armoured personnel carriers, which some of the troop contributing countries supplied to their troops. In sum, peacekeepers noted that although the UNAMID is authorized to operate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the equipment available could not support Chapter VII operations.

Political and military context: Nature of key actors

The challenges being encountered in Darfur seem to confirm a basic finding from peacekeeping research: although the overwhelming majority of intrastate conflicts are terminated through negotiated peace accords, ‘the implementation of civil war peace agreements is difficult and prone to collapse’.

While this difficulty is often attributed to the role played by spoilers—factions and leaders who oppose peace agreements and use violence to subvert them—the greatest impediments to the achievement of mission mandates in Darfur derive from the hostile relations between the GoS and disgruntled armed factions. This is, in turn, linked to the failure of the ongoing peace accords to secure the support or buy-in of the movements. Unrelenting violent confrontations between the GoS and the armed opposition movements is making tangible progress all the more difficult.

Fighting between government forces and the SLA/AW, for example, has intensified since January 2016, resulting in the displacement of over 105,000 people. In May 2015, there were a series of attacks and counter attacks between government forces and the SLA/AW, SLA/MM, and JEM/Gibril, which subsequently intensified following the launch by the government of its ‘Operation Decisive Summer’. Aerial bombardment campaigns have been a major source of threat to the security of civilians. Other forms of human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based violence, have also been prevalent. While UNAMID continues to perform a critical protection function during such hostilities, for example, through police patrols and the protection of IDP camps, its ability to ensure

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50 Interview, UNAMID peacekeeper, El Fasher, North Darfur, 17 December 2015.
effective protection is severely constrained by access denials and movement restrictions imposed on it by the GoS. This point is discussed in more detail shortly.

**Relationship between UNAMID and host government**

Another critical factor affecting the dynamics of the mission relates to the relationship between the mission and the host government, which remains a mix of both cooperation and lack of cooperation. While there is some cooperation on matters like policing, the overall relationship between both parties is characterized by mistrust and a lack of support for the mission by the government, manifested in GoS-imposed restrictions of movement of UNAMID personnel, denial of access and security clearance, and flight restrictions. This constrains the ability of the mission to protect civilians and discharge other critical mandates. Access and movement restrictions became particularly severe following a shooting incident on 23 April, 2015, involving UNAMID personnel and “approximately 40 unidentified armed men” in the town of Kass in South Darfur, which resulted in the killing of four of the armed men. While UNAMID claimed that the men were killed while attempting to hijack its vehicle, Sudanese authorities insisted that they were killed in cold blood.

In April 2015, UNAMID was informed that it was no longer permissible for the mission to undertake flight operations in certain areas of Darfur. These restrictions query the mission’s status as a Chapter VII operation and cast doubt on its ability to provide effective protection. During interviews with the Sudanese authorities, they noted that the decision to impose movement restrictions and access denials to certain areas were informed by the need to ensure the safety and security of UNAMID personnel. UNAMID peacekeepers however insisted that movement restrictions were imposed to cover up human rights abuses. Though it is difficult to ascertain the truth, the deleterious effects that these restrictions are having on the mission, particularly in terms of the protection of civilians, are incontrovertible.

A number of the UNAMID personnel interviewed noted that the government is pursuing a deliberate strategy aimed at frustrating UNAMID. They claimed that this is discernible, for instance, through the GoS’ insistence on the deployment of predominantly Arabic-speaking personnel and undue delays in the clearance of UNAMID or contingent-owned equipment at the port of entry in Sudan. However, the authorities explained that their preference for Arabic-speaking personnel is to ensure that peacekeepers deployed to

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52 Interview, high-ranking Sudanese government officials, Khartoum, 22 December 2015.
53 Interview, UNAMID personnel, El Fasher, North Darfur, 19 December 2015.
54 Interview, senior UNAMID official, El Fasher, North Darfur, 19 December 2015.
Darfur understand the local culture. Moreover, they do not believe that personnel who do not understand Arabic can police local communities effectively. Both UNAMID and government officials confirmed that there has been significant improvement on the hitherto problematic issue of visa denials.

The question of mission exit is another problem. The UN holds the view that adequate progress has not been made toward the mission’s benchmarks and that it would be premature and counterproductive to draw down before key indicators are met. Yet the GoS is demanding the withdrawal of UNAMID on the ground that the security situation in Darfur is conducive. It insists that UNAMID is exaggerating the security situation in order to protect mission jobs, citing Western and Central Darfur as areas that do not need UNAMID presence. Government authorities have also cited increased police presence and police escort convoys provided on major highways by the Sudanese police as evidence of the government’s preparedness to take over from UNAMID. However, the need for police escorts seems to suggest an atmosphere of insecurity, casting doubt on some of these claims. UNAMID has, however, proposed a gradual and phased withdrawal from West Darfur, given the relative peace in that area. In 2015, following a strategic review of UNAMID’s operations conducted in 2014, the UN and the AU took the decision to gradually downsize UNAMID’s military and other capacities in parts of the Darfur Region that were considered relatively safe and stable. Also, the mission has begun the process of transferring aspects of its mandate to the UN country team as part of its exit strategy.

**AU-UN peacekeeping partnership in Darfur**

Overall, there appears to be an effective working relationship between AU and UN peacekeepers serving in UNAMID. Most of the peacekeepers interviewed noted, however, that the AU leadership has been less involved in UNAMID as “actual support from the AU is not forthcoming”. One of the peacekeepers suggested that the failure of the AU chairperson to visit the mission area was not encouraging. Another noted that “the AU is more present at the political level than at the operational level” and that the AU is more actively involved with appointments to senior leadership positions, giving the mission the image of a UN project rather than an AU-UN peacekeeping partnership.

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55 Interview, UNAMID peacekeeper, El Fasher, North Darfur, 16 December 2015.
56 Interview, UNAMID peacekeeper, El Fasher, North Darfur, 17 December 2015.
57 Interview, UNAMID peacekeeper, El Fasher, North Darfur, 16 December 2015.


**Achievements and challenges**

Since the UNAMID deployed, the security situation in Darfur has improved so much that labels like ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’ are no longer appropriate. Despite the presence of severe restrictions, the UNAMID continues to make a significant contribution to the protection of civilians, through security provision at IDP camps and in local communities, military deployments and patrols in areas of potential insecurity, promotion of community policing (through training), and the facilitation of medical evacuations of wounded civilians.

Beyond the protection of civilians, the mission is contributing toward the implementation of the DDPD. Additionally, the mission offers support towards the transformation of the various intercommunal conflicts by organizing critical fora for dialogue and is also taking significant steps toward the promotion of human rights and the restoration of the rule of law to the region.

This notwithstanding, UNAMID is facing a number of debilitating challenges that include the following:

- Initial GoS opposition to the deployment of non-African or UN peacekeepers.
- Lack of progress towards the achievement of comprehensive peace in Darfur.
- Challenging relationship between the mission and the host government.
- Access denial and movement, including flight restrictions imposed by the government.
- Attacks against UNAMID personnel resulting in deaths and injuries.
- Hijacking of UNAMID vehicles on patrol and escort missions.

**Conclusion and recommendations**

Whether or not the UNAMID can achieve its mandates depends on how well it is able to influence belligerent factions toward complying with the peace agreements that it was established to implement. Without a comprehensive peace agreement that is signed and respected by all the parties to the conflict, peace will remain elusive. There is a need for renewed dialogue that ensures that the key stakeholders become part of the peace process. There is also an urgent need for improvement in the relationship between UNAMID and the GoS. In the meantime, the UNAMID’s protective function remains indispensable.
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THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SOUTH SUDAN

John Mark Pokoo and Benjamin Antwi Serebour

Abstract
The Republic of South Sudan gained political independence on 9 July 2011 from the Republic of the Sudan and was recognized by the United Nations through its Security Council Resolution 1996. Prior to independence, conflicts between southern Sudan (now South Sudan) and northern Sudan had persisted since the 1950s over power relations along the lines of exclusionary politics. The conflicts continue and its transformative nature informs the changing role of the United Nations (UN) mission in that country. This chapter reviews the role of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) by examining its mandate amid divergent local and regional security threats while linking potential sources of further conflict to its future scope of work. It identifies the patchy enforcement of peace agreements as a factor in the protracted conflicts. It also highlights the August 2015 Peace Agreement as transformative but may widen the scope of work of UNMISS.

Background
The Republic of South Sudan gained political independence on 9 July 2011 from the Republic of the Sudan and was recognized by the United Nations through its Security Council Resolution 1996. Prior to independence, conflicts between southern Sudan (now South Sudan) and northern Sudan had persisted since the 1950s over power relations along the lines of exclusionary politics. Over two million people died, four million were displaced and some 600,000 people fled the country as refugees. At independence, South Sudan had to balance competing internal and external interests toward state-building and peacebuilding but conflicts erupted immediately after independence largely as a
result of personality clashes within the leadership of the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM)—the movement that led the independence struggle and became the ruling political party after independence. The conflicts continue and its transformative nature informs the changing role of the United Nations (UN) mission in that country. Prior to Independence of South Sudan, the UN and African Union (AU) had responded to the conflicts in the Sudan by authorizing missions in the Sudan—initially, an African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and later, a UN Advanced Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS) which transformed. However, these efforts were joined up at the political level under an AU High Panel on the Sudan to coordinate the efforts of the AU, UN and Arab League in the Sudan. At the operational level, the UN had separate missions in the Sudan and also, South Sudan. The sub-regional body, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has also been active in leading the mediation efforts in South Sudan with technical and political support from the AU and the UN.

This chapter reviews the role of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) by examining its mandate amid divergent local and regional security threats while linking potential sources of further conflict to its future scope of work. It identifies the patchy enforcement of peace agreements as a factor in the protracted conflicts. It also highlights the August 2015 Peace Agreement as transformative but may widen the scope of work of UNMISS.

**Context**

As already indicated, prior to the independence of South Sudan, the actors in the conflict in Southern Sudan were the Khartoum Government on one hand, the SPLM, on the other. The SPLM initially focused on seeking an inclusive and just Sudan with greater political recognition and economic autonomy for the south. However, some of the members within its leadership (e.g. Riek Marchal), were interested in outright secession from the Sudan. Thus, the hidden role of the Sudan and the lack of clarity regarding political direction of the SLPM, continue to drive the crisis in that country. In July 2002, the Sudan peace process under the auspices of IGAD led to the signing of the Machakos Protocol, setting forth the principles of governance, the transitional process and the structures of government, and self-determination for the people of southern Sudan. The protocol also provided for further talks on arrangements relating to the sharing of power and wealth, human rights and a ceasefire on which the parties to the conflict signed a number of agreements in 2004. In that same year, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1547 to establish a special political mission: the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS) which complemented and transformed earlier
Africa Union (AU) deployment in the Sudan as part of international efforts to intensify the peace process there and build on ongoing momentum.

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was initiated in the 1980s as a liberation movement with political and military mandates. It led the independence struggle for South Sudan and became the ruling political party in 2011. However, the Movement has become a victim of its own character and military tactics marked by unclear political direction, internal rebellion and factionalism. For example, some of its founding members and respected commentators in South Sudan share the view that the SPLM/A could not initially clarify its vision around the issues of whether to unite with or secede from the Republic of the Sudan. For those who share the above views, the SPLM should have decided upfront whether it wanted to unite with the Sudan or breakaway to form and independent South Sudan and by extension, settle the question of whether the Movement subscribed to the idea of unitary or federal form of government. Thus, among many other points of difference, the SPLM Government is split between President Salva Kir and former Vice President Riek Marchal (and their respective supporters) over whether to run the country as a federation or unitary State. Furthermore, the Movement has become vulnerable to its own military tactics, marked by rebellion and militant factionalism. Many of its internal rebellions have been resolved through nationally-mediated agreements which provide opportunities to reintegrate untrained fighters into its fold. Other disputes have been resolved through internationally-mediated peace agreements. However, commitment to the implementation of all such peace agreements has been weak and disturbances within the SPLM/A easily take on national proportions and have the tendency to threaten the security of the entire country.

On 9 January 2005, the Government of the Sudan and the SPLM/A signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). It included agreements on issues outstanding after the Machakos Protocol and contained provisions on security arrangements, power-sharing in the capital of Khartoum, some autonomy for the south and the distribution of economic resources, including oil. Also in 2005, the Security Council adopted resolution 1590, establishing the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to support implementation of the CPA, facilitate and coordinate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons and provide humanitarian assistance, among others. The Security Council further decided that UNMIS would consist of up to 10,000 military personnel and an appropriate civilian component, including up to 715 civilian police personnel.
Resolution 1996 which recognized the independence of South Sudan also established the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Its predecessor, UNMIS, was initially conceived as a third party international mechanism to monitor the implementation of the CPA. However, as the May 2011 special report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council shows, ‘the range of challenges to stability and security in post-Comprehensive Peace Agreement South Sudan calls for a comprehensive, results-based approach to peace consolidation that is focused from the outset on building national capacities… support the new state in meeting political, security and protection challenges’. With violent events on the ground, subsequent mandates of UNMISS continue to reprioritize its operational emphasis from state building at one point, to the protection of civilians at another and, most recently, to security sector transformation. This shift in emphasis has entailed operational level re-calculation that question its commitment to meeting the original threefold priorities of ‘political, security and protection challenges’. The latter is a factor that undermines the peace process in that country.

Mission Statistics

UNMISS is a Chapter VII mission combining diplomacy and the use of force, where necessary, to ensure security and stability in South Sudan. Resolution 2155 (2014) authorized the following force level for UNMISS: a military component of up to 12,500 troops of all ranks and a police component, including Formed Police Units of up to 1,323 personnel. The initial authorized strength of the mission was up to 7,000 military personnel, 900 police personnel and an appropriate civilian component. As at 30 June 2015, the following constituted the staffing levels of UNMISS:

- Total uniformed personnel numbered 12,523. This included:
  - 11,350 troops
  - 179 military liaison officers
  - 994 police (include formed police units)
- 769 international civilian personnel
- 1,204 local staff
- 409 United Nations Volunteers

Peace Agreements Signed

Since 2005, several nationally-mediated peace agreements have been signed to advance the peace process in South Sudan. In addition, there are critical internationally-mediated

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peace agreements which are mostly signed between the government and splinter groups emerging from within the SPLM. The internationally-mediated agreements are facilitated by either a neighboring government, IGAD or the AU with support from the UN. Notable among the latter are:

- The Cooperation Agreements, signed in September 2012;
- The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, signed in January 2013 and
- The Peace Agreement, signed in August 2015.

The strongest points of the peace agreements lie in the inherent recognition of opposing views and the political leverage in the opportunity to append one’s signature to a pacification document with the government. The latter enables factions to take part in post-agreement power-sharing processes and thus, eligibility to sponsor candidates for key government positions and also, be able to access state resources. Apart from the August 2015 Peace Agreement, implementation of most of the other peace agreements has been left largely to the signatories with the international actors in observation and monitoring roles. However, the August 2015 Peace Agreement provides for direct participation of the international community in its implementation.³

The weakest points of the peace agreements in South Sudan have been their ambitious targets (an example on the 2015 Agreement is discussed below) and the lack of commitment to their implementation by the signatories. Both types of agreements (i.e. nationally and internally-mediated) have suffered violations by their signatories and the consequent insecurity has inspired expansions in UNMISS’ mandate as captured in updates to relevant UN Security Council resolutions.⁴

That said, one of the challenging tests in the above-mentioned 2015 Agreement is its ambitious targets relating to the tight time-lines within which particular benchmarks must be met. For example, the scope of the August 2015 Peace Agreement is vast, particularly in the area of security sector reforms, governance—including elections management—and national constitution-making processes. It also addresses issues of peace, reconciliation and transitional justice. The agreement calls for the establishment of a new and professional military. Under Chapter IV, the agreement sets up a Strategic Defense and Security Review Board to assess the military and non-military security needs of South Sudan in the wider context of framing the requirements for a National Defense Force and associated security agencies for the country. The assessment will

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³ See Chapter VII of Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, Addis Ababa, 17 August, 2015
inform the design of a security policy for security sector transformation and disarmament
demobilization and reintegration processes. However, a permanent ceasefire and
transitional security arrangements (PCTSA) workshop proposed by the Agreement and
organized in Addis Ababa in September 2015, could not develop a detailed plan for
demilitarization including declaration of force disposition by the parties.

**Mandates**

UNMISS was established to support peace consolidation and foster longer-term state-
building and economic development in South Sudan; conflict prevention, mitigation,
resolution and protection of civilians; and also promote the principle of national
ownership by developing the capacity of the Republic of South Sudan.

Following the outbreak of violence in December 2013 and the resultant mass killings and
abuse of human rights, the Security Council updated Resolution 1996 with Resolution
2132 on 24 December 2013, demanding that the warring parties ‘cooperate fully with
UNMISS as it implements its mandate, in particular the protection of civilians.’ The
Council has since updated the mandate of UNMISS again with Resolution 2241 of 9
October 2015 which raises staff and equipment levels while expanding the mission’s
scope in five key areas: protection of civilians; monitoring and investigating human
rights; creating conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
supporting the implementation of the monitoring and verification mechanism/ceasefire
and transitional security arrangements monitoring mechanism; and supporting the
implementation of the August 2015 Peace Agreement.

**Operational Issues/Challenges**

Many of the multiple issues confronting South Sudan are rooted in a combination
of weak state institutions, leadership crises, the quest for a suitable power-sharing
arrangement, and conflicts at the country’s periphery linked to contestations over
land and other resources and demanding cultural practices. These are discussed under
politics, security and social contexts below.

**Politics**

The central political actor in South Sudan is the SPLM. As already indicated, splits are
not new to the SPLM. However, in December 2013, one such split led to the dismissal

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6 Ibid. Art. 3(b).
7 Ibid. Art. 3(c).
8 s/res/2132 (2013) Art.2.
of the then vice president, Riek Machar and 24 other ministers who held key positions in the government and in the National Liberation Council—the highest decision-making organ of the SPLM. These dismissals were confirmed by various presidential decrees. The circumstances leading to the dismissals provoked fighting among supporters of the dismissed officials and those SPLM fighters loyal to the government. The clashes resulted in mass killings that took ethnic dimensions.

Furthermore, the Government routinely engages with rebel groups to try to restore their leaders and fighters into the SPLM. For example, since 2011, the government has brokered a number of bilateral arrangements to integrate militia leaders and their fighters from Jonglei, Unity and Southern Kordofan States into the SPLM. Key among these were 1,000 persons from the militia allied to General Peter Gadet (former Commander of the 8th Division of the in northern Jonglei State), 450 from the group led by Gatluak Gai (rebel leader killed on 23 July 2011), and 207 allied with David Yau (former leader of an insurrection and later, Chief Administrator of the Greater Pibor Administrative Area of South Sudan), as well as unknown numbers from groups led by Johnson Olony and Paulino Matiep.

Recent political issues in South Sudan include whether the country should adopt a unitary or federal system of government. In that regard, the government announced in October 2015 the establishment of 28 new states up from 10 even though under the August 2015 Peace Agreement, such powers fall under the exclusive powers category that require the joint agreement of the office of the president and the office of the first vice president. Also arising from the August 2015 Peace Agreement is the development of a professional military and a new national constitution for South Sudan. The constitution making process, in particular, is expected to elicit yet more political disagreement between the president and the first vice president that would require diplomacy and tact to resolve.

11 The August 2015 Peace Agreement already ratified by the Parliament of South Sudan, created the office of First Vice President to be sponsored by the faction of former Vice President, Riek Machar. The Agreement also sets up categories of political powers, some require agreement between the Office of the President and the Office of the First Vice President. Other categories of power were devolved to the States with a third category classified as residual which could be exercised by either the national or the state governments. The creation of the 28 new States come ahead of the institutionalization of the above structures. Such an announcement is bound to deepen the tension in the country if not well managed.
Security

The greatest threats to life and property in South Sudan stem from the operations of militia groups loyal to either the government or opposition forces. Additionally, there is underlying tension from inter-communal conflicts centered on land disputes and certain cultural rites. While all the above factors are located within the wider conflict dynamics in South Sudan, they present a specific challenge to UNMISS’ protection of civilians (PoC) responsibilities. For example, breakdown in social structures affect the identification of local actors with whom the UNMISS PoC outreach team would engage.

In light of the above, the formation of new national security agencies, including the military as stated in the August 2015 Peace Agreement must be well managed. Experiences with integrating SPLM personnel into the Sudanese Army in the 1980s show that although such military unification processes are based on merit, the dismissal or placement of high-ranking militia personnel in low ranks in the emerging national army could turn them into new spoilers going forward. There is also some nervousness about the reinstatement of former Vice President Reik Marchal as first vice president under the 2015 Peace Agreement. The agreement allows the president, first vice president and vice president to each have their own security quotas—a situation which will be difficult to manage on the ground given the level of indiscipline within the SPLM and the adversarial relations between the president and the first vice president.

Furthermore, South Sudan is one of the countries targeted by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA evolved from northern Uganda in 1987 as a violent militant group led by Joseph Kony. The AU has documented that between 1987 and 2004, the LRA committed horrendous atrocities in northern Uganda before extending its operations into South Sudan in 1994 and to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2004. Thus, the LRA has become a regional problem, perpetrating grave human rights abuses against civilians in the region with catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Using dehumanizing tactics like mutilations, rape and sexual enslavement. Against vulnerable populations in remote areas, the group has induced the internal displacement of about 416,000 civilians and refugees in the region. It has also impeded the delivery of essential services and undermined governance and development in affected areas. The LRA has been listed as a terrorist organization by the United States since 2001 and in 2003, the government of Uganda referred five of its most senior leaders to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

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12 In 2011, the UN confirmed attacks by the LRA in parts of the country, including the looting of a police station at Deim Jallabi with potential danger to livelihoods. UNMISS consequently doubled its deployment in the suspected areas.

13 See more at: http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/100-au-led-rci-lra-1#sthash.AJiT5f5r.dpuf; See also: http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/100-au-led-rci-lra-1
The ICC subsequently issued arrest warrants for Joseph Kony (fugitive), Raska Lukwiya (killed on 12 August 2006), Okot Odhiambo (fugitive), Dominic Ongwen (fugitive), and Vincent Otti (executed by firing squad on Kony’s orders on 2 October 2007). The African Union has also listed the LRA as a terrorist organization and its Peace and Security Council, with support from the international community, authorized the Regional Cooperation Initiative (RCI) in November 2013 for the elimination of the LRA with a staff strength of 3,085.

**Social Context**

Land-based conflicts are common in South Sudan, especially since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. During the civil war, internally displaced persons (IDPs) were settled in urban areas. The host communities expected the IDPs to return to their ancestral lands after the signing of the CPA but some of them refused to vacate the camps and free up the lands they occupied, creating pockets of tension with the host communities. Also, those IDPs who returned to their original homes realized on arrival that their land had been taken over by different ethnic groups and this also created conflict among groups in the country. Concurrently, land-based conflict occurs between nomadic communities and settled farming communities with the latter always claiming that their crops are trespassed by grazing herds of cattle. This type of conflict occurs mostly in the Eastern and Western Equatorial states.

Since the late 1990s, cattle acquisition has become a very important practice for most ethnic groups as it is a major determinant of financial status and a man’s ability to marry. Young prospective husbands are sometimes requested to pay a bride price of 300 to 500 cattle which very few can afford. As a result, they resort to cattle raiding which has become a common practice, especially in the pastoral regions of the country. In response, and in the absence of a national police force, local vigilante groups have emerged to protect community cattle from raiders. Some of these groups are however exploited by warlords who lure them with weapons and enlist them into their fighting forces. With the breakdown of the traditional value system, access to guns provides leverage and a means of survival. This means that communities now require arms to ward off violent attacks against their cattle and properties. For this reason, many people

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14 USAID Country Profile, Property rights and resources governance. South Sudan. http://usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/country-profiles/full reports/USAID_Land_Tenure_South_Sudan_Profile.pdf

15 Ibid


17 Ibid

18 Interview with UNMISS Official.

19 Interview with UNMISS Official.

20 Ibid
tend to rely on local militia for protection which has in turn affected the influence of chiefs on their subjects.

**Gender Dimensions**

Throughout the conflicts in South Sudan, women were particularly targeted for being wives of soldiers or public officials.\(^{21}\) While a thorough discussion of the gender dimensions of UNMISS is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note that women have become the most vulnerable group and are traumatized due to the intensity of the killings they witness as well as the ill-treatment they were subjected to. Traditionally, women in South Sudan have often played the caretaker role in their families by ensuring the wellbeing of children and the elderly as well as serving fighters and nursing injuries sustained from the conflict.\(^{22}\) According to the UN Women in South Sudan, traditional practices such as early and forced marriages, child abductions and teenage pregnancies subordinate women and girls and disable their efforts to contribute to development. Sexual and gender-based violence is prevalent, with at least 4 out of 10 women reported to have experienced one or more forms of violence.\(^{23}\) However, the means of providing the livelihood support to women has been destroyed as women have been left with no access to land for cultivation.\(^{24}\)

The UN Women in South Sudan has specific mandate on women and gender issues. In an effort to promote women’s interest and participation in national activities, UN Women together with UNMISS has supported women’s civic engagement, including their involvement in the constitutional making process. Again, UNMISS has worked with members of national and state legislative assemblies toward gender responsive legislation and policy development.\(^{25}\) The mission has also advocated for the greater participation of women in peace and security, women’s political empowerment by ensuring improved protection and security for women and girls by helping to build the capacity of justice and security sectors and civil society organizations in addressing violence against women and girls, and issues relating to the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence.\(^{26}\) Additionally, UNMISS undertakes activities that ensures that the poorest and most excluded women are economically empowered and benefit from

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\(^{21}\) Interview with a deputy speaker of parliament


\(^{23}\) See more at: [http://africa.unwomen.org/en/where-we-are/eastern-and-southern-africa/south-sudan#sthash.6dNgMrgW.dpuf](http://africa.unwomen.org/en/where-we-are/eastern-and-southern-africa/south-sudan#sthash.6dNgMrgW.dpuf)

\(^{24}\) Ibid


\(^{26}\) Ibid
development through its provision of technical assistance to key government institutions to develop gender responsive policies, strategies and services that will enhance the sustainable livelihoods of women, with particular focus on the agricultural sector. A key challenge to the gender-related work of UNMISS related to the high levels of illiteracy and breakdown of social structures which affects effective community outreach.

Human Rights and the Protection of Civilians (PoC)

The military campaign of the SPLM recorded massive atrocities long before the 2013 conflict. But the 2013 conflict recorded one of the worst human rights and humanitarian crises in the country and all parties to the conflict targeted civilians.\(^{27}\) Scores of civilians were killed, maimed, tortured, burned alive inside their homes, displaced, raped and abducted, and children were recruited and used as part of the war effort.\(^{28}\) People were targeted and killed purposefully because of their ethnicity.\(^{29}\) For example, a 2015 Human Rights Watch Report highlights that during the fighting in December 2013, forces allied to the government conducted a brutal crackdown on Juba’s Nuer population that included targeted killings, house-to-house searches, mass arrests, unlawful detention of hundreds of men in poor conditions, ill-treatment and torture.\(^{30}\)

UNMISS developed a protection of civilians (PoC) strategy in 2012 to ensure a more coherent and coordinated approach to the implementation of its protection mandate.\(^{31}\) The strategy has two major tactics. Firstly, the mission will assist and provide advice to the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) on the protection of its civilian population. Secondly, when the GRSS is unwilling or unable to act, UNMISS will act independently and impartially to protect civilians. To achieve these goals, UNMISS agreed on three tiers of action, each of which has distinct protection plans: protection through political process, providing protection from physical violence and establishing a protective environment.

Despite the atrocities committed over the years, none of the reparation and reconciliation provisions in many of the peace agreements have been thoroughly implemented. For example, the CPA provided for a Peace and Conciliation Commission that was rejected

\(^{27}\)See Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015)
\(^{28}\)See Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015)
\(^{29}\)South Sudan Marks First Anniversary of War. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/15/south-sudan-first-anniversary-civil-war
\(^{31}\)See the final draft of the UNMISS PoC strategy
by Khartoum and poorly implemented in Juba. This has however been reinforced in the August 2015 Peace Agreement.

In 2013, the African Union commissioned a high-level panel to inquire into human rights abuses in South Sudan whose report was published in 2015. In another development, the AU has announced the setting up of a war crimes court whose work may have security implications if it targets the country’s political elites.

### Tactics

UNMISS initially positioned itself to support peacebuilding, state-building and the extension of state authority in South Sudan. However, given the centrality of the militia groups in the protracted conflicts in the country, particularly in the context of the violent clashes in December 2013, the mission adopted a new strategy in 2014 that stresses impartial relations with all the parties and thus enhances access to all combatants. This approach also consolidates UNMISS’ in-country liaison and coordination activities and has helped to prioritize its PoC responsibilities.

Arising from the above shift in tactics, UNMISS adopted five priority tasks for its military component in 2014: protecting civilians; contributing to the creation of security conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance; supporting human rights investigations and reporting; providing support to the IGAD monitoring and verification mechanism; and protecting United Nations personnel and installations. Consequently, UNMISS established three sector headquarters in Malakal, Bor, and Bentiu where much of the fighting has intensified in 2013. Troop contributing countries either provided personnel directly from home or via transfers of already deployed troops in the context of inter-mission cooperation. The mission headquarters remains in Juba.

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32 Interview with Executive director, Civil Society Institute, Juba, South Sudan, 12th September 2015.
Table One below illustrates the military and police deployment in the mission and sector headquarters:

**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector HQ</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Mechanisms/Arrangements that facilitated supply of troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Juba</td>
<td>PoC, security, protect UN House, patrol in Juba</td>
<td>Nepal (also Bangladesh and Nepalese Police performing PoC tasks)</td>
<td>Inter-mission- MINUSTAH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Malakal</td>
<td>PoC, secure UN compound in Jonglei State</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Inter-mission - UNAMID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Bentiu</td>
<td>PoC, secure UNMISS facilities, patrol Western Warrap State</td>
<td>Ghana, Kenya</td>
<td>Inter-mission - UNOCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bor</td>
<td>PoC tasks</td>
<td>Nepal and Bangladesh</td>
<td>Inter-mission: UNMIL &amp; UNOCI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion**

The protracted conflict in South Sudan undermines the emergence of a common vision for the country and the development of a shared and inclusive national identity. While the initial three priorities of supporting the new state to deal with its political, economic and protection challenges were well conceived, changes in local security dynamics have led to greater emphasis on the UNMISS’ protection mandate. Politically, uncertainties about national actors’ willingness to work with UNMISS to enhance their state-building capacity are compounded by a leadership crisis in which a sitting government embroiled in protracted conflicts is invited to lead a national reconstruction programme.

The AU and the UN are facing serious challenges determining how to provide international assistance in such an adversarial post-conflict environment. The August 2015 Agreement provides an option though implementation also include the conclusion of a constitutional making process. The Agreement creates an Office for the First Vice President. However, it allows the constitution-making process to abrogate that office after the first tenure of the first occupant of that office expires. The processes of abrogating the office of the First Vice President could throw up further security challenges. In order to maximize national support for its effective implementation, peace efforts must overcome national perceptions—which delayed the signing process—that the 2015 agreement was internationally driven. While the cooperation of actors outside of government shall be critical in ensuing phases, the role of UNMISS is expected to expand and deepen in the foreseeable future. An exit strategy does not look politically and technically feasible in the short term.


USAID, Property rights and resources governance. South Sudan. Available at: http://www.usaidlandtenure.net/5CB2FB7A-34C1-4554-8E8B-1E203601D48C/FinalDownload/DownloadId

AFRICAN UNION INTERVENTIONS AT A CROSSROADS? AN EXAMINATION OF THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA

Nana B. Nti

Abstract
The African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is the longest-running stabilization mission carried-out by the AU and its partners. Its experience has provided insights into the contrasts between normative frameworks on peace interventions on the one hand, and the reality on the ground, partnerships for peace and security, and the AU’s comparative advantage beyond rapid deployment of troops for initial stabilization, on the other. Does this signal a turning point in AU interventions? Following a review of AMISOM’s mandate, operations and exit strategy, this chapter puts forward that the AU is at a crossroads regarding the future of its interventions; it must decide whether to follow the current model of short-term peace support operations, which are heavily dependent on non-AU resources, or pursue Plan B: review its normative structure on interventions and build up sufficient independent resources and capacity for long-term interventions suitable to emerging security threats and trends in Africa. The chapter argues for the AU to consider Plan B.

Introduction
In 2015, the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) marked its eighth year of existence. AMISOM has demonstrated the AU’s resilience to fulfil its mandate against all odds, including fatalities and protracted length of stay, and its agility to respond to emerging security threats and trends such as terrorism. But, most importantly, AMISOM provides the AU with a glimpse into the possible future of its interventions in member states, particularly:
Interventions beyond what is permitted under Article 4(h) of the *Constitutive Act of the African Union* (2000);

Expansion of peace support operations mandates into the ‘war on terror’;

A partnership for peace and security model that goes further than the United Nations (UN) Chapter VIII structure for regional peace enforcement missions; and

Extension of the AU’s regional ‘comparative advantage’ beyond short-term rapid stabilisation missions that prepare the ground for a longer term UN stabilisation and peacebuilding operation, post-conflict reconstruction or a UN peacekeeping mission.

This chapter discusses these issues through a review of AMISOM’s mandate, operations and exit strategy. It does not attempt, however, to provide a comprehensive overview of all discourses on and issues arising from AMISOM in 2015 or before. Neither is it based on any independent fieldwork observations. The chapter simply seeks to contribute, based on extensive documentary analysis, to projections of the future of AU interventions with some main points from the organisation’s Somalia experience.

**Background**

Somalia is located in East Africa with Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and the Gulf of Aden as its neighbours. The aforementioned neighbouring countries also have Somali populations as a result of state formation during the colonial era. Somalia is a merger of British Somaliland and Italian Somalia, which formed the Somali Republic in 1960, shortly after their respective independence the same year. However, the history of Somalia is plagued with inter and intragroup conflict, including irredentist struggle.¹

Internal armed conflict resulted in the fall of the Siad Barre regime in January 1991, which in turn, brought about clan warfare headed by warlords, the secession of Somaliland though internationally unrecognised², and a famine that led to the authorisation of the first peace operation in Somalia in 1992: the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). UNOSOM I was later supported by the United States-led Unified Taskforce for Somalia and both were taken over by UNOSOM II in 1993. UNOSOM II withdrew in 1995, mainly due to the deaths of 18 United States peace enforcers in 1994 and the general precarious


² Puntland also declared itself ‘semi-autonomous’ in 1998 but is now part of Somalia’s Interim Regional Administrations.
situation for mission staff operations. Since then, no other peace operation was deployed to Somalia until AMISOM in 2007.

In between those years, the ‘international community’ focused on supporting a political peace process that resulted in several agreements between previously warring factions, notably:

- The 1997 *Cairo Declaration on Somalia* in, which provided a framework for the Transitional Government, among other things;
- The *Arta Declaration* in 2000, which established ‘the first [internationally recognised] Somali government since 1991’—the Transitional National Government—but was opposed by warlords of the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council;
- *The Declaration on the Harmonization of Various Issues Proposed by the Somali Delegates at the Somali Consultative Meetings from 9-29 January 2004*, which ‘called for the establishment of Transitional Federal Institutions as well as elections’;
- The *Transitional Federal Charter* in 2004, which laid down guidelines for the Transitional Federal Government and Transitional Federal Institutions; and

On 19 January 2007, the AU’s Peace Security Council authorized the establishment of AMISOM. Per UN Charter Chapter VIII directives, the AU sought the UN Security Council’s approval for this mission, which was granted under Resolution (UNSCR) 1744 (2007).^9^

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3 See (1997). *Cairo Declaration on Somalia*.
5 Ibid.
Consequently, AMISOM was deployed in Somalia in March 2007 with an initial contingent of three Ugandan battalions.  

**Mandates**

As outlined in the Communiqué of the 69th Meeting of the AU’s Peace and Security Council, the mission’s mandate was:

(i) to provide support to the [Transitional Federal Institutions] in their efforts towards the stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation.

(ii) to facilitate the provision humanitarian assistance, and

(iii) to create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia.

The Communiqué listed seven tasks for AMISOM to undertake. These tasks were eventually incorporated as AMISOM’s mandate in UNSCR 1744 (2007). Figure 1 compares the original tasks in the Communiqué with the mandate as enumerated in UNSCR 1744 (2007).

**Figure 1**

**AMISOM’s Mandate in 2007**

12 Each box in Figure 1 lists AMISOM’s tasks in the Communiqué of the 69th Meeting of the AU’s Peace and Security Council first and then, in bold, how these tasks are appear in UNSCR 1744 (2007) as AMISOM’s mandate. Subsequent resolutions infer that the original mandate is found in UNSCR 1772 (2007), which is basically the same as UNSCR 1744 (2007) but contains updates on the all-inclusive political process in its opening paragraphs.
Eight years on, the AU Peace and Security Council’s original three-point mandate largely remains the same but its interpretation as a mandate listed in UNSCRs has been widened. AMISOM’s current UN Security Council authorisation is UNSCR 2232 (2015), which upholds its mandate as per UNSCR 2093 (2013). This latter mandate summarises ‘the process’ referred to in paragraph 4(a) of UNSCR 1744 (2007) as ‘the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia’; takes cognisance of a Federal Government of Somalia and of the extension of AMISOM’s protection to ‘[UN] personnel carrying out functions mandated by the [UN Security Council]’, with other significant additions and amendments to the original mandate as follows:

Additional provisions

(a) To maintain a presence in the four sectors set out in the AMISOM Strategic Concept of 5 January 2012, and in those sectors, in coordination with the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, including receiving, on a transitory basis, defectors, as appropriate, and in coordination with the United Nations, in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia;

(b) To assist, within its existing civilian capability, the Federal Government of Somalia, in collaboration with the United Nations, to extend state authority in area recovered from Al-Shabaab.

(c) To assist, within its capabilities, and in coordination with other parties, with implementation of the Somali national security plans, through training and mentoring of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, including through joint operations.  

While the original and present mandate demonstrates the AU’s readiness for and commitment to the continent’s ‘peace, security and stability’\(^{14}\), it transcends the Union’s own provisions regarding military interventions in sovereign states. Articles 4(g) and 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU state:

(g) Non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another.

(h) The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.\(^{15}\)

Thus, Article 4(h) did not form the basis of AMISOM’s mandate as AMISOM was deployed to protect the state, its institutions and the political peace process, and facilitate humanitarian access and the entry of a longer-term stabilisation mission. Nonetheless, AMISOM’s deployment in March 2007 was critical to the peace and security of Somalia, East Africa and the continent as a whole, and thus, indirectly, of its citizens. Furthermore, the state has the principal responsibility to protect its own civilians. Therefore, by protecting and supporting the re-establishment of the state, the end goal would be the protection of citizens by their own state.\(^{16}\) Finally, the Government (at that time, transitional) was in support of AMISOM.

The main challenge to AMISOM’s mandate at this stage is that it contravenes the AU’s existing normative basis. While this has not posed a problem so far, the AU could consider amending its current normative framework to give clear instructions on non-Article 4(h) and 4(j) interventions. This would provide clarity for future replications of the AMISOM model in similar circumstances and help to ensure consistency in AU policy and practice.

Another challenge to AMISOM’s mandate is its extension to the ‘war on terror’ with respect to its joint operations with the Somali National Army against Al-Shabaab, a home-grown militant group which joined the Al-Qaeda terrorist network in 2012. AMISOM’s mandate cannot be fulfilled without resolving the threats posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed

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\(^{15}\)African Union. (2000). Constitutive Act of the African Union. Lomé: African Union; Article 4(j) gives ‘The right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security’ however, the Communique of the 69th Meeting of the PSC did not explicitly state that AMISOM was requested by the Transitional Federal Government, but indicates that there were ‘consultations in Mogadishu with the [Transitional Federal Government]…on the planned deployment of a peace support mission in [Somalia]’, see African Union. (2007), p.1.

opposition groups. Additionally, Somali National Army’s collaboration with AMISOM has proven effective in gaining territories once controlled by Al-Shabaab and AMISOM and its troop contributing countries have demonstrated a willingness to undertake this task. Nevertheless, in the future, the AU could consider separating these mandates or dividing its African Standby Force into two forces: one would constitute the originally intended peace support operation and the other would comprise a military alliance along the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to fight threats like terrorism. The challenge is of a conceptual nature: the centrality of peace operations is to protect civilians while the purpose of military alliances is to protect the state or alliances of states. To put it in a different context, it would be problematic to conceive NATO members using peace enforcers to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in place of NATO or an ad hoc alliance of national armed forces.

### Operational Issues

AMISOM deployed first its military component and grew into a multidimensional peace support operation, adding police and civilian components. The police component includes individual officers, formed police and senior leadership, while the civilian component is made-up of political; humanitarian liaison; gender; civil affairs; safety and security; public information; and support units. Figures 1 to 3 show the gender and national composition of these components, respectively.

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Figure 2
AMISOM Civilian Personnel Statistics as at 30 September 2015

Figure 3
AMISOM Police Personnel Statistics as at 30 September 2015
The civilian component reports directly to the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC), who is also the Head of Mission. The police component reports to the Police Commissioner and the commanders of military contingents that make up the military component report to the Force Commander. ‘Both the Police Commissioner and the Force Commander report to the Head of Mission. At the operational level, mission coordinating entities such as the Mission Operations Centre…, Joint Support Operations Cell [and] Joint Mission Training Cell… etc., ensure the integration and smooth running of the mission. At the strategic level, the mission is managed by the AU [Commission] Peace and Security Department…’

This procedure does not prejudice the integrated nature of the mission as planning and implementation is undertaken jointly by all three components. There is also an AU High Representative for Somalia whose main task is supporting the political peace process through advocacy. AMISOM’s main headquarters is in the capital Mogadishu, with a rear headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya. AMISOM also has military and police presence in different parts of South Central Somalia.

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20 African Union Mission in Somalia. Acronyms replaced with ‘...’
AMISOM and the AU do not work in a vacuum concerning peace and security in Somalia. Apart from the AU’s collaboration with the Federal Government of Somalia, its other main partner is the UN. Article 17(1) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, concurring with Article 24(1) of the UN Charter\(^2\), acknowledges that the UN Security Council ‘has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 17(2) thus adds that the AU ‘[w]here necessary [would] recourse...to the [UN] to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the [AU’s] activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of Regional Organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security’.\(^2\) In line with this idea of a ‘partnership for peace and security’\(^\text{23}\), the UN provides assessed financial and technical support to AMISOM through the United Nations Support Office in Somalia\(^2\) and the AMISOM Trust Fund as well as operating its own political mission—the UN Assistance Mission to Somalia.\(^2\) The AU and UN have held joint planning, implementation and benchmarking and review exercises.\(^2\)

Nonetheless, there are other partners directly supporting AMISOM in the implementation of its mandate in cash and kind. These include contributions of individual states and the European Union. This model is possibly beyond the vision of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter of a more streamlined bilateral approach between the UN and the regional organisations that it has authorised to undertake peace enforcement missions. But a plethora of aid mechanisms should offer more options for AMISOM’s continuation. However, in general, the UN has been facing financial constraints and there were competing global security priorities for major donors in 2015 including the crises related to migration, Ukraine, the South China Sea and the terrorist activities of the Islamic State. The UN has called on its ‘Member States and international partners’ to provide funds in the wake of ‘the European Union’s decision to reduce its contributions to AMISOM’.\(^\text{27}\) But whose primary responsibility is it to ensure the financial sustainability of AMISOM?

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\(^1\)See United Nations. (1945).
\(^3\)See Ibid Article 7(k).
\(^5\)In general, there is a UN-AU Joint Task Force on Peace and Security
The AU infers in different documents that it is the UN, underlining the latter’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of global peace and security and affirming that AMISOM is there for the UN. Yet the UN, though requesting its member states in general to contribute to AMISOM, also called in UNSCR 2232 (2015) ‘upon the AU to consider how to provide sustainable funding for AMISOM... [and underlined] the AU’s call for its Member States to provide financial support to AMISOM’. Indeed, the AU’s Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union states that it would “recourse...to the [UN for support]’ ‘[w]here necessary’.

Though the root causes and impact of the Somali crises are not entirely African, Africans have a greater stake in Somalia’s stability due to proximity. Further, African priorities are not necessarily at the top of the global agenda as other continents are facing their own proximate security threats, which affect their national funds. Therefore, the AU should consider not only sending in rapid troops to stabilise its member states where necessary, but also independently funding its own African Peace and Security Architecture through its Peace Fund. The functioning of inter-African trade, the building of industries to develop secondary goods, the backing of innovation and innovators on the continent, anti-corruption strategies, consolidated fair packages for the continent and its people in dealing with trade with non-African countries, the weaning-off of aid in preference to trade and all other economic independence mechanisms should be renewed with a sense of urgency. For they do not only affect human security but state security as well.

### Exit Strategy

AMISOM was supposed to be a short-term stabilisation mission to transition into a UN peace operation within six months—by August 2007. Yet, almost eight years later, its mandate was extended once more to 30 May 2016 as a Joint AU-UN Benchmarking Exercise and Review of AMISOM in April 2015 found that the situation in Somalia was still not conducive for a UN peacekeeping operation before the end of 2016. The team that undertook this assessment revised the benchmarks of a similar process in 2013 for AMISOM’s transition into a UN operation (see Figure 5).

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30 *Ibid.* adopted in 28 July 2015 provided the security strategy for ‘the next 18 months’, inferring that AMISOM is expected to be in Somalia until the end of 2016.
AMISOM's exit strategy is tied to key pillars of Somalia’s Vision 2016: ‘neutralising’ Al-Shabaab and other armed groups, a strong security sector and consent by the Federal Government of Somalia and the people to a UN peacekeeping operation. The status of and concerns regarding these issues are addressed in turn below:

- **Somalia’s Vision 2016** was developed by the Federal Government of Somalia and its partners in 2013 and is based on provisions in the Somali Provisional Constitution relating to ‘constitutional review and implementation, and completion of the federal system and democratization’.  
- By the end of 2015, chapters 1 to 8 of the Provisional Constitution were being technically reviewed, almost all Interim Regional Administrations had been established, the National Independent Electoral Commission and the population for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation.

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Boundaries and Federation Commission [had been constituted but the AU Peace Security Council called] for the mobilization of the required human, technical and financial resources to enable the two Commissions to fulfill their respective mandates, and the Mogadishu Declaration ‘which reiterated that there should be no extension of constitutionally mandated term limits and outlined a number of key principles and actions to be taken in relation to the 2016 electoral model’ had been adopted by a National Consultative Forum. However, the Forum adopted the Declaration acknowledging that ‘one person, one vote’ elections would not be possible in 2016. The Forum ‘agreed that Somali leaders would reconvene and endorse a detailed electoral model and implementation plan and a political road map from the period 2016 to 2020 by 10 January 2016’. The National Independent Electoral Commission ‘started preparations for the eventual conduct of ‘one person, one vote’ elections in 2020’.

AMISOM’s joint operations with the Somali National Army have recovered territories from Al-Shabaab. Their cooperation continues with their current Operation Jubba Corridor, which replaced Operation Ocean Build in July 2015, in order to recover remaining Al-Shabaab strongholds in south-central Somalia. Al-Shabaab’s territorial strongholds have been weakened but it has continued its asymmetric attacks on hotels, individuals, Ministries and locations of UN personnel resulting in both local and foreign casualties. It has also attacked AMISOM bases in Jameco, Leego, Baidoa and Janale, killing and wounding AMISOM personnel resulting in both local and foreign casualties.

See African Union. (10 December 2015).
Ibid.
Ibid.
troops\textsuperscript{42} as well as civilians in Kenya, a troop contributing countries, killing 147 students at Garissa University College.\textsuperscript{43} Furthermore, AMISOM and the Somali National Army have not been able to hold on to all territories recovered from Al-Shabaab and there are other armed groups opposing the Federal Government of Somalia.

\begin{itemize}
\item The Guulwade (Victory) Plan to build the capacity of the Somali National Army for joint operations with AMISOM against Al-Shabaab and towards an AMISOM withdrawal in 2016 has been ‘approved by the Minister of Defence, and was endorsed by the National Security Council on 31 March 2015\textsuperscript{44}’ but it has been noted that ‘[m]eaningful financial and equipment support…has yet to materialize’.\textsuperscript{45} The Heegan (Readiness) Plan was completed in October 2015 for the Somali National Police Force.\textsuperscript{46} However, it is regarded as a ‘living document’, which ‘the [Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goal 2] working group meeting [agreed] on 9 December [2015] to further refine technical aspects to allow for its implementation.’\textsuperscript{47} AMISOM and other partners have been supporting capacity building of the security sector.

\item The Federal Government of Somalia works in partnership with AMISOM and other foreign actors and appreciates their support. However, acceptance by the general population for further peace operations would depend on a number of factors, including their assessment of AMISOM’s operations. In 2015, AMISOM faced human rights allegations including the killing of civilians in its ‘[m]ilitary operations against Al-Shabaab\textsuperscript{48}’. Investigations were held and where applicable, actions were taken\textsuperscript{49}.
\end{itemize}


\textsuperscript{44} Guulwade (Victory) Plan Draft


\textsuperscript{46} United Nations. (8 January 2016), p. 7.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{49} See ibid. N.B. the report cited three cases but provided the follow-up activities of two cases.
established in 2015, ‘as requested in resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2124 (2013)’50. Furthermore, the AU released the ‘key findings and recommendations’ of its Independent Investigation Team on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse allegations in a Human Rights Watch report published in 201451. Two out of the 21 allegations were proven52. The SRCC subsequently (in March 2015) spelt out Directives for the Implementation of the Recommendations of the AU Commission Investigation Report53. But the UN’s ‘Independent Expert was however shocked to learn that the implicated troop contributing countries did not cooperate with the investigation team and denied them access to former officers and the alleged perpetrators that were critical to an effective investigation. [He added that] [t]his indicates a lack of commitment by the relevant troop contributing countries54. Thus, AMISOM would have to further demonstrate to Somalis its commitment to their protection and well-being.

**Does Somalia really need another peace operation?**

It can be argued that the longer-term stabilisation and peacebuilding task envisaged for a UN operation is already unfolding in Somalia. Apart from Vision 2016, a New Deal Compact for Somalia was developed by the Federal Government of Somalia and its partners, also in 2013, toward an inclusive political process, statebuilding and peacebuilding, and a framework for partner engagement. Besides bilateral and other multilateral partners, the UN also has its country team in place in Somalia with its development agencies. It can be argued that achieving the necessary benchmarks will take time, at the end of which Somalia may not be in need of a UN peacekeeping mission.

By this token, the AU’s ‘comparative advantage’ could be extended beyond the rapid deployment of troops to include peacebuilding and reconstruction. African states have similar historical experiences of trying to manage complex hybrid modern and traditional governance systems. They share developmental concerns and challenges and have comparable values and cultural practices. Therefore, while it is important to have exchanges of knowledge and ideas from other continents and for the umbrella of UN authorisation to give each sovereign state some recourse for objection, AMISOM’s case may be a pointer for a truly Africa-led and owned sustainable peace process—right from peacemaking to stabilisation to peacekeeping and then to peacebuilding.

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and post-conflict reconstruction. AMISOM’s experience could point to a possible new chapter in African joint-causes in security cooperation, conflict prevention and financial independence.

**Conclusion**

AMISOM’s experience has highlighted the possibility of the AU and other regional organisations taking on and fully sponsoring peace and security tasks normally expected of the UN and major donors. The mission has demonstrated:

- The resilience and agility of the AU which, in spite of changing threats, loss of life and expanded time frames, has stood its ground and continues to work toward a stable Somalia;
- The need for the AU to reconsider or add an addendum to its intervention policy to provide clarity for new operations;
- The necessity for the AU in rolling out its plans for an African Standby Force to consider forming a military alliance such as NATO to fight terrorist activities on the continent and limit the repertoires of peace operations;
- The opportunity for AU member states to sufficiently build their own financial resources in the Peace Fund to equip and finance peace operations; and
- The possibility of the AU expanding its ‘comparative advantage’ to wholly African-owned, spearheaded and supported long-term interventions, with the only external requirement being UN authorisation.

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African Union Interventions at a Crossroads? An Examination of the African Union Mission in Somalia


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CHAPTER ELEVEN

FROM OILFIELDS TO BATTLEFIELDS: ASSESSING UNSMIL’S MANDATE IN POST-WAR PEACEBUILDING IN LIBYA

Mustapha Abdallah

ABSTRACT

As the 2011 Libyan uprising mutated into intense battle between the Gaddafi government and the National Transitional Council, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation intervened with the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, ostensibly to protect civilians. The intervention subsequently led to the removal of Muammar Gaddafi from power in October 2011. Prior to his removal, however, security and humanitarian situations had deteriorated such that the United Nations, through Security Council Resolution 2009 established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) in September 2011 to understand the context of the Libyan conflict and propose a longer-term presence. This chapter assesses the implementation of UNSMIL’s mandates, focusing on democracy and the formation of the Government of National Accord as critical post-conflict peace building interventions in Libya. Based on extensive desk and empirical findings, the chapter argues that the hitherto prosperous oil-producing country turned into a battlefield resulting from competing claims of legislative legitimacy from the General National Congress and the House of Representatives, and exacerbated by varied external interests. The chapter concludes that such divisions will continue to pose a challenge to UNSMIL in its peacebuilding efforts and recommends an increased collaborative approach with key actors such as the African Union in restoring peace to Libya.
Introduction

Although Libya experienced a long dictatorship under Muammar Gaddafi that lasted over four decades, it remained relatively stable and offered economic prosperity for both Libyans and non-Libyans. The oil sector was the backbone of the country’s economy, accounting for about 95 percent of total exports and 40 percent of Libya’s total economic output. Benefits that accrued from oil revenues were used to sustain progressive social welfare programmes for all Libyans and resident immigrants. Among others, Libyans benefitted not only from free healthcare and education, but also free electricity and affordable housing. Indeed, before the war, Libya had one of the highest incomes per head in Africa and few people lived below the poverty line. Arguably, the question of migration in search of greener pastures was alien to Libyan nationals. In spite of these achievements, Gaddafi’s rule had long brewed discontent among a section of the citizenry, especially in Benghazi, for a lack of transparency in governance processes, a lack of democracy and media freedom, growing human rights abuse, and the marginalization of some ethnic groups such as the Amazigh Berbers.

Perhaps the removal of former presidents Ben Ali of Tunisia (2010) and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (2011) provided the momentum to galvanize local and external support to remove Gaddafi from power under the aegis of the National Transitional Council (NTC). But unlike the events in Tunisia and Egypt, the Libyan uprising became quickly militarized as the Libyan leadership vowed to use raw state power and brute force to counter the armed rebellion. The recognition of the NTC by some western states, especially France, served as a hurricane that gave impetus to increased protests. With the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1973, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervened to protect civilians. However, continued protest and a worsening security situation made Gaddafi vow to ‘cleanse Libya house by house’. In response, the NTC and NATO maintained that any successful transition had to ensure that Gaddafi left the political scene. This position subsequently led to the removal of Gaddafi in

4 The National Transitional Council (NTC) sometimes known as Transitional National Council (TNC) was the defacto government in Libya for a period during and after the Libyan civil war. The formation of the NTC was announced in the city of Benghazi on 27 February 2011 with the purpose to act as the "political face of the revolution".
October 2011. Following that, the previously prosperous oil-producing Libya turned into a battlefield controlled by two parallel power structures. The chaos was exacerbated by the presence of multiple militia and terrorist groups across the country.\(^7\)

But prior to Gaddafi’s demise, the worsening security situation had prompted the United Nations Security Council to adopt unanimously Resolution 2009 on 16 September 2011. This established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) under the leadership of Ian Martin, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for an initial period of three months.\(^8\) Since then, a number of peacemaking and peacebuilding interventions have been undertaken to restore peace and stability. This chapter assesses the implementation of UNSMIL's mandates, focusing on democracy and the formation of the Government of National Accord (GNA) as critical post-conflict peacebuilding interventions in Libya. It proceeds in five sections.

The first section examines the socio-political context of the conflict while section two delves into the context of the mission, highlighting critical national, regional, and international political complexities. It also explains the type of mission as well as the mission mandates that have guided the operations of UNSMIL since 2011. Section three discusses the contribution of oil resources to Libya’s economy and how the ouster of Gaddafi has changed the fortunes of the country from a prosperous oil-producing country into a battlefield. Evidently, the current political dynamics impact negatively on security, human rights, and gender situations, hence constituting major impediments to peacebuilding efforts. In section four, the chapter assesses the effectiveness of implementing UNSMIL’s mandate, focusing on two key priority issues: establishing the foundations for democracy and the formation of the GNA. The choice of these issues is informed by the fact that first, laying foundations for democracy is critical to setting the ground rules for effective governance, and second, forming unity government is crucial in building consensus and national cohesion in a deeply divided country. The final section provides concluding thoughts based on the analyses of the security issues.

### Background to the Conflict: Exploring the Socio-Political Contexts

Although the immediate background to the Libyan conflict is traceable to the Arab Spring that began in Tunisia in 2010, a number of factors are rooted in the socio-political context of the country. The country is basically divided into three geographic regions, namely Cyrenaica in eastern Libya, Tripolitania in the northwest and Fezzan in the

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\(^8\) Besides Ian Martin, three others, including Tarek Mitri, Bernadinho, and Martin Kobler have served as heads of UNSMIL. The current leader is Martin Kobler.
southwest. Like his predecessor King Idris, Gaddafi also ruled the nation with no contemporary nation-state institutions such as independent security mechanisms. He suspended and suppressed all political parties and opted instead for a *jamahiriyya*—a political system in which the Libyan people governed directly without the help of state institutions. He prevented the formation of free and democratic institutions that might challenge his authority, although a semblance of democracy was provided by indirect elections from a hierarchy of people’s committees to the General People’s Congress. Yet, civil society groups had little influence on Libya’s political and economic orientations. Thus, Gaddafi’s repressive policies disunited the country and in the context of growing interpersonal distrust, Libyans embarked upon their revolution on 15 February 2011, leading to the removal of Gaddafi in October of the same year.

### Context of the Mission

Like many conflicts around the globe, the Libyan conflict had many complex political aspects. First, Libya under Gaddafi was one of the five main contributors to the African Union’s (AU) Peace Fund. As a Pan-Africanist, Gaddafi was a champion for the cause of African unity and supported economic and developmental initiatives in several poorer African countries. This made it difficult, if not impossible, for the AU to be a neutral arbiter in the Libyan conflict. At the same time, Gaddafi was accused of propping up rebel groups and supporting insurgencies on the continent. Coupled with his adoption of radical initiatives like nationalizing oil companies and banks, and his seeming antagonism

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10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
to the West, Gaddafi was considered a potential enemy, especially by some Western states.\textsuperscript{16}

Though a section of Libyans expressed discontent with Gaddafi’s undemocratic governance style, a significant number were obedient to his autocratic rule.\textsuperscript{17} As opposed to Tunisia and Egypt, these multiple dynamics added to the political complexities of the conflict. Thus, as it raged, it was not surprising that different approaches were adopted by the UN, the AU, and the League of Arab States (LAS) toward resolving the crisis. There were also divergent positions on the part of permanent members of the Security Council and the roles of neighbouring countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and Qatar.

As the humanitarian situation worsened, condemnations came from organizations such as the LAS and the AU. This resulted in the UNSC’s unanimous passage of Resolution 1970 referring Libya to the International Criminal Court and issuing punitive directives, including the freezing of assets, a travel ban on Gaddafi and his associates, and an arms embargo on the Libyan regime.\textsuperscript{18} This was followed by Resolution 1973 passed by the UN on 17 March 2011, authorizing ‘\textit{all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya, including Benghazi.}’\textsuperscript{19}

It became apparent that while the UN’s intervention was to protect civilians and possibly to exploit the phrase ‘\textit{all necessary measures}’ to remove Gaddafi, the AU at the organizational level preferred a diplomatic approach to resolving the Libyan crisis. However, key AU member states had different opinions. Presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe were sympathetic to Gaddafi while Sudanese President Al-Bashir and the then Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, nurtured personal disgust toward Gaddafi and insisted that he step down. The then leaders of Nigeria, Senegal, and Mauritania were also eager to see Gaddafi out of power.\textsuperscript{20} In all, there were three distinguishable positions: those who supported Gaddafi to remain in power, those who favoured a diplomatic approach based on the ‘African solutions to African problems’ paradigm and those who were neutral and would follow the tide as they deemed appropriate.\textsuperscript{21} Due to this division, the AU as an organization could

\textsuperscript{16}Campbell, Op Cit, 2013.
\textsuperscript{17}Interview with the Deputy Head of Office and Director of Political Affairs, United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), 05 October, 2015.
\textsuperscript{21}Interview with Chief Political Affairs officer, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 05 October, 2015
not be relied upon fully for solutions. It follows that although the AU’s diplomatic approach may not necessarily have resolved the conflict, it was equally problematic that its proposal was sidelined and that the UN intended to exclude Gaddafi from a possible transition.

As Gaddafi became more intransigent, more civilians died and the NTC gained recognition and legitimacy, especially in the Western world. This paved the way for NATO to intervene under a protection mandate. But before Gaddafi was removed in October, the security and humanitarian situations had deteriorated such that the UN had to propose a political direction, necessitating the establishment of UNSMIL.

**Type of Mission and Mandates**

At the request of the Libyan authorities following six months of armed conflict, UNSMIL was established in 2011 by the UN Security Council in its Resolution 2009 (September 2011). It is an advanced and integrated special political mission established to support the country’s new transitional authorities in post-war peacebuilding efforts. The mission is presided over by the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, which provides guidance and operational assistance. Established under the leadership of a SRSG and supported by a Deputy SRSG, UNSMIL was mandated for an initial period of three months. As a political mission, all SRSGs, namely Ian Martin (September 2011 to October 2012), Tarek Mitri (October 2012 to August 2014), Bernardino León (September 2014 to November 2015), and Martin Kobler (November 2015 to date) have propounded the use of a political approach rather than military intervention in resolving the conflict. To this end, several resolutions encapsulating the mandates of the mission have been passed by the UNSC.

A number of these resolutions relate to the revision and extension of UNSMIL’s mandate to continue with mediation and peacebuilding efforts, while other resolutions were adopted in response to the dynamics of the security situations in Libya, particularly the proliferation of arms and the emergence of terrorist groups, including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The first two resolutions, 2009 (2011) and 2022 (2011) were adopted unanimously for respective periods of three months—September to December 2011 and December 2011 to March 2012. Other resolutions include UNSCRs 2040, 2095, 2114, 2214 and 2238.

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22 Ibid.
23 Interview with Political Affairs Director, UNOAU, 05 October, 2015.
24 Other resolutions include UNSCRs 2040, 2095, 2114, 2214 and 2238.
propose a longer-term presence."\(^{25}\) Within the first three-month period, UNSMIL was mandated and expected to assist Libyan national efforts to, among others, ‘restore public security, promote the rule of law, foster inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation, and embark on constitution-making and electoral processes’.\(^{26}\)

However, subsequent resolutions, including 2040 (2012), 2095 (2013), and 2144 (2014) had extended periods of 12 months, subject to review after six months. The expanded revisions were based on the periodic reports of the SRSGs, presidential statements and field assessments by panels of experts on issues relating to security, and human rights, among others. Following further assessments, resolutions 2213 (2015) and 2238 (2015) were modified and extended for a six-month period, while the current resolution 2273 (2016) was further reviewed for three months, which expired in June 2016.

### An Examination of Security, Human Rights and Gender Issues

During Gaddafi’s regime, Libya’s economy hinged largely on its many oilfields. As indicated in the introductory section of this paper, the oil sector accounted for about 95 percent of total exports and 40 percent of Libya’s total economic output. The country supplied crude oil to numerous European countries, including Ireland (23.3 percent), Austria (21.2 percent), Italy (22 percent), France (15 percent), and Spain (12.1 percent).\(^{27}\) Although Gaddafi was accused of diverting the country’s oil revenues into personal accounts in Western countries, a significant percentage of oil dividends was supposedly used to promote economic development through the provision of free electricity, health services, and education.\(^{28}\) However, following Gaddafi’s removal, oil revenues for economic development have declined due to blockades and the seizure of some oilfields by militia and terrorist groups.

#### Security

The need to establish a safe and secure environment following the removal of Gaddafi was widely recognized by both the Libyan transition leaders and international actors.\(^{29}\) In December 2011, Ian Martin noted in his briefing to the UNSC: “Unless the security situation [in Libya] is addressed quickly and effectively, interests of various stakeholders

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\(^{25}\) See Report of the UN Secretary General, United Nations General Assembly, 68th meeting, 16 April 2014, A/68/327/Add.12.


may become entrenched, undermining the legitimate authority of the State.” Implicit in Martin’s briefing was the need to prepare, anticipate, and manage possible threats to the country’s security. In spite of this foreknowledge about the Libyan security situation, both Libyan authorities and UNSMIL faced challenges with respect to cleaning up the armaments of the war and securing Libya’s borders, reforming and rebuilding the national security sector, and ensuring the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants into either civilian society or Libya’s new national armed forces. UNSMIL and the government were also confronted with other security challenges, including managing Libya’s borders relative to the flow of arms, the proliferation of armed groups and their continued fractionalization into splinter rebel groups, the exacerbation of the conflict, and the propagation of terrorist groups such as ISIS.

The proliferation of arms and related material in Libya poses a material challenge to regional and international peace and security. UN estimates indicate that at least 6 million small armaments and 1 million tonnes of weapons are in circulation, possessed by the two parallel governments and their affiliates controlling oilfields with the support of international mafia. The difficulty in addressing the security challenges posed by these groups has been highlighted in all the UN Secretary-General’s reports since 2011, with 2014 being the most difficult year for UNSMIL because it witnessed the most serious outbreak of armed conflict in Tripoli, Benghazi, and other parts of the country. The conflict also caused the vast majority of the international community present in Libya, including the UN, to withdraw temporarily from the country. The February 2016 UNSG report indicates that the overall security in the country has continued to deteriorate sharply alongside a worsening migration crisis and the mounting acts of savagery being perpetrated by ISIS in occupied territories, particularly Sirte and its surrounding areas.

**Human Rights**

Human rights issues remain a major concern for UNSMIL as highlighted in all UNSG reports since 2011. Following the 2012 legislative elections, conflict-related detentions became rampant; about 3,000 of an estimated 7,000 detainees were held in facilities run by

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31 Ibid.
33 Interview with Senior Political Officer and the Focal Point of AU/UN Cooperation, Peace and Security Department, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 30/09/15

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the ministry of justice. Following the outbreak of conflict in 2014, the human rights environment in Libya deteriorated further, characterized by fighting between armed groups, which resulted in violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. The indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas, abductions of civilians, unlawful killings, arbitrary executions, torture, and the deliberate destruction of property were reported. By the end of December 2014, approximately 1,144 Tawerghan families were displaced from five camps in Benghazi. As estimated by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, out of the 170,100 persons who arrived in Italy between January and December 2014, approximately 141,000 Libyans and migrants departed from the country while some 3,300 are known to have drowned at sea and an unknown number have gone missing. The expansion of ISIS in Sirte has led to more human rights infractions, including floggings of foreign nationals accused of drinking alcohol following convictions by self-appointed Islamic courts.

Gender

The involvement of women in the protest marches leading to the removal of Gaddafi was an indication that, like their male counterparts, some women’s groups were also averse to Gaddafi’s governance policies. Arguably, these women expected that his departure would bring about a paradigm shift in governance, and specifically, that gender issues and the rights of women would be considered critical in policy formulation. However, having assumed office after the 2012 elections, the pro-Islamist General National Congress (GNC) government adopted a patriarchal system, relegating women’s issues to the background. A total of 33 women were elected to the 200-member GNC during the July 2012 parliamentary election. Lambsdorff criticized the low representation and involvement of women, blaming ‘social, religious, economic, and cultural factors.’ This also reflects the view of one research respondent who argued that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to promote gender issues in a traditional Bedouin, Arab and Muslim country such as Libya. Although not surprising, it was worrying that attacks on women activists increased during the 2014 conflict, with many having to flee Libya after threats against them and their children. The 2015 UNSC report indicated that one woman activist received several telephone calls from armed groups warning that if she continued writing on women’s rights, she risked being killed together with her children. Others received anonymous telephone calls and text messages warning that they would be abducted and killed should they continue championing the rights of women. As a

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36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
40 Interview with Chief Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), October 5, 2015.
result, there is growing fear that the involvement of GNC members in the GNA might further impede the inclusion of women, especially in the assignment of key political roles in the drafting of the new constitution, and hence lead to serious violations of their rights.

Assessing UNSMIL’s Mandate in Libya’s Post-war Peacebuilding

Establishing Foundations for Democracy

One of the key motivating factors for the 2011 Libyan revolution was to establish and promote democratic governance. Pursuant to this, the initial mandate of UNSMIL recognized the importance of conducting elections as a critical factor in the democratization process. By 22 November 2011, the Libyan authorities together with UNSMIL had established a transitional government to oversee the conduct of legislative elections in June 2012. Subsequently, a Libyan National Electoral Law and an electoral commission were established on 28 January 2012 and 12 February 2012 respectively. These events laid the institutional foundations that enabled UNSMIL to contribute to Libya’s democracy, especially to the conduct of elections in June 2012 and 2014.41

At the request of Libyans, UNSMIL played key roles in both the 2012 and 2014 legislative elections. It provided technical and operational advice to key interlocutors, principally the High National Elections Commission (HNEC), during the elections for the GNC on 7 July 2012 and those for the Constitution Drafting Assembly on 20 February 2014. In the period between these two elections, the UNSMIL electoral team focused on consolidating HNEC’s capacity and raising awareness on electoral matters, particularly on electoral systems, women’s participation, and voter registration systems. UNSMIL also engaged with government and media representatives to encourage more women to register as candidates and held capacity-building and training sessions for women candidates in Benghazi and Tripoli. Further, it collaborated with organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to provide electoral assistance and played a lead role in coordinating electoral support provided by other international organizations.

In both elections, however, the HNEC and UNSMIL faced a number of security challenges, characterized by violent disputes in some parts of the country. Notwithstanding, the National Forces Alliance Party, headed by Mahmoud Jibril won the general assembly elections which international observers declared as relatively peaceful.42 Political power was subsequently transferred peacefully from the NTC to the GNC as the first

42 Mahmoud Jibril, a former lecturer in political science at Pittsburgh University was appointed by Gaddafi to head the National Economic Development Board of Libya, a post which he held from 2007 to his resignation in 2011 to join the TNC.
democratically constituted National Unity Government. By 2014, when new legislative elections were due, the GNC had made efforts to draft the Libyan Constitution. However, it disregarded UNSMIL’s warning and passed a Political Isolation Law which sought to prevent persons associated with Gaddafi’s regime from holding an official political position for 10 years.43 While the law was intended as a state-cleansing mechanism to purge the new Libya of former corrupt political officers, it undermined the spirit of political inclusion and democratic transition, further polarizing the country. It therefore came as no surprise when the House of Representatives (HoR) won the 2014 legislative elections and took power as the legitimate government in Tripoli. But, as Martin indicated: ‘[the election] is just...a critical first step in Libya’s democratic transition’.44

What was significant regarding the outcome of the 2014 elections was an increased division in the country. As observed by Lacher, the post-2014 election was exemplified by ‘a contest between Islamists and more secular factions’.45 Hardliners in the GNC faction refused to recognize the HoR and persistently sought to undermine its legitimacy. As a result, the HoR moved and established in Toburuk as the internationally recognized legitimate government, while the de facto GNC controlled government took over in Tripoli to provide a veneer of legitimacy as Lacher puts it.46 The challenge with these parallel power structures is the associated coalitions of militia and terrorist groups that pose significant challenges to UNSMIL’s peacebuilding efforts.

**Government of National Accord/Unity Government**

Since the establishment of UNSMIL, one important issue proposed under the mandate has been to bring the people of Libya together in a Government of National Accord through the signing of a Libyan Political Agreement between the GNC and the HoR. The process of signing the agreement has, however, been fraught with many challenges, especially during the leadership of Bernadinho León, when he attempted to broker a peace deal in July and September 2015. In July, the proposed LPA was initialled by the legitimate Toburuk government while the pro-Islamist GNC delegation led by Saleh al-Makhzum refused to sign and raised a number of reservations, including having equal status under the power sharing arrangement with the HoR, relative to approving legislation and

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44 Smith, Op Cit, 2012


46 Ibid
making appointments to key state positions. The divided interests of regional actors—Egypt and the UAE are backing the HoR while Turkey and Qatar support the GNC—also affected the July political agreement. Similar reservations were expressed by both the GNC and the HoR in September 2015. Nonetheless, León announced on 8 October the intention of the two parties to initial the LPA in Skhirat, Morocco upon the composition of a new GNA.

León’s announcement was welcomed internationally with statements from the representatives of the UNSG and a joint statement from key Western countries. US Secretary of State, John Kerry noted that the announcement marked the “completion of the Libyan political framework” and constituted a significant milestone in Libya’s political process.

Accordingly, the UN urged the two parties to endorse the proposal on 17 October 2015, simultaneously reiterating its readiness to punish those who would undermine the stability of the peace process. This was seen by both the GNC and the HoR as an imposition of UN will, which they describe as a violation of the agreement. Together with other politicians, ordinary Libyans, Amazigh-Berbers and the Libyan National Commission for Human Rights, the UN-facilitated political agreement was rejected, evoking demonstrations in Benghazi, Tripoli, Tobruk, Almerj and other Libyan towns against what they called ‘the hypocrisy government’. HoR members, argued that the proposed ministerial appointments (including that of the prime minister) violated both the Constitutional Declaration and the signed agreement because war criminals had been included. The GNC, on the other hand, accused the UN, and particularly León, of refusing to include its proposed amendments and failing to manage the dialogue well, which could potentially trigger the recurrence of a civil war in Libya. There were also claims that León excluded other influential actors in facilitating the political dialogue in Libya, hugely influencing why he was replaced recently by Martin Kobler.

On assumption of office, Martin Kobler continued with the peace efforts and on 17 December, the two parties agreed to and signed the LPA which establishes the GNA in

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47 Interview with Senior Political Officer and the Focal Point of AU/UN Cooperation, Peace and Security Department, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 November, 2015.
49 The proposed Unity Government will consist of a Prime Minister, 3 UN proposed Prime Minister Deputies, 2 Ministers, constituting the Presidential Council and 17 UN Proposed National Accord Members.
50 Ibid.
51 According to the Amazigh Berber, the UN’s main concern was “dividing power” between the various Libyan factions for the purpose of creating a government to control the flow of immigrants into Europe, Ibid.
52 Ibid.
Article 1. Its highest decision-making body is the Presidency Council of the Council of Ministers, headed by Prime Minister, Fayez Mustafa Al-Sarraj. As the GNA names its ministers and moves to establish state authority in Tripoli, more challenges lie ahead as hardliners in both the GNC and the HoR continue to oppose the new government. It is in this sense that the question of raising foreign troops to support the GNA in consolidating peace becomes absolutely imperative. UNSMIL under Martin Kobler has a critical role to play.

Conclusion

This chapter focused on the implementation of UNSMIL’s peacebuilding mandate in post-war Libya. Specifically, it assessed the mandate and effort of UNSMIL in contributing to building foundations for democracy and the formation of the GNA through the conduct of elections and signing of political agreements. With respect to building democratic institutions, UNSMIL played key roles in the conduct of two successful legislative elections in 2012 and 2014. However, the outcome of both elections brought to the fore a deep polarization between the two parallel governments, the GNC and HoR along political and ideological lines, creating a legitimacy crisis in the country. Again, while UNSMIL under Bernadinho Léon facilitated the process of signing the LPA, divisions between the two parties persistently hampered the process until Martin Kobler assumed office and presided over the signing of the LPA in December 2015. In spite of these efforts, the current situation in Libya supports the argument that UNSMIL is merely promoting a precarious stability rather than positive change in Libya. It is on this basis that the GNC, the HoR, and other local stakeholders criticize the UN-facilitated political agreement as disregarding the concerns of key stakeholders.

But beneath the obvious lack of agreement between the GNC and the HoR are multiple challenges, including but not limited to security, human rights, and gender-related issues that continue to undermine UNSMIL’s effort at building and consolidating peace. Having formed the GNA, UNSMIL under Martin Kobler has the difficult task of winning and building trust between the two parties. More crucially, it has to decide how to deal with the proliferation of arms and militia groups as well as the disturbing expansion of terrorist groups such as ISIS. Ultimately, achieving political consensus and building democratic structures will remain strenuous unless a conscious effort is made to address the complex national security challenges that have assumed regional and international dimensions. The success of this will, however, be dependent on the UN collaborating with other key stakeholders such as the AU, the LAS, and neighbouring states whose interest in Libya cannot be downplayed.

53 See Article 1 of the Final Libyan Political Agreement, 17 December, 2015.
References


Guinea-Bissau has experienced persistent political instability since its independence from Portuguese colonial rule in 1974. This cycle of chronic insecurity is the result of two interrelated factors: the politicization of the military and the militarization of the state. These contributed to a devastating civil war that prompted the deployment of an Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group interposition force and the establishment of the UN Office in Guinea-Bissau in 1999. While these missions have contributed significantly to building peace and averting another civil war in the country, the volatility of the situation has on many occasions necessitated a re-adjustment or review of the missions’ mandates, sometimes setting back progress in reforms and peacebuilding. This chapter exposes a trend of cyclical crisis in Bissau-Guinean politics that necessitates the continuous presence and support of the United Nations, ECOWAS, and other intermediaries. It argues that well-coordinated international assistance will greatly enhance security and governance reforms that are crucial for sustainable peace and stability in the country.

Introduction

Guinea-Bissau is a small West African country and former Portuguese colony with a population of about 1.7 million people. Since gaining independence in 1974, it has experienced repeated crises, manifesting in nine attempted and substantive coups d’état since 1980. No elected president has served a full term since independence. The country has attracted international attention through its military’s frequent intrusions
into politics, incessant internal tensions and an unenviable reputation as a drug trafficking hub.\(^1\) Consequently, Guinea-Bissau has been variously designated as ‘failed’, ‘coup-prone’, and ‘a narco-state’.\(^2\) In many respects, the politicization of the military and the militarization of the state, further exacerbated by constitutional ambiguities, have manifested frequently in the cycles of chronic instability crippling the state’s ability to provide essential social services.\(^3\)

The politicization of the armed forces meant that an intimate link was preserved in the constitution between the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC, Portuguese acronym), which started an armed rebellion to liberate the country from Portuguese colonial rule, and the state and the armed forces.\(^4\) Even though this relationship was terminated through the 1991 constitutional review that ushered in a multiparty democratic system, the political nature of the armed forces persisted and assumed new forms.\(^5\) The incessant military interference into politics contributed to the internal political instability that preceded a relatively short but devastating civil war in 1998.

This chapter presents an overview of the political situation in the country and discusses how the international community has responded, particularly through the United Nations (UN) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to the perennial crisis engulfing the country. Though the country has witnessed some positive advances with the 2014 legislative and presidential elections, the chapter exposes a familiar trend in Bissau-Guinean political landscape that does not project a wholly optimistic prospect for sustainable peace and stability. The chapter further highlights the need for close coordination and harmonization of external assistance by the multiple international actors operating in the country, while arguing for sustained support for the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) and the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) to ensure the consolidation of stable conditions.

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\(^3\) Guinea-Bissau operates a semi-presidential system of government through a constitution that is largely inherited from the Portuguese. Serious gaps in the constitution have created constant bickering between the president and the prime minister, crippling the government’s ability to function effectively.


Guinea-Bissau: Ending the Perennial Political Imbroglio

Figure 1: Map of Guinea-Bissau.

Source: UN Department of Field Support.

Background to the conflict

Guinea-Bissau has experienced periodic violence throughout the last four decades of its history, producing unstable political, social and economic conditions. After independence, the PAIGC, a symbol of the liberation struggle, had exclusive control of the country’s political and military administration. This developed into an internal struggle for power which engendered cycles of repression in response to claims of attempted coups d’état by rebels that also form a significant segment of the armed forces. The ‘sobel’\(^6\) identity, traceable to the People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces that were formed as a rebel militia in 1964, and the armed forces’ close association with the PAIGC led to prolonged repression, which caused deep resentment in segments of the population. After Guinea-Bissau embraced multiparty democracy in the early 1990s, elections were held in 1994 which saw João Bernardo Vieira sworn in as the first democratically elected president of Guinea-Bissau on 29 September 1994.

\(^6\) Sobel is a term used to describe members of an army who commit rebel attacks and are thus soldiers by day, and rebels by night.
Though Vieira’s term was due to expire in September 1999, his dismissal of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Ansumane Mané, for allegedly smuggling arms to the secessionist movement, the Forces démocratiques de Casamance in the Casamance Region of neighbouring Senegal, led to eleven months of violent civil war (the 7th June War) in 1998. Senegal and Guinea deployed about 3000 troops to the country to support Vieira under a dubious bilateral defense agreement with Guinea-Bissau. The civil war resulted in the overthrow of Vieira on 7 May 1999 and the near destruction of the country’s infrastructure in addition to the heavy human toll. It also weakened state institutions severely and ushered in a chronic cycle of political instability that remains a major predicament to date. The end of the war placed the military at the centre of political action, resulting in a succession of political-military crises over the following decade, including coups d’état, political assassinations, and rebellions which have earned Guinea-Bissau the reputation of a notorious, coup-prone West African country.

The dramatic return to power of Vieira in 2005 would escalate an already fragile political situation engendered by years of political volatility, economic mismanagement, and institutional paralysis that led to the overthrow of President Kumba Yalá’s regime in September 2003. This volatility would eventually lead to the double assassination of the army chief of staff, General Tagme Na Waie and President Vieira on 1 and 2 March 2009 respectively. The events of March 2009 reinforced existing certitudes of a direct link between political stability and security sector reform (SSR) in Guinea-Bissau. After the 2009 transition which brought Malam Baçai Sanhá to power, there was some expectation that Guinea-Bissau would experience a semblance of stability. However, this proved to be wishful thinking when Sanhá’s death in January 2012 led to a military takeover in April 2012, even though the first round of transitional elections had been conducted. The coupists justified their action with the presence of the Angolan Technical Military Mission (MISSANG), a force of about 600 troops deployed in March 2011 to implement a $30 million SSR programme in Guinea-Bissau under a bilateral defense agreement between the two countries. The deployment of MISSANG caused disaffection within ECOWAS and sections of the military, who viewed them as a clandestine foreign mission deployed at Sanhá’s behest. The military coup triggered a political intervention by ECOWAS and the imposition of sanctions on five senior military officials by the Security Council. After a two-year transition that brought José Mário Vazto power through peaceful legislative

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and presidential elections in May 2014, there was, yet again, optimism that the return to constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau held prospects for stability. This familiar sentiment was short-lived, however, as the country yet again descended into a political crisis with the dismissal of Prime Minister Domingos Simoes Pereira and his sixteen-member government in August 2015.10 The table below highlights how the precarious political situation has reflected in instability at the executive level in Guinea-Bissau.

Table 1: Presidents of Guinea-Bissau and how their rule ended.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Term of Office</th>
<th>End of Rule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luís Cabral</td>
<td>September 1983 – November 1980</td>
<td>Overthrown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>João Bernardo Vieira</td>
<td>November 1980 – May 1999</td>
<td>Overthrown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malam Bacai Sanhá</td>
<td>May 1999 – February 2000</td>
<td>Transitional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumba Yalá</td>
<td>February 2000 – September 2003</td>
<td>Overthrown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henrique Rosa</td>
<td>September 2003 – October 2005</td>
<td>Transitional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>João Bernardo Vieira</td>
<td>October 2005 – March 2009</td>
<td>Assassinated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raimundo Pereira</td>
<td>March 2009 – September 2009</td>
<td>Transitional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malam Bacai Sanhá</td>
<td>September 2009 – January 2012</td>
<td>Died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raimundo Pereira</td>
<td>January 2012 – April 2012</td>
<td>Transitional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo</td>
<td>May 2012 – June 2014</td>
<td>Transitional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Mário Vaz</td>
<td>June 2014 –</td>
<td>Incumbent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by author.

Guinea-Bissau’s current state of affairs, a direct reflection of its historical legacy, can be categorized into four main challenges, namely political-military dynamics hinged on the balance of interest; chronic state weakness in the provision of education, health, justice, and infrastructure; a culture of impunity as a direct consequence of state weakness; and poverty and unequal access to economic opportunity, resulting in fierce competition and cyclic conflict.11

Peace operations in Guinea-Bissau

In March 1999, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctioned the creation of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) to support the restoration of constitutional order in the country, though a civil war was technically still raging. UNOGBIS was supplanted by the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) in January 2010. The African Union (AU) has also established a political presence in Guinea-Bissau to strengthen advocacy and early warning mechanisms, as


11 Interview, UNIOGBIS Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Bissau, 17 September 2015.
well as hold constant dialogue with various political stakeholders since March 2011. Further, the European Union (EU) was involved in a failed SSR programme, which led to the premature liquidation of the EU office in Guinea-Bissau in September 2010, while the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP, Portuguese acronym), led by Portugal, has been involved in various dialogue and peace processes, including mediation and electoral assistance. However, it is the regional grouping, ECOWAS, which has played a pivotal role in restoring immediate stability to the notoriously unstable country through two distinct regional interventions: the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) mission and the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB). The following sections focus on the mandate and activities of ECOWAS and UN missions in ensuring sustainable peace and stability in Guinea-Bissau.


Following a ceasefire agreement between President Vieira and General Ansumane Mané in Praia on 26 August 1998, the parties met in Abuja, Nigeria, on 21 October and 1 November 1998 to conclude a peace agreement. The agreement provided, among others, for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Guinea-Bissau and simultaneous deployment of an ECOMOG interposition force to guarantee security along the Guinea-Bissau/Senegal border, keep the warring parties apart, and guarantee free access to humanitarian organizations. It also enabled a government of national unity to be put in place to oversee the organization of general and presidential elections in the country. After the Abuja Accord was signed in November 1998, a new ECOMOG interposition force of 712 troops from Benin, Niger, The Gambia, and Togo replaced Senegalese and Guinean troops in February 1999, with French logistical support. The first ECOMOG mission in Guinea-Bissau was essentially a peacekeeping mission mandated to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, act as a buffer between the parties in conflict, and facilitate the holding of elections. However, due to serious logistical and financial difficulties, the force remained ill-equipped and underfunded, seriously constraining its ability to execute the mandate. This weakness enabled General Mané to topple Vieira’s regime in May 1999. Subsequently, ECOWAS decided to withdraw

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12 Interview, senior political officer, AU Liaison Office in Guinea-Bissau, Bissau, 21 September 2015.
13 Abuja Accord, 1 November 1998.
14 Senegal and Guinea deployed troops to fight alongside government forces in 1998 at the behest of President Vieira through contentious bilateral defence agreements signed with Guinea-Bissau.
its troops, despite requests from the transitional government to maintain ECOMOG in Guinea-Bissau until fresh elections. The decision to withdraw from Guinea-Bissau was premised on difficulties in financing the operation and the deteriorating security situation which rendered the ECOMOG mandate inapposite. The ECOMOG troops were withdrawn completely on 7 June 1999.

Table 2: ECOMOG Troop Contributors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>712</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author compilation.

The ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB)

ECOWAS re-established a presence in Guinea-Bissau through the institution of the office of the Special Representative of the ECOWAS President in 2005. The permanent office has since been facilitating political dialogue and mediation efforts of the regional bloc, as well as supporting various democratic processes in the country. ECOMIB was authorized on 26 April 2012 following the 12 April 2012 military coup which occurred after the first round of elections, subsequent to the death of President Bacai Sanhá in January 2012. Composed of about 684 troops from Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Senegal, ECOMIB was mandated, among other things, to facilitate the withdrawal of MISSANG, support the restoration of constitutional order, contribute to the Defense and SSR process in the country, and provide security for designated persons to be involved in the programme. The mandate was reviewed in March 2014 following the withdrawal of MISSANG from Bissau in June 2012 to include the provision of security and support for the transitional and electoral processes, assistance for the implementation of the DSSR programme, and provision of security for institutions, very important persons, vulnerable persons, and the general population. Guinea-Bissau returned to democratic order after the

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21. Interview, ECOMIB Political and Diplomatic Advisor, Bissau, 23 September 2015.
legislative and presidential elections in May 2014 in which ECOMIB played a key role in ensuring security. This informed a further review of the mandate by the authority of heads of state and government during its 46th ordinary session, to include support for the consolidation of government authority in Guinea-Bissau, support for the security of institutions, training and restructuring of designated security agencies, and support for the post-election reform programme. ECOMIB’s current mandate is expected to terminate in June 2017. However, ECOMIB faces serious financial strain, a common feature of most ECOWAS missions, which may force it to terminate its mission in the absence of external support.24 Nigeria, the primary contributor to the force, is challenged financially and has therefore called for burden-sharing to sustain the mission.

Table 3: ECOMIB Troop Contributors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td></td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>201</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Headquarters (all contingents)</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ECOMIB Headquarters, September 2015.

The United Nations Missions in Guinea-Bissau

The civil war left in its wake a devastated country in need of stability and rebuilding. The UNSC, following recommendations from the Secretary-General, authorized the establishment of UNOGBIS in March 1999 to support the restoration of constitutional order as well as work with the Government of National Unity, ECOWAS, and other partners to enable the implementation of the Abuja Agreement.25,26 The mission was also tasked to implement a voluntary arms collection and disposal programme. Guinea-Bissau was placed on the agenda of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2007 to support comprehensive public sector reform and national and international action to strengthen the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law. A 2008 Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding, adopted by the PBC and the Government of Guinea-Bissau, was reviewed in 2010 with recommendations reinforcing the UN focus on security and justice sector reform, the fight against drug trafficking, and institution building. A new Priority Plan to contribute to SSR, reconciliation, and youth employment was adopted

in June 2011 following the allocation of $16.8 million from the Peacebuilding Fund to Guinea-Bissau.\textsuperscript{27}

The 1999 establishment of UNOGIS after the Abuja Agreement paved the way for rebuilding efforts in Guinea-Bissau. UNOGIS was initially mandated to support the peace consolidation process through the organization of elections and implementation of the Abuja Agreement. However, following the 7 May 1999 coup and in view of the deteriorating security situation, the mandate was revised three months later to include national reconciliation and confidence building initiatives. In November 2003, the mandate was revised further following a constitutional crisis instigated by the dissolution of the national assembly by President Kumba Yalá in November 2002, which eventually led to a military intervention on 14 September 2003. The revised mandate recognized the need to prioritize post-conflict recovery through an integrated peacebuilding strategy. It perhaps signaled recognition of the need for an integrated approach to peacebuilding by the UN, even though this did not immediately reflect in a change of mission.

The existing integrated peacebuilding mission was necessitated by years of extreme fragility caused by political violence and increased drug trafficking and organized crime.\textsuperscript{28} UNIOGBIS was established for an initial period of 12 months. Thereafter, its mandate has been renewed eight times—most recently through resolution 2267 (2016) for a period of twelve months until 28 February 2017.\textsuperscript{29} The mandate of UNIOGBIS is comprehensive, necessitating a UN system-wide support involving the PBC, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Women, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The integrated peacebuilding approach imposes a somewhat heavy footprint on Guinea-Bissau which may reinforce the country’s dependency on UN external support for institution building, political dialogue and national reconciliation, and support for the implementation of the SSR strategy and reforms in the criminal justice systems. UNIOGBIS also supports efforts to combat drug trafficking and transnational organized crime, which have attracted serious international attention, particularly from the EU and the United States (US).

\textsuperscript{27} UN Security Council. (2011). Security Council Report, S/PV.6648. Security Council. Retrieved from: www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%d0%9f%d1%82%d0%b5%d1%80%d1%81%d0%b8%d0%b2%d0%ba%d0%be%d0%b9/UNOGIS/187/spv6648.pdf (Accessed: 29 September 2015).

\textsuperscript{28} UNSC Resolution 1876 (2009), 26 June 2009.

\textsuperscript{29} UNSC Resolution 2267 (2016), SC/12259, 26 February 2016.
Table 4: UNIOGBIS Staff Strength.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composition</th>
<th>Number of Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNIOGBIS, September 2015.

With only a few personnel in the integrated mission, UNIOGBIS relies heavily on multiple actors to implement its mandate, including ECOMIB and numerous UN agencies. Though UNIOGBIS was initially established as a post-conflict peacebuilding office, a succession of destabilizing crises since the civil war has limited its main focus to immediate stabilization efforts geared toward a return to constitutional order, including supporting transitional processes and election administration. Over the past five years, the mandate of UNIOGBIS has remained virtually unchanged, focusing on dialogue and reconciliation, and reforms in the defense and security sector. However, persistent interruptions in the democratization process have slowed peacebuilding efforts, in some cases setting back progress in reform programmes. This state of instability has also largely informed the mandates of other actors such as the ECOWAS, the AU, the EU, and the CPLP.

Impact of peace operations on security and stability in Guinea-Bissau

The uniqueness of peace operations in Guinea-Bissau lies in the multiplicity of actors operating in the country. The presence of a cocktail of concurrent political and military missions amply demonstrates the circumstances of a country that is in dire equal need of massive rebuilding and political stabilization. Undoubtedly, the presence and involvement of the ECOWAS, the UN, the AU, the EU, the CPLP, and other international actors has contributed immensely to the avoidance of another civil war in the country, despite the persistent military-political crises. However, disagreements between the ECOWAS and other prominent international actors in Guinea-Bissau, especially the CPLP, have sometimes exacerbated the country’s stabilization problems. For instance, following the 2012 coup, divisions between the ECOWAS and the CPLP became apparent, as the two blocs pursued distinctly different responses to the crisis. Portugal has remained influential in Guinea-Bissau and has used its strong ties with the PAIGC to engage various actors in the country. Conversely, ECOWAS views the CPLP’s involvement, primarily through Portugal and Angola, as a breach of its preeminent role in ensuring peace and security in West Africa, and has often accused the CPLP of exceeding its role in the
promotion of cultural and trade ties.\textsuperscript{30} The reactivation of the International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau (ICG-GB) has however helped to improve relations between the ECOWAS and the CPLP.\textsuperscript{31}

Judging by the country’s history of intermittent crises and dependency, it would be difficult to maintain a semblance of stability without external support. Since the last legislative and presidential elections in 2014, there has been an appreciable level of stability in Guinea-Bissau, even though that is being threatened by the crisis of leadership between the president and the prime minister. However, it may be premature to predict with certainty the sustainability of the current positive political climate until the government has served a full uninterrupted term.\textsuperscript{32} One resident Bissau-Guinean exclaimed that the country experiences some form of crisis on a six-month cycle.\textsuperscript{33} While somewhat sarcastic, it demonstrates how hard the country has struggled to remain stable, and the centrality of the contributions of external actors to preventing a civil war. With the implementation of a retirement policy still pending and a barely functional government, it may become necessary for external actors, particularly the ECOMIB and the UN, to continue providing support to the country—at least until the SSR programme is fully implemented.

**Sustaining peace and stability in Guinea-Bissau: Some considerations**

Since the restoration of democratic governance in May 2014, there has been comparatively huge international attention to and optimism in Guinea-Bissau. A recent donor conference held in Geneva in March 2015 raised over $1.1 billion in financial assistance. Although it is not clear how much of these funds have been disbursed, it is expected that this will be a huge boost to the ongoing peace consolidation efforts in the country, particularly in the areas identified below.

*Defense, Security and Justice Sector Reforms*

There is an increased drive to reform the military into a disciplined national army. However, civilian and legislative oversight of the defence and security institutions is virtually non-existent as the armed forces have retained their historically rebellious


\textsuperscript{31}The International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau was set up in 2006 to help mobilize international assistance required for its development and stability. It is made up of Angola; Brazil; Cape Verde; Spain; France; The Gambia; Ghana; Guinea; Niger; Nigeria; Portugal; Senegal; the UN; the AU; the EU; the CPLP; the ECOWAS; the West African Economic and Monetary Union; the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.

\textsuperscript{32}Interview, UNIOGBIS Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Bissau, 17 September 2015.

\textsuperscript{33}Interview, local resident, Bissau, 20 September 2015.
character, despite the introduction of multi-party democracy.\textsuperscript{34} Transforming the armed forces into a republican army thus remains a top priority for all the actors in the country. However, to be effective, the politicization and collusive relationship between the military and political powerbrokers needs to be severed in order to rid the country of incessant military interventions.\textsuperscript{35} As noted by the chief of defence staff, two main factors account for the military’s constant intrusions into politics. First, the absence of a pension for retired military personnel exposes them to scheming politicization by political elites.\textsuperscript{36} Second, the lack of clarity on the role of the military seems to play into political vacuums and crises created either through constitutional ambiguities or bad governance.\textsuperscript{37} To address these concerns, an SSR Steering Committee identified 2,282 personnel to be retired over a five-year period as part of efforts to reform the security sector.\textsuperscript{38} The ECOMIB, which is also executing the DSSR programme in addition to maintaining security, has committed $46.1 million toward a five-year retirement package for members of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{39}

While priority has been given to DSSR programmes, it is essential to build the capacity of civilian institutions to enable democratic control of the armed forces. However, such fundamental governance reform cannot be performed effectively by peace operations. This creates a lacuna that has negative implications for all the security-related reforms being implemented in the country. In other words, without an independent and capable institution to ensure civilian oversight of the security sector, DSSR initiatives will not translate to anticipated ends.

Finally, there is a critical need for a robust disarmament programme to mobilize illicit weapons in the country. So far, there have been three \textit{ad hoc} weapons collection exercises by the armed forces which have proven rather ineffective due to the absence of secured armouries, an enduring instability necessitating the constant need for arms, and the economy of arms smuggling facilitated by the porous nature of the borders.\textsuperscript{40} Without secured armouries and an appropriate arms database in the country, any disarmament programme is likely to be an exercise in futility.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{35} Interview, ECOMIB Force Commander, Bissau, 23 September 2015.
\textsuperscript{36} Interview, Chief of Defense Staff, Bissau, 17 September 2015.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} Interview, Police Training Officer, ECOMIB Joint Defence and Security Sector Reform Programme, Bissau, 23 September 2015.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
Combating Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime

Besides SSR, the alarming use of Guinea-Bissau as a major hub for drug trafficking is of serious concern to the UN, the EU, the US, and others. Many senior military officers have been deeply involved in trafficking, with Rear Admiral José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto, General Ibraima Papa Camará, and General António Indjai commonly cited.\(^{42}\) The inclusion of the combatting of drug trafficking and organized crime in the UN mandate is closely linked to reform of the security and justice sectors. Prior to this, the EU’s attempts since 2005 at implementing SSR through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programmes had failed. The EU also launched the Guinea-Bissau SSR mission in 2008 to assist with the implementation of the national SSR action plan. This included expert support with establishing standards, a coherent legal framework to combat crime, and capacity building of the judicial police in conducting criminal investigations.\(^{43}\) However, persistent coups, a succession of rebellions by members of the armed forces, and the increased involvement of sections of the military in drug trafficking led the EU to suspend the mission in August 2010, though some support to the justice sector has continued.\(^{44,45}\) The EU had expected security and justice sector reforms to reinforce the country against drug trafficking and illicit migration, which impacts largely on European countries.\(^{46}\)

Though efforts at combatting trafficking are proactive, they should be seen in light of enhancing state capacity to function effectively, the lack of which has enabled military interference and politically motivated murders, and allowed organized criminal networks to operate with impunity. With only 21 of the 88 islands and islets of the Arquipélago dos Bijagós currently inhabited, a situation further exacerbated by the absence of local authority on the inhabited islands\(^{47}\) and porous borders, Guinea-Bissau is nearly a free zone for trafficking networks. Additionally, there is glaring evidence of the rapid disappearance of local government structures in many regions and sectors of the country.\(^{48}\) The absence of state structures in these isolated spaces, especially at the local level, has created a vacuum that is conducive to drug trafficking and other forms

\(^{45}\) Interview, Director General of Judicial Police, Bissau, 22 September 2015.
\(^{47}\) Interview, Director General of Judicial Police, Bissau, 22 September 2015.
of organized crime. Combatting organized crime will thus prove counter-productive without improving the presence and capacity of the state, which will in turn help to address the long-term consequences of the erosion of state structures. Further, the fight against organized crime, particularly drug trafficking, should fit into a regional, if not international, strategy to combat organized crime. Recognizing the transnational dimension of drug trafficking creates an opportunity for increased coordination, and intelligence and burden sharing.

Civil Society Action

There has recently been an upsurge in civil society platforms for peace and stability in the country. Though civil society in Guinea-Bissau has not had a visible impact on the political landscape, recent developments point to a vibrant society that is determined to influence leadership changes in the country. This was evident during the crisis engendered by the dismissal of the government in 2015 when a series of engagements, particularly by women’s groups with President Vaz, parliamentarians, political parties, and ECOWAS, contributed to dialogue and the eventual resolution of the crisis.

Evidence from the field seems to point to an adverse effect of instability on women in Guinea-Bissau. Even though women are documented to have played a critical role in the liberation struggle, the incessant obstruction of the democratization process since the introduction of the multi-party system has impacted negatively on women’s representation at decision making levels. This is evidenced by the dwindling number of women in socio-political and economic structures since 1994, which elicited the 2014 Canchungo Declaration. Besides the effects of instability, the dearth of capacity remains a key impediment to women’s participation in governance, even though UN Women and UNIOGBIS support capacity building for women and election campaigns of women candidates in various political parties.

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49 According to a 2015 report by the Joint SSR Assessment Mission to Guinea-Bissau, about 90 percent of the public order police is based in Bissau, while the Judicial Police is based exclusively in the capital. This has meant that capacity to investigate crimes in the regions is non-existent.

50 Interview, UNIOGBIS Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Bissau, 17 September 2015.

51 Interview, President of the National Movement of Civil Society, Bissau, 22 September 2015.

52 Canchungo Declaration is a sixteen-point action plan adopted by women civil society organizations at a workshop in Canchungo, Guinea-Bissau. The declaration renounced discrimination against women and called, among others, for the adoption of affirmative action and the revision of legal frameworks to make them sensitive to women’s participation at decision-making levels.

53 Interviews, UNIOGBIS Gender Unit, and the Executive of Political Platforms for General Security in Guinea-Bissau, 21 and 23 September 2015 respectively.
**Human Rights, Justice and Reconciliation**

A national dialogue and reconciliation process established by President Sanhá in 2009 and a constitutional review commission have also been revived by the national assembly with technical and financial assistance from the UN, the governments of Portugal and Japan, and the Inter-Parliamentary Union. However, in spite of the consistent inclusion of dialogue and reconciliation in the mandate of UNIOGBIS, the absence of justice has created a culture of impunity which makes reconciliation virtually impractical. No past crimes have been brought to justice due to the weakness of the justice system and politicization of crime. This is further complicated by an Amnesty Law of 2007 which exempts from prosecution all perpetrators of political and military crimes between 1980 and 2004—the second such amnesty since independence. Without an effective justice system, Bissau-Guineans are likely to see a third amnesty that will only reinforce the prevailing culture of impunity. As observed by the chair of the National Reconciliation Commission, Domingos da Fonseca, many of the recurrent conflicts are caused by ‘... unresolved problems and postponed solutions, and issues that Bissau-Guineans carry with them, generating hatred, settling of scores, and revenge.’

**Exit Strategy**

UNIOGBIS currently does not have an exit strategy in place, suggesting the fluidity of the current situation and the need for long-term stability. Even though ECOMIB is scheduled to withdraw from Guinea-Bissau in June 2016, this will be dependent on the security situation in the country and the availability of funding to sustain the mission. These notwithstanding, the lack of state capacity to ensure local ownership of the peacebuilding process, exhibited by the level of dependence of Guinea-Bissau on international support, will likely create exit complications for external actors engaged in the country, especially the ECOMIB and the UNIOGBIS. The continued presence of both missions is crucial for long-term stability, owing to the essential support that they provide in key areas such as security and the provision of social services. A government that is dependent mostly on development aid and incapable of organizing transparent elections without external assistance will be no more competent at ensuring law, order, and political stability in the absence of the ECOWAS and the UN.

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54 After his election in June 2009, Sanhá established the National Reconciliation Commission for Peace and Development and head edit until his demise in 2012.
56 Interview, Director General of Judicial Police, Bissau, 22 September 2015.
Conclusion

Guinea-Bissau’s instability complex and state of fragility is symptomatic of state failure. This failure justifies the crisis control policies implemented by international actors, meaning that long-term peacebuilding and state-building policies have been either difficult or non-existent. The adverse effects of intermittent military-political-constitutional crises have, in many cases, truncated progress made in reform programmes or necessitated a re-alignment of UN and other donor support, or a shift from core peacebuilding activities. The challenges facing the country require systemic reforms in the security, governance, and economic sectors in order to ensure long-term stability.

External interventions have had a visible impact on peace and stability in the country. The UN’s integrated peacebuilding office has largely coordinated international assistance toward building sustainable peace in the country. ECOMIB has also played a crucial role in facilitating political dialogue, and ensuring short-term stability and vital reforms in the security sector, although financial support to the mission is crucial to ensure its continued presence in the country. Further, the EU and the CPLP have provided some financial and technical assistance in reforming some sectors of the country. While these efforts have been beneficial, external assistance by the multiple international actors has sometimes been counter-productive and complicated institutional reforms in Guinea-Bissau. Such external assistance could thus be harmonized by operationalizing the ICG-GB, which provides an effective multilateral platform to advance stability in the country.

References


SECTION FOUR

Policy Dimension of Peace support Operations
Women’s participation in peace support operations in Africa remains low despite years of international and regional efforts at increasing the numbers and active involvement of women in peacekeeping. This is due to a number of factors, including their under representation in the security sectors of contributing states. The basis for enhancing women’s participation in peacekeeping hinges on several factors, from improving the operational effectiveness of peacekeeping missions, to the broader issues of participation and inclusion. This chapter provides an overview of women in PSOs in Africa through an analysis of the evolution and current situation of women’s participation in PSOs in Africa. It highlights some of the challenges to women’s participation in peacekeeping and concludes with implications of enhancing women’s participation in PSOs for present and future PSOs in Africa.

Introduction: The Case for Increasing Women’s Participation in PSOs

Following Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace, the transformation from traditional peacekeeping to peace support operations (PSOs), as promoted by the Panel on United Nations (UN) Peace Support Operations (the Brahimi Panel) in August 2000, signified a momentous change in the global organization’s approach to conflict management. Since the definition of peace operations broadened from military intervention to ‘conflict prevention and peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building’, PSOs have become multi-dimensional with combined military, police, and

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civilian components. PSO mandates have also expanded to include the facilitation of political processes, the protection of civilians, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration targeted at meeting the different needs of women, men, boys, and girls to ensure peace and stability.

Consequently, this new approach to peacekeeping heightened discourses on recognizing women’s roles in conflict and peacemaking processes. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 in 2000 doubled as an important landmark for mainstreaming gender in UN PSOs and a guiding principle for other organizations such as the African Union (AU). Yet, sixteen years on, women’s participation in PSOs remains numerically and substantively low. For example, in 2014, of the 125,000 UN peacekeepers serving globally, women made up only three percent of military contingents and ten percent of police personnel.2 Further, as at 2013, there were no military gender advisors appointed at operational levels in any UN mission.3 In that same year, there were only two women out of the twenty-five international civilian staff deployed to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).4 The call for greater women’s participation in PSOs has been criticized for focusing merely on increasing female numbers rather than simultaneously looking to improve the quality of women peacekeepers and the representation of women’s issues in peace missions.5 Despite this criticism, the increasing contributions and efforts of women in PSOs cannot be overlooked. Further, as long as Africa continues to play host to numerous peacekeeping missions on the continent and contribute the most troops to global PSOs, consistent discourses on women’s participation in PSOs will remain pertinent.6

Although the topic is broad, the focus of this chapter is to contribute to the debates that are shaping thinking around women’s participation in PSOs, particularly in Africa. It recognizes the existing disparities in PSOs despite the progress made over the past sixteen years. The chapter provides a holistic overview of women’s participation in PSOs by first tracing a background to the evolution of women and PSOs in Africa, and assessing the current situation of women’s participation in PSOs on the continent. It further highlights some of the challenges to women’s participation in peacekeeping

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operations and concludes with some discussion of the implications of enhancing women’s participation in PSOs for present and future PSOs in Africa.

**Evolution of Women in Peace Support Operations in Africa**

Peacekeeping in its early days was constructed in terms of military operations with many of the security agencies of countries that participated in peacekeeping, mainly the military and the police, considered to be some of the most conservatively masculine state institutions. Very few countries had women in their armed forces and even where they were admitted, they served in auxiliary services as medical corps, clerks, and cooks. However, dramatic changes in the nature of conflict and the conduct of warfare at the end of the Cold War necessitated shifts in the way that peacekeeping was conducted. The rise in intra-state conflicts saw the targeting of civilian populations, including women and children in conflict situations. These factors, among others, required that peacekeeping operations take up more complex multifaceted roles that combine robust military force with significant police and civilian elements in order to respond adequately to conflict and crises situations. Besides, the level of human suffering and the nature of sexual violence which characterized these armed conflicts also required a move from the traditional peacekeeping approach of just monitoring ceasefires to include other responsibilities such as the delivery of humanitarian aid, the protection of civilians, and post-conflict rebuilding. These transformations further brought to the fore other complex issues such as the differential impacts of conflict on women and men, requiring peacekeeping missions to adopt appropriate mechanisms to address the different needs of women, girls, men, and boys affected by conflict. These issues re-emphasized the point that for PSOs to be successful, they need to fully incorporate gender perspectives into every aspect of their operations. These further became a central topic in the debates on women’s rights and gender equality.

In the mid-1990s and early 2000s, the UN was heavily criticized for its low numbers of female personnel and staff, and the lack of gender analyses and gender-specific references in peacekeeping mandates to inform and guide policies and interventions. In response, the 1995 *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action* identified ‘women

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and armed conflicts’ as a priority area in addressing the gender dimensions of conflict and also acknowledged the important roles that women play in peace processes. As a follow-up to the outcomes of Beijing, several other frameworks including the *Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming Gender Perspectives into Peace Support Operations* in May 2000 also demanded that gender mainstreaming become a standard component of all peacekeeping missions, especially in relevant areas such as peace negotiations, mission mandates, leadership, recruitment, structure, training, and monitoring and evaluation. These actions were considered necessary to ensure the effectiveness of PSOs and to enhance gender equality at all levels.

In furtherance of these principles, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted in October 2000 the ground-breaking Resolution 1325 as the blueprint for women’s participation in peace and security. UNSCR 1325 among others, recognized the disparate consequences of conflict on women and men and called for effective institutional arrangements to protect women and girls during armed conflicts. It introduced a gendered approach to understanding violence and security whereby women are represented not only as victims, but are also recognized as perpetrators of violence and as peacemakers. Resolution 1325 therefore offered an overarching policy framework for the UN, its member states, parties to conflict, and other actors to incorporate gender considerations into their activities, especially the specific needs of women and girls.

As new conflicts emerged, violence against civilians, especially women and girls, escalated with rape and sexual violence increasingly used as a weapon of war. In Africa, countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Chad, and Darfur are among several cases in point. In 2007, for example, over 30,000 women were reportedly raped in Kivu in eastern DRC and fifty percent of rape victims in the country were noted to be minors, including boys. Disturbingly, global reports indicated that perpetrators of

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12 The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 1995
18 Ibid.
sexual violence in conflict were non-state actors as well as peacekeepers and members of state security forces. To address this and expand the reach of UNSCR 1325, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1820 in 2008. Resolution 1820 recognized conflict-related sexual violence as a warfare tactic and called for the deployment of more women in peace operations, the training of peacekeepers to recognize and adequately respond to sexual violence, and the enforcement of a zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse.\textsuperscript{19} Subsequently, the UN adopted resolutions 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2013), 2122 (2013), and 2242 (2015) to support its women, peace, and security agenda.\textsuperscript{20}

The UN has not been the only organization conducting peacekeeping operations on the continent. Over the past two decades, the AU and its regional economic communities (RECs) and member states have also engaged in peacekeeping operations on the continent as well as provided peacekeepers for UN operations outside the region. The AU (it first deployed in 2003 with the AU Mission in Burundi) and its RECs have conducted over ten peacekeeping operations in countries such as Burundi, the Central African Republic, Comoros, Darfur, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Mali.\textsuperscript{21} Despite these efforts, changes in women’s participation in African-led PSOs have been slow-paced, albeit progressive. The AU, since its inception, has expressed its commitment to gender equality through its foundational document, the \textit{Constitutive Act} (2000).\textsuperscript{22} Extensive interest in women’s participation in conflict resolution and peace processes however began taking centre stage in the organization’s priorities in 2003 with the adoption of the \textit{Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa}, and subsequently, the 2004 \textit{Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa}.\textsuperscript{23} These policies, which were informed by UNSCR 1325, encouraged an


increase and the effective inclusion of women in conflict prevention, peace processes, and post-conflict reconstruction.

**Current Situation: Women in Peace Support Operations in Africa**

Women’s participation in PSOs has evolved gradually with relative improvements in the representation of women compared to past peace operations. For instance, the periods between 1957 and 1979 recorded only five female personnel out of the 6,250 UN peacekeepers; 1957-1989 had only twenty women out of the 20,000 military personnel. Since the last decade, there has been considerable progress towards women’s participation in PSOs. From a very low one percent representing all uniformed female personnel in 1993, women now comprise three percent of military personnel and ten percent of police personnel in UN peacekeeping missions. Additionally, the number of gender advisors in UN peace operations reportedly increased from two in 2000 to ten in 2005. According to the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), there are currently eight gender advisors of whom six are in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, namely the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, the United Nations Mission in Liberia, the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire. In 2010, during the tenth anniversary celebration of UNSCR 1325, the consolidated statistics for female military and police personnel from 2000-2010 indicated that out of the total of about 736,424, women constituted only 11,732. Table 1 illustrates a detailed statistical data for the period. It contains no data on women from 2000-2004 because DPKO only began publishing gender disaggregated statistics for military and police personnel in 2005 and 2009 respectively.

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26 Ceesay-Ebo, 2011. op cit


29 Ibid.
Table 1: Consolidated Statistics for Female Military and Police Personnel in UN Peacekeeping Operations (2000-2010).

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Source: DPKO.30

By December 2011, with the total of 119,348 serving in fifteen UN peacekeeping missions, women accounted for 21 percent of civilian staff and 3.8 percent of uniformed personnel.31 Furthermore, as at 2013, women represented less than four percent of UN peacekeepers worldwide, two percent of UN military personnel, and approximately 9.8 percent of UN police.32

Similarly, with regard to Africa specific missions, data reflects the global dynamics. In MINUSMA, for example, as at June 2015, women constituted 166 (1.8 percent) out of 9,149 troops, 44 (4.15 percent) out of 1059 police, and 358 (27 percent) out of 1334 civilian personnel.33 The disparity seems demonstrably less within the civilian component. Furthermore, consolidated data from January to June 2015 of UN military

30 Ibid
33 Questionnaire responses from Gender Unit, MINUSMA. 5 October 2015
and police peacekeepers deployed to the nine missions on the continent indicates that of the 523,110 deployed within the period, females represented 13,309 and 6,483 while males constituted 445,980 and 57,338 respectively. Figure 1 illustrates male and female aggregates.

Figure 1: Male and Female Representation in PSOs in Africa.

![Graph showing the number of females and males in various UN missions in Africa](image)

**Source:** Authors’ compilation with data from DPKO.

From Figure 1, it is evident that in terms of numbers, UNAMID has the largest representation of women with 3179 military and 2097 out of 101,194, while the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara has the smallest female contingent of 42 military and twelve police out of the total 1303 personnel. These numbers are inadequate considering the UN’s target of increasing the number of female police personnel to 20 percent by 2014. At the level of mission leadership, there are currently only five female Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) leading UN missions, two of whom are in Africa. A comparable disparity also exists in AU-led missions. Currently in AMISOM, of the 21,584 military personnel, males constitute 20,594 and females 477, while of the 381 police deployed, there are 297 males and 84 females.

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35 UNPOL, (2009). Global Efforts Initiative, UN


37 Peace Support Operations Department, AU
Although the figures above indicate some improvements toward women’s participation in peacekeeping operations, there is more room for improvement as women are still highly under represented. It is also important to emphasize that while these challenges persist, it is the responsibility of the Troop/Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) to ensure a gender balance of its personnel in accordance with UN and AU policies and requirements. The overall statistics may not be impressive, but the impact of the few women in peacekeeping operations cannot be overlooked. Several studies have demonstrated that women’s participation in PSOs is beneficial in many ways. In Liberia, for instance, the presence of female peacekeepers among the various national contingents inspired local women to join the military and the police service. While cultural differences and variations affect how local populations relate to and perceive peacekeepers, it has been proven that female peacekeepers have the ability to inspire hope and challenge local women to overcome social and sometimes institutional barriers to participate in fields such as the security services that are or are perceived to be male-dominated.38

Also, the presence of female peacekeepers in the DRC and Darfur is believed to have created safer environments for victims of sexual violence and encouraged the reporting of such crimes.39 This is based on the notion that women and girls who have suffered sexual violence can identify better with and prefer to confide in another woman than a man, thereby helping to ensure access to justice and reduce the incidence of sexual and gender-based violence in some camps for internally displaced persons. In societies where there is a strict differentiation of public interaction spaces for men and women, female peacekeepers are useful for providing access to local populations. This has not only fostered trust but has also improved the image of the mission as well as enhanced intelligence gathering, although women are equally capable of performing other roles that men do such as in the decision making structures of missions. All of the foregoing makes it imperative to increase women’s participation.

Some of these improvements and successes, however, did not happen in isolation. To an extent, some of them were made possible by the systematic efforts of civil society organizations at both the international and national levels to operationalize and implement UNSCR 1325 and other related policies, as well as mainstream gender perspectives into peacekeeping mandates and training programmes for military, police, and civilian peacekeepers.40 Also, the development of policy and operational tools such

as the Gender Resource Package and the establishment of partnerships among UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, and UN member states have all contributed to increasing women’s participation in peacekeeping missions.

### Challenges to Women’s Participation in Peace Support Operations in Africa

Although considerable gains have been made in terms of policy development and gender mainstreaming strategies to increase women’s participation in PSOs, significant challenges remain. The continued under-representation of women in PSOs as enunciated earlier has been attributed to many factors, including bureaucratic and institutional hurdles to women’s participation in PSOs, unfavourable policies that hinder women’s participation in national security sector institutions, and prevailing social and cultural beliefs and practices that enable gender discrimination in the security and peacekeeping sectors, among others.

Bureaucratic and/or political hurdles within the UN itself are a challenge to women’s participation and leadership in peacekeeping. For instance, since the inception of UN peacekeeping, only six women have headed missions as SRSGs. The appointments of Ellen Margaret Løj to Liberia and Aïchatou Mindaoudou to Côte d’Ivoire, and the creation of an SRSG position to exclusively address sexual violence are all laudable efforts toward encouraging women’s leadership in PSOs. However, these alone are not enough and need to be part of a continuing trend. The AU and regional organizations are however yet to make such strides and require greater commitment and political will to increase women’s leadership in their peacekeeping missions.

Beyond institutional hurdles, many national governments are not strongly committed to increasing women’s participation and gender equality within security sector agencies and in PSOs, despite being signatories to various relevant international frameworks. This lethargy may be due either to a lack of resources or the fact that gender mainstreaming is often not a priority in national plans and programmes.

The ratio of men to women in the security sector institutions of T/PCCs generally reflects and explains the under-representation of women in PSOs. Security institutions have historically been male-dominated with very little space for women’s participation.

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42 Dharmapuri, 2013. op cit

43 Interview with assistant gender adviser, UNOCI. 16 September, 2015, Abidjan

44 Interview with Gender Advisor, UNOCI. 17 September, 2015, Abidjan.
due to several factors, some of which border not only on institutional but also cultural lines, thus curbing many women’s availability for peacekeeping duties. Where reforms have occurred, they have not necessarily transformed gender and power relations as well as institutional structures to accommodate women effectively and enhance their roles and participation in security sectors and in peacekeeping. For instance, several gendarmeries across francophone West Africa remained exclusively male institutions until they began to recruit women between 2005 and 2008. Consequently, francophone peacekeeping contingents do not include women. For example, in Burkina Faso, newly recruited gendarmes are required to have served for at least ten years before they qualify to participate in peacekeeping operations. At the moment, no female officers have been deployed into peacekeeping yet because the institution began to recruit women only in 2008.45 In this case, some specialized training programmes could be designed for female recruits to increase female participation in peacekeeping contingents. Closely related to this point, is the fact that some T/PCCs are unwilling to deploy female peacekeepers due to social, cultural and religious biases that consider peacekeeping environments as dangerous and PSOs as unfeminine and unsuitable for women, thus preventing them from participating in peacekeeping operations. While the UN and regional organizations aim to increase women’s participation in and leadership of the security sector and PSOs, it is important to address these challenges effectively.

Enhancing Women’s Participation in PSOs: Implications for Present and Future PSOs

Although women’s participation in PSOs is receiving immense support from the highest level with concomitant policies, strategies, and actions within the UN, the AU, and other peacekeeping organizations on the continent, there is still more to be done. A major gap is the need for political will toward the promotion and implementation of policies to increase and enhance women’s participation and leadership in peacekeeping. If women represent at least 50 percent of the populations in most conflict and post-conflict contexts, then their needs and priorities must be taken into account in the planning, design, and implementation of mission mandates. This can be done through mainstreaming gender perspectives into all aspects of PSOs.

It must be emphasized that the UN, the AU, and the Economic Community of West African States do not have security forces for peacekeeping; these are provided by their member states. Thus the onus lies on T/PCCs to develop and implement policies which will improve the levels of female participation in national armies and the police.

Strategies to achieve this include developing gender-sensitive recruitment and retention policies, and providing training that can help to ensure professional and highly qualified female peacekeepers.

Patriarchal influences from socialization processes persist and affect commitments toward enhancing women’s participation and roles in security sector institutions and in PSOs. A reorientation of such biases through appropriate sensitization and training programmes will improve gender dynamics and power relations and ensure gender equality in all aspects of institutional structures and peacekeeping missions. Existing gaps in literature and research on women’s roles in peacekeeping on the continent pose a possible impediment to the development of concrete strategies to improving women’s involvement in PSOs. It is important to document and disseminate stories of experiences with regard to women’s participation in peacekeeping in Africa in order to fill these gaps and inform policy and planning on this subject.

As indicated earlier, the cultural roles of women such as their social and family responsibilities also pose some hindrances to their participation in the security sector. As such, the provision of facilities that would enable women to easily facilitate their family and professional obligations could help increase their participation in the security sector. At the national level, the states could provide facilities such as daycare for mothers within the security agencies so that they can easily participate in trainings and fulfill other professional requirements. In Niger, for example, daycare and nursery are made available for female gendarmes in order to improve female retention in the institution.46 This is a good practice which, if replicated in other African countries, would help strengthen the capacity and contributions of women in national security institutions and, ultimately, in peace operations.

Conclusion

The attainment of sustainable peace and stability is hinged on collective action; it requires the efforts and contributions of all stakeholders, including women. As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon rightly expressed: ‘Sustainable peace is possible only with women’s full participation—their perspectives, their leadership, their daily, equal presence wherever we seek to make and keep the peace.’47

The increasing complexity of Africa’s select but protracted conflicts makes collective and coordinated efforts indispensable. For a continent facing threats like coups d’état, transnational organized crimes, terrorism, and piracy, it is essential that PSOs take an inclusive approach toward addressing these threats which are notable drivers of violent conflict. Therefore, the continuous alienation of women in peace operations is a potential hindrance to the attainment of sustainable peace. According to H.E. Bineta Diop⁴⁸, UN Special Envoy on Women, Peace, and Security, “women should no more be seen as victims but actors of change”⁴⁹, capable of making substantial contributions to peace and security in Africa.

References


⁴⁸Remarks of AU Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security at the Opening of the Roundtable Discussion on women, peace and security in the context of the 15th anniversary of united nations security council resolution 1325, 5th October, 2016 at KAIPTC.


Questionnaire responses from MINUSMA Gender Unit, 5 October 2015.


UNITED NATIONS IN AFRICAN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Chapter Fourteen

Festus Kofi Aubyn

Abstract
The United Nations (UN) has partnered with African Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs) for peace support operations since the early 1990s. This partnership has evolved and expanded over the past decade, particularly following the transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) in 2002. This chapter explores the nature and scope of this strategic partnership between the UN and the AU/RECs for peace operations in Africa. It argues that no single organization has the capacity to resolve Africa’s security challenges, partly due to their complex nature and issues of resource constraints. Hence, an enhanced partnership with the AU/RECs is essential if the UN wants to effectively address African peace and security problems.

Introduction
Africa remains a key strategic focus of efforts by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to promote international peace and security due to recurrent conflicts on the continent. Correspondingly, the continent hosts the majority of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping activities globally. As of June 2015, approximately 62.5 percent of UN peace operations and 87 percent of all uniformed UN peacekeepers were located in Africa. Furthermore, over 80 percent of the annual peacekeeping budget was spent on missions in Africa.¹ Although the UNSC has the primary responsibility for responding to global security challenges, over time, their complex nature and the UNSC’s limited resources

have necessitated partnerships\(^2\) with other actors especially regional organizations to promote peace, as envisaged in the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The African Union (AU) and its Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms(RECs)\(^3\) are among the regional bodies that the UN has partnered with to maintain international peace and stability. Over the past decade, the UN has intensified its strategic partnership, particularly with the AU, considering the important role that the AU/RECs play on the African continent. This chapter explores the nature and scope of the UN-AU/RECs trilateral cooperation and partnership for peace operations in Africa.

The chapter, which is divided into six sections, begins with a historical overview of the UN-AU/RECs relationship. There ensues a discussion of the normative and legal frameworks that underpin the partnership. The different forms of partnership at the strategic, institutional, and operational levels are examined in the subsequent section, followed by an analysis of the challenges and the lessons learnt from the UN-AU/RECs partnership. The last section concludes with policy recommendations on how the UN’s cooperation with the AU and its RECs can be further enhanced to address African peace and security challenges.

**Historical Trajectory**

The UN’s very first relationship with an African regional organization after its establishment in 1945 occurred when it signed a cooperation agreement with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1965.\(^4\) The agreement covered key areas including mutual consultations, reciprocal representation, the exchange of information and cooperation between both secretariats. Alas, the weakness of the UN due to the Cold War political rivalry and the fact that the OAU itself did not undertake peacekeeping activities prevented its effective implementation. The UN-OAU cooperation remained largely inactive until the early 1990s when the growing number of intrastate conflicts in Africa occupied the bulk of the UNSC’s time and focus. Two landmark documents played a role in reviving the cooperation: the 1992 UN Secretary-General’s report, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive*

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\(^2\) There exists a lack of conceptual clarity on the definition of partnership. For the purposes of this paper, partnership is defined as a strategically formed relationship between organizations that involve varying degrees of resource sharing, joint decision-making, and collaborative work to address common interests and achieve shared goals. It is used in this paper to describe other forms of inter-organizational relationships such as collaboration, cooperation, coordination, alliance, and joint working. Although these terms mean different things to different people, their core element involves shared commitment by organizations to achieve common objectives, underpinned by the principles of division of labour and complementarity of efforts.

\(^3\) For simplicity, RECs will be used as an umbrella term for both regional economic communities and regional mechanisms.

Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping and the 1995 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace. A key recommendation in both reports was the need for the UN to decentralize peacekeeping, including through the increased involvement of regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The 1995 supplementary report outlined the forms that this cooperation should take, namely consultations, diplomatic support, co-deployment, joint operations, and operational support to regional peacekeeping efforts.

In furtherance of this and to operationalize the recommendations of the two reports, the UN entered into a variety of ad hoc security arrangements with the OAU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) between 1992 and 1999. At the continental level, the UN and the OAU worked collaboratively on peacemaking efforts in Burundi, The Comoros, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In Rwanda, in particular, the OAU facilitated peace talks and deployed a Neutral Military Observer Group in 1993. The OAU’s intervention helped to stabilize the security situation prior to the eventual takeover of the mission by the UN.

The UN’s engagement in peacekeeping at the sub-regional level was more focused on the ECOWAS because a majority of the RECs were at their formative stages in the 1990s. The UN worked with ECOWAS during its interventions in Liberia (1990-1998, 2003-2004), Sierra Leone (1997-2000), Guinea-Bissau (1999), and Côte d’Ivoire (2003). While the UN did not authorize the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone from the outset due to internal divisions within ECOWAS and the UNSC, it approved ECOMOG’s actions retrospectively under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter in October 1992. Operationally, the ECOMOG forces deployed to these countries either worked alongside or were succeeded by UN missions as represented in Table 1. Though the outcome of the UN-ECOWAS cooperation helped to ensure relative stability in most of the countries where they worked together, in Liberia especially, difficulties such as the lack of clear mandates, divergent approaches to peace, and disparities in financing and logistics obstructed the relationship.

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Table 1: Some African-led peacekeeping interventions transferred to the UN.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African Peace Support Operations</th>
<th>UN Peace Support Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• ECOMOG in Liberia, 1990</td>
<td>• UN Observer Mission in Liberia, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• OAU Neutral Military Observer Group I (NMOG I) and NMOG II, 1992</td>
<td>• United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, 1997 2008</td>
<td>• UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ECOMOG in Côte d’Ivoire, 2003/2004</td>
<td>• UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• AU Mission in Burundi, 2003/2004</td>
<td>• UN Operation in Burundi, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ECOMOG in Guinea Bissau, 1998</td>
<td>• UN Peace-building Support Office in Guinea Bissau, 1999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation.

Today, these initial cooperative arrangements between the UN and the OAU and the UN and the ECOWAS in the 1990s have evolved and expanded, particularly following the transformation of the OAU into the AU in 2002. With the adoption of the 2000 Constitutive Act and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in 2002, the AU and its RECs have worked together with the UN in Peace Support Operations (PSOs) at several levels: strategic, institutional, and operational. The AU-RECs and the UN have cooperated in undertaking PSOs in countries like Burundi, the CAR, Mali, and Somalia and, in Darfur, have jointly deployed a peacekeeping mission. In Mali, and more recently in the CAR, the respective successful handovers to the UN of two African-led missions illustrate clearly this increasingly effective partnership.

**Normative Context**

The UN-AU/RECs partnership in PSOs occurs within the context of the UN Charter, the AU Constitutive Act, the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, and the respective security frameworks of the RECs.9 Under the UN Charter, Articles 33 of Chapter VI and 52-54 of Chapter VIII provide the main legal basis for the UN’s partnership with regional organizations (ROs)10. Article 33 requires member states to use regional bodies ‘first of all’ to peacefully

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10ROs refers to both the AU and the RECs.
resolve their conflicts. Article 52 provides for the involvement of regional agencies in the pacific settlement of disputes, while Article 53 allows regional agencies to take enforcement action, but only with the explicit authorization of the UNSC. Article 54 stipulates that regional agencies shall always inform the UNSC of their peace and security activities. Although not expressly mentioned, the principle enshrined here is the subsidiarity principle, which vaguely defines certain roles for regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. In reality, the latter provisions have not always been adhered to, especially Article 53, whereby all enforcement actions by regional bodies have to be sanctioned by the UNSC. The 1990 ECOMOG intervention in Liberia, for instance, occurred without prior UN authorization due to internal divisions within the ECOWAS and the UNSC.¹¹

The implementation of the provisions of chapters VI and VIII has also been hindered by the lack of common interpretation and understanding of the modalities for partnership in conflict situations. The nature and division of responsibilities between the UN and ROs under Chapter VIII is not clear. This shortfall has affected not only political level relationships, but more ominously, field-based UN-AU/RECs’ collaborations in countries such as Libya.¹²

At the level of African ROs, their cooperation is informed by the UN Charter provisions as well as by their respective conflict prevention, management and resolution frameworks. The 2000 AU Constitutive Act and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) Protocol provide the normative basis for cooperation with the UN at the continental level. Article 17 of the PSC protocol directs the AUPSC to work closely with the UNSC and, where necessary, to seek its financial, logistical and military support in the maintenance of peace, security and stability. The implementation of this article however presents a challenge in situations where the AU and the RECS take different positions on a particular African crisis. The key normative standards of the RECs radiate broadly from the diverse but related regional and international normative frameworks such as the AU Constitutive Act, the AUPSC Protocol and the UN Charter together with their respective security frameworks. The Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Peacekeeping, and Security of ECOWAS and the Southern Africa Development Community Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation are just two examples of such sub-regional normative frameworks.


### Current Nature and Scope of Cooperation

The UN’s partnership with African ROs occurs at three levels: strategic, institutional and operational. Since 2002, the relationship has focused mainly on the AU with less engagement with the RECs. For this reason, this section looks more closely at UN-AU partnership for PSOs in Africa.

#### Strategic Level Collaboration

This level of engagement involves the UNSC and the AUPSC. As organs with similar mandates in Africa with the responsibility to provide high-level strategic direction and political guidance on issues of peace and security including PSOs, they have met annually in Addis Ababa and New York since 2007 for joint consultations on African security issues. Issues discussed in these meetings have included, among others, terrorism, peace and security challenges in the CAR, the DRC, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, and Darfur; modalities for improving the resource base and capacity of the AU; and the possibilities of financing UN-mandated AU-led PSOs. However, while some country-specific and capacity-building issues have been resolved, others like the financing of AU PSOs are yet to be addressed.  

Moreover, both security councils have avoided discussions that might challenge the UNSC’s position as having primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Also, the RECs and the Troop/Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) have not been actively involved in the strategic discussions. In light of the key roles that RECs and T/PCCs play in the financing, deployment, management, and termination of missions, it is important to involve them more actively in the strategic partnership.

#### Institutional Relationship

The partnership at this level is between the UN Secretariat and the African Union Commission (AUC) at different levels. There are, first, the formal and informal interactions between the AUC Chairperson and the UN Secretary-General on African peace and security matters. A second layer involves the working relationship between the different departments within the two secretariats through consultative frameworks like the UN-AU Joint Task Force (JTF) on Peace and Security and desk-to-desk meetings. Specifically, the JTF is jointly chaired by the Under-Secretaries-General of the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of

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Field Support within the UN Secretariat, and the respective AU Commissioners for Peace and Security and Political Affairs.\textsuperscript{15} They meet twice a year on the margins of the AU Heads of State Summit in Addis Ababa and the UN General Assembly in New York. Apart from providing political and strategic guidance to the UNSC and the AUPSC, the JTF is a forum where the senior management of both institutions exchange views on how to address Africa’s crises.

Desk-to-desk meetings occur at the working level between the desk officers of the two secretariats. They usually discuss and exchange information on country specific and thematic issues of peace and security in Africa.\textsuperscript{16} While the JTF and desk-to-desk meetings have helped with information-sharing and improved coordination, their existence has not generated automatic consensus on how they act in crisis situations.\textsuperscript{17} There have also been a number of joint assessments between the AU Commission (specifically, the Peace and Security Department) and the UN in relation to the transfer of authority from AU PSOs to UN peace operations. To further improve the practice, the report of the High level Independent Panel on Peace Operations in June 2015 indicated the need for joint analysis, planning, monitoring and evaluation of PSOs by both organizations to enhance clear understanding of their respective roles.\textsuperscript{18} The AU liaison offices and field missions in conflict and post-conflict zones also interact daily with UN personnel in those settings. In Mali, the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel and the ECOWAS Political Office are, for instance, working with UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on the mediation and peace processes between the government and the various armed groups.\textsuperscript{19}

Both secretariats have also established offices within each other’s headquarters. The United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) in Addis Ababa is mandated to provide operational, planning and long-term capacity-building assistance to the AUC under the framework of the Ten-year Capacity-building Programme for the AU. The UNOAU provides technical support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and in the development of policies, guidelines, doctrines and training for the African Standby Force. Conversely, the AU has also established an office in New York to manage its relationship with the UN. But unlike the UNOAU, the AU office in New York lacks the capacity to effectively facilitate the interaction between the two Secretariats.

\textsuperscript{15}Or their designated representatives. As at 1 February 2016, there had been twelve meetings of the JTF.
\textsuperscript{17}Boutellis and Williams, 2014, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{19}Interview with AU, ECOWAS, and UN officers in Bamako, September and October 2015.
Field-Based Cooperation

Various forms of partnership exist at the operational level as represented in Table 2. The most prominent involves the construction of a hybrid operation like UNAMID, where both organizations operate within a joint chain of command. While the deployment of UNAMID represented a major development in global peacekeeping, several challenges affected its effectiveness. For instance, the Government of Sudan has consistently obstructed UNAMID’s operations through bureaucratic bottlenecks such as blocking vital equipment at customs, delaying the issuance of visas, and restricting the mission’s access to certain regions in Darfur.\textsuperscript{20} Besides, the power imbalance between the UN and the AU has resulted in a situation where the latter is frequently sidelined in the decision-making process at the mission headquarters as the former virtually controls the operation.

The second form of partnership which was pervasive globally during the 1990s is sequential operations. In the 1990s, such operations existed between the UN and the ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the UN and the OAU in Rwanda. As shown in Table 1, in 2003, the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia was also transferred to the UN Mission in Liberia. Likewise, the AU’s first ever PSO, namely the AU Mission in Burundi, was transferred to the UN Operation in Burundi in 2004 while the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire was transferred to the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire in 2004. Another dimension of the sequential operation is the trilateral peacekeeping partnerships involving the UN, the AU, and the RECs. In this kind of partnership, the AU-RECs’ intervention is usually transferred to the UN. Examples include the transfers of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to MINUSMA in July 2013, and of MISCA to MINUSCA in September 2014.

It is instructive to note that the processes for the transfer of operations from African ROs to the UN has not always been smooth due to tensions over issues relating to command and control, the appointment of senior mission leadership, and the composition of troops, police and civilians. In Mali, for instance, the UN refused to appoint the AU’s preferred candidate, former President Pierre Buyoya of Burundi, who was then the head of AFISMA as the new head of MINUSMA in 2013, creating tensions between the two organizations.\textsuperscript{21}


\textsuperscript{21}See PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXXI); PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXXI).
In the last form of cooperation, the UN provides logistics and technical and financial support to AU-led PSOs. Thus both organizations coordinate their activities while operating under different chains of command. The UN Support Office to Somalia, which supports AMISOM with funding and logistics, is an example.

**Table 2: Different forms of cooperation between the UN and African ROs.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrated/Hybrid</td>
<td>UN and regional organisation operate with single or joined chain of command</td>
<td>Darfur (UN and AU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinated</td>
<td>UN and regional organizations are coordinated but operate under different chains of command</td>
<td>Somalia (AU, UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequential</td>
<td>UN precedes or follows a regional peacekeeping force</td>
<td>Liberia (ECOWAS, UN), Burundi (AU, UN), Mali (UN, AU, ECOWAS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jones and Cherif, 2004.

### Challenges of Cooperation

One of the many challenges affecting the UN-AU/RECs partnership is the lack of consensus on the interpretation and application of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This challenge has manifested in two forms: divergent interpretations of the principle of subsidiarity by the UN and the AU, and the lack of a common understanding of this situation which could inform a harmonized and mutually agreeable response. This has often led to misunderstanding and open rifts between the UN and the AU/RECs in certain conflict situations. A typical case was their disagreement over the best course of action during the Libyan crisis in 2011. In this particular case, while the AU insisted on a political solution, the UN opted for a humanitarian (military) intervention.22

Further challenges are mutual distrust of and disrespect for each other’s perspectives on African security issues. The AUPSC has complained that members of the UNSC do not consult the AU and sometimes reject its views on African security issues and decline to give due consideration to the decisions and requests of the AUPSC before arriving at their own decisions.23 One instance was the UNSC’s denial in 2009 of the AU’s repeated request for the deferral of the prosecution of then Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir...
by the International Criminal Court. Similarly, the UNSC refused the AU’s request in 2012 for AFISMA to receive the same kind of logistical and financial support that the UN gave to AMISOM in 2009.\(^\text{24}\) In the communiqué adopted at its 371st meeting on 25 April 2013, the AUPSC also noted that the AU and ECOWAS were not consulted and their concerns were not taken into account in the drafting of the UNSC Resolution 2100 on the deployment of MINUSMA.\(^\text{25}\)

In response to these claims, some members of the UNSC like the United States, have argued that AU member states have not always provided unified or consistent views on key issues and have on occasion also been slow to act on urgent matters.\(^\text{26}\) In a statement, former US ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice posited that the UNSC is not subordinate to the schedules of ROs and that it cannot cooperate on the basis that ROs independently decide policy while the UN simply blesses and pays for it.\(^\text{27}\) This position, which seems to reflect the views of other permanent members of the UNSC, is somewhat disconnected from reality.\(^\text{28}\) Since the 1990s, African ROs have shown that acting together, they can prevent and resolve conflicts. For instance, ECOWAS intervened alone in the Liberian civil war in 1990 when the international community was reluctant to get involved. The AU has since 2002 also intervened in very difficult places like Burundi, Sudan, and Somalia when the UN and other international actors have been hesitant. Each of these instances is clear evidence that African ROs have not always been slow to act on urgent matters as argued by Susan Rice.

At the operational level, among the difficulties that confront joint operations are unreasonable delays in appointing senior level officials due to cumbersome bureaucratic procedures and politics, especially in the AU. The modalities for transferring an AU/RECs mission to a UN mission are also not clear. Additionally, given the absence of consensus on subsidiarity in terms of responses to conflicts, the UN’s relationship with the AU and its RECs has sometimes depicted competition and antagonism instead of complementarity.

\(^{24}\) See the Communique, of the Peace and Security Council, 265th meeting, Addis Ababa, 10 March 2011, PSC/PR/COMM. 2 (CCLXV).

\(^{25}\) PSC/PR/COMM. (CCCLXXI); PSC/PR/COMM. (CCCLXXI).


\(^{27}\) Ibid.

Lessons Learned

First, the UN cooperation with the AU and its RECs in Mali, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, and South Sudan has shown that no single entity holds the solutions to African security problems—hence the need for task sharing. The complexities of these conflicts, coupled with the multiplicity of actors and the confluence of organized crimes like terrorism and drug trafficking, affirm the importance of multilateral responses to conflict. A very good example of this is the joint approach adopted by MINUSMA, the AU, the ECOWAS, the European Union, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and other partners to the peace processes between the Government of Mali and various armed groups in the country’s north. The intervening partners are leading efforts toward the signing and implementation of the Ouagadougou and Algiers peace agreements between the two main warring parties. The involvement of so many actors in the Sahel however—there are at least 16 initiatives in the region—underscores the importance of effective communication and the need to harmonize all efforts.

Second, through the sequencing of operations, the AU and its RECs like ECOWAS have demonstrated the value of undertaking the high-risk stabilization missions needed for long-term post-conflict reconstruction and development. Nevertheless, they lack the requisite logistics and funding to sustain such missions for long periods. Conversely, while the UN lacks a rapid response capability, it is able to sustain and backstop long-term PSOs financially. This has ipso facto led to the trend where the AU/RECs deploy initially to stabilize a conflict situation and thereafter, the UN takes full responsibility. This happened successfully in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Sudan, Mali, and the CAR. Third, the UN’s involvement in African PSOs has enhanced the capacities of the AU and, to a lesser extent, the RECs. Through the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme of the UN, the AU is receiving technical and financial assistance through support for AMISOM and in the operationalization of the African Standby Force.

Fourth, the AU has provided the UN with local access and legitimacy in certain conflict situations, like Darfur, when the host country has refused UN presence. In this case, the AU used its political authority to soften the stance of the Government of Sudan to enable the deployment of UNAMID. Lastly, the field based partnership in Mali, Burundi, Somalia, Sudan, and the CAR has shown that there is no generic model for cooperation and that each situation requires innovative solutions. Each cooperation model, whether

29 Interview, MINUSMA and AU personnel, Bamako, Mali, October 2015.
hybrid/integrated, coordinated, or sequential, depends on the operational requirements of each peacekeeping context.

**Conclusion and Policy Recommendations**

While there has been significant improvement in UN-AU/RECs cooperation since 2010, some challenges remain. Some of these challenges include, the lack of consensus on the interpretation and application of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter; mutual distrust of and disrespect for each other’s perspectives on African security issues; and the lack of clear modalities for transferring an AU/RECs mission to a UN mission. As the partnership grows, both organizations will need to have a political dialogue on how best to overcome existing imbalances in order to ensure a mutually beneficial relationship.

To further improve the sustainability and predictability of their cooperation, the UN and the AU/RECs should sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU), specifying the strategic vision, shared objectives, principles and modalities governing their relationship and outlining their respective roles and responsibilities when they partner in crisis situations. Some of these issues are discussed in the reports of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations and the Common African Position on the UN Review of Peace Operations.\(^3\) Admittedly, while the signing of an MOU may not necessarily ensure compliance or be legally binding, it would make the relationship more systematic and comprehensive and help to ensure coherent responses to existing and emerging conflicts. It will also help address the *ad hoc* nature of the partnership and ensure that it proceeds in a systematic, principled, and predictable manner. The T/PCCs and the RECs should be more actively involved in the strategic partnership. However, the AU should first strengthen its own relationships with the RECs which are currently weak and competitive. While recognizing that this is an African issue, the UN can play a positive role by encouraging the development of institutional and political frameworks that better interlink the AU and the RECs.

On the whole, the UN’s relationship with the AU remains asymmetrical owing to the latter’s financial and material dependence on the former. This is due in part to the fact that the UN is a global organization with largely sustainable resources, while the AU is a regional body whose capacities are comparatively nascent. The challenge of financing African-led peace operations in a flexible, predictable and sustainable manner must be addressed as it has the potential to undermine the effectiveness of the partnership. The

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UN should develop a generic framework of financial support to the AU instead of the prevailing case-by-case approach. On its part, the AU should find alternative innovative ways to finance its peace operations on the continent.

At the operational level, the UN and the AU/RECs should institute joint policies on the modalities of cooperation (hybrid, sequential or coordinated) in each context and document comprehensively the lessons and experiences of each model to improve future operations. This should include control and command issues, clarity on reporting lines, clear procedures for the appointment of senior officers, and clear processes for transferring an AU/RECs’ mission to a UN mission.

The experiences of the UN with African ROs in PSOs show that it cannot keep peace in Africa alone. Hence, an enhanced cooperation with the AU and its RECs is essential if the UN wants to effectively address African peace and security problems.

References


Afua Lamptey and Margaret Sosuh

Abstract

Peacekeeping training plays an important role in mission effectiveness. Accordingly, normative frameworks and guidelines have been developed by both the United Nations and the African Union (AU) to guide interventions in peace support operations (PSOs). Within the AU, the African Standby Force (ASF) has been conceptualized to intervene in crisis situations. The AU also provides guidelines for training and has oversight responsibility for harmonizing and coordinating training in Africa. However, a 2013 AU training needs assessment highlights the lack of a systematic approach in dealing with ASF training requirements. The assessment further notes that regional economic communities have little input in the training, development and delivery of courses at designated training centres. This chapter investigates the extent to which ASF training requirements are being implemented by TCs and how training is evolving to meet current trends in PSOs in Africa. It concludes that unfamiliarity and a lack of oversight and prioritization of the ASF training requirements are inimical to the overall realization of the concept of the ASF.

Introduction

Over the past few decades, the waning interest of the international community to intervene militarily in Africa has deepened the regionalization of peace operations and security responsibility.¹ This has resulted in a more visible and assertive role in the continent’s conflicts by actors such as the African Union (AU) and drawn attention to

the often underestimated but critical aspect of the state of readiness of the intervening forces. The 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations emphasized this link between training and performance, noting that a ‘better support for the field’ is essential for the future design and delivery of United Nations (UN) peace operations.\(^2\) That same thinking is at the foundation of the AU’s response to complex emergencies which birthed the concept of the African Standby Force (ASF).\(^3\)

Training is a critical factor for the preparedness of the ASF and is aimed at instilling the guiding principles, mindsets, knowledge and skills for conducting PSOs.\(^4\) The ASF doctrine mandates regional centres of excellence\(^5\) to conduct training, evaluation and validation in PSOs.\(^6\) However, due to a lack of structured and systematic dissemination, most of these training doctrines are not fully utilised by training centres (TCs). This chapter seeks to examine the extent to which training given by TCs in Africa has been informed by the changing nature of PSOs and ASF doctrines. It begins with an overview of the evolution of training for PSOs in Africa after which the APSTA is examined. It then examines the TCs in Africa, elaborating the issues of standards, curricula, gender, monitoring and evaluation and funding constraints. Finally, best practices and lessons learned are discussed before a conclusion is drawn with recommendations for improving training for PSOs in Africa.

**Evolution of Training for PSOs in Africa**

In the early years of peacekeeping in the 1960s, PSO training generally focused on basic skills for peacekeepers who were usually military personnel deployed to monitor ceasefires and create buffer zones between warring countries. However, as the bipolar world system ended in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the nature of conflict changed from inter-state to intra-state. This meant that traditional peacekeeping was unable to respond to the new nature of conflicts which demanded different actors, skills and logistics.\(^7\) In the ensuing years, PSOs have evolved from traditional peacekeeping to multidimensional peace support operations, allowing for a more robust response to intra-state conflict and necessitating a more comprehensive approach to peacekeeping training.\(^8\)

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\(^3\) See chapter on ‘The Future of PSO in Africa: the ASF for more information on the concept of the ASF.


\(^5\) Under the ASF training concept, each of the 5 regions in Africa are to have designated training centres for peace operations training in the sub-region and beyond.


\(^7\) See the Changing nature of peacekeeping Operations for a more detailed analysis.

\(^8\) See chapter on the evolution of peace support operations by Ernest et al for more information.
PSO training improves the likelihood of mission success, allows for effective humanitarian assistance and, most importantly, supports societies in their transitions from conflict to stability.\(^9\) This underscores the importance of effective training of individual peacekeepers whose contributions are critical to the success or failure of any PSO. Nigeria’s 1978 deployment during the Lebanon crisis, for instance, was preceded by additional complex training which would not have been the case in the 1960s.\(^10\) The need for additional capacity for deployment also fuelled the emergence of peacekeeping training centres (PKTCs). The debacle in Somalia as well as the haunting experiences of Rwanda galvanised action toward African solutions to African crises. Further, Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) like the ECOWAS underwent a paradigm shift from its fundamental economic integration focus to a peace and security mandate which allowed it to intervene in the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone.\(^11\) Its experiences in these conflict theatres subsequently informed both the policy and practice of peacekeeping training. It also showcased that Africa could take the initiative and respond to its own conflicts and helped to shape subsequent actions and policies at the continental level.

The need to strengthen African PSOs was also noted at the level of the OAU at a chiefs of defence staff meeting in 1996. It ultimately led to a study which recommended that there was the urgent need to develop common concepts, guidelines and doctrines for participation in peace operations by member states.\(^12\) Further, centres of excellence were envisaged which were to be capable of conducting research into training, developing common training syllabi and conducting training control and evaluation.\(^13\) Additionally the OAU was expected to provide guidance and support to member states as well as harmonise sub-regional and continental efforts to manage conflict and maintain peace and security.\(^14\) The rebranding of the OAU in 2002 to the AU formalized these concerns in the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC).

The PSC is charged with providing control and strategic directives for training which are planned and executed by the planning elements under the umbrella of the African Standby Force (ASF). Member states, through the RECs/RMs, are responsible for the training and readiness of their committed forces with a view to being able to conduct PSOs in a multinational environment. Basic training for these security forces is supposed

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\(^11\) Ibid.
\(^14\) Ibid.
Peacekeepers today operate in increasingly volatile environments and are exposed to a higher degree of risk. This means that they must have critical knowledge of their environments and the skills and ability to respond effectively to crisis situations. The ASF thus seeks to provide peacekeeping forces at high levels of readiness and capability for rapid deployment in response to requests by the UN, the AU or any given region.\(^\text{15}\)

In line with this, the ASF training policy and standards have been designed to provide guidelines on training for PSOs. Table 1 lists the AU normative frameworks on training and the key points.

**Table 1: AU Normative Frameworks and key points.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policies or Guidelines</th>
<th>Key points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conceptualizing African Peacekeeping* (A comprehensive guide to the Development of the ASF)</td>
<td>Stresses that effectiveness of the ASF is dependent on standardization of concept, doctrine, training and operating procedures. It highlights the role of training and tasks TCs within the various regions to achieve and maintain training standards. It also assigns strategic leadership to the AU Peace Support Operations Division while RECs/RMs and member states are responsible for the individual and collective training of respective standby forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF PSO Doctrine</td>
<td>Provides comprehensive information on the threats to peace and security as well as the mechanisms available for the prevention and management of security challenges at the global and continental levels. The Doctrine sets the strategic context, concepts and direction for PSOs; clarifies the nature, fundamentals and principles of PSO and outlines the potential missions of the ASF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF Training Policy</td>
<td>This breaks down training into four stages i.e. basic training; basic PSO training; Command groups and staff elements training; and Specialised training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF Training Standards</td>
<td>Divides training for peacekeeping operations into three stages, Elementary PSO training; Mission oriented PSO training/Pre-deployment training and in mission training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF Training Directives</td>
<td>The AU provides guidance and ensures coordination of training for its mandated and authorized missions and the African Standby Capacity roster to ensure that such training initiatives are in concert with the ASF doctrine, as well as AU missions’ mandates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF Evaluation and Validation Document</td>
<td>Provides a modality framework for the evaluation, validation and lessons learned. Responsibility for the evaluation and validation of the force is vested with the African Union Commission and RECs/RMs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roadmaps relating to the Plan of Action for the ASF</td>
<td>Developed to guide the operationalization of the ASF.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The AU has held a series of field training exercises termed AMANI to operationalize the ASF.\(^\text{16}\) After missing two deadlines for operationalization, the AU together with

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\(^{15}\)ASF Training Policy, p. 1.

the RECs/RMs conducted the AMANI Africa II field training exercise in Lohatla, South Africa in October and November 2015. Though it encountered further challenges, the evaluation team pronounced it a success and a positive signal of the readiness of the ASF. Feedback from the exercise also suggests that with the right coordination, dedication and resources, the AU could be better positioned to continue to intervene in future conflicts on the continent. However, there must be a standardization of the training efforts if the ASF is to proceed as envisaged.

The African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA)

The OAU initiated efforts at peace operations which led to an increase in the establishment of PKTCs in Africa. Thus from the 1990s, there was a proliferation of PKTCs to respond to the increasing need to have trained personnel in PSO environments. Most of them were founded with the support of external donors and a number of them grew out of government institutions such as ministries of defence.

The first training centre, the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA) was established in 1960 in the southern Africa region, which to date hosts the largest number of training centres. In 2002, the African Peace Support Training Association (APSTA) was formed as the African Chapter of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres. APSTA seeks to promote and harmonise training for PSOs toward a peaceful and stable Africa. Some of their achievements include a memorandum of understanding with the AU to enhance standards of PSO training in Africa; the development of the ASF police dimension policy framework guidelines; revised harmonised standards for civilian peacekeepers and a foundation and police pre-deployment training manual. These manuals have been developed as a basic guide for the training centres and are currently being used by some of them in their pre-deployment training. Today, there are over 20 peacekeeping training centres in Africa but as at September 2015, only 16 were under the APSTA.

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17 The former Organization of African Unity, now African Union, organized the first African-led peace operation in 1981 in its quest to address the armed conflict in Chad.

18 These include France, Germany, Norway, Canada, GIZ, Japan, Britain, and the United States. It must be noted that these training institutions do receive some government support in terms of location, amenities and personnel, but most are unable to support themselves without donor intervention and that is one of the critical points for the sustainability of these institutions.

19 Membership of the association requires annual dues of $5000 which some members are unable to pay.
Table 2: Short Profiles of PSO Training Institutions in Africa.\(^\text{20}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Institution</th>
<th>Date and Country of establishment</th>
<th>Target Group</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA)</td>
<td>1960, South Africa</td>
<td>Military, Civilian, Police (MPC)</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)</td>
<td>1992, South Africa</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA)</td>
<td>1994, Egypt</td>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ecole de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin Beye (EMPABB)</td>
<td>1999, Mali</td>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Peace Support Training Centre (FDRE PSTC)</td>
<td>2010, Ethiopia</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Institute for Peace and Security Studies</td>
<td>2007, Ethiopia</td>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies</td>
<td>2005, Tanzania</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)</td>
<td>2003, Ghana</td>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Ecole International des Forces de Sécurité (EFORCES)</td>
<td>2007, Cameroon</td>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Rwanda Peace Academy</td>
<td>2008, Rwanda</td>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (SADC- RPTC)</td>
<td>1999, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PSO Training in Africa

The 2013 AU training needs assessment made some observations and recommendations on PSO training in Africa. This section looks at a number of them, including those

\(^{20}\)The list is based on interviews conducted in 2015 and website information.
pertaining to the use of the AU training standards, the nature of current training curricular for personnel, quality of the training, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and sustainability issues.

**Training Materials**

The ASF training directives require that training be based on ASF doctrine, AU guidelines, UN Standardised Training Modules and other documents prepared by the AU and the UN. The Roadmap relating to the Plan of Action for the ASF and revised Roadmap III on ASF also emphasize the incorporation of the ASF concept into the curricula of training centres.\(^{21}\) Generally, there is no consistency to the level to which AU doctrines and policies guide PSO training.\(^{22}\) Though the policy and standards state the types and levels of training to be conducted, the lack of specialised training packages to guide the process has made implementation irregular. Thus most, if not all, of the training centres use UN-authorised material to train their personnel. Nonetheless, the AU and APSTA have developed ‘Revised Harmonised Standards for Civilian Peacekeepers Foundation and Police Pre-Deployment Training’. The document is to serve as entry-level training for both civilians and police. While training centres refer to this document to guide their training, it is a fairly new document.

Most of the PSO military training for standby forces is handled by training centres at the regional level. In East Africa, for instance, PSO training centres adapt the AU framework for pre-deployment training of their staff.\(^{23}\) Further, the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) has a simulation village that exposes participants to real scenarios pertaining to the peacekeeping environment which has had a significant impact on the professionalism of trainees in PSOs.\(^{24}\) In West Africa, the ASF doctrine is integrated into some course modules but does not feature largely in pre-deployment training which is usually based on UN standards.\(^{25}\) However, context-specific training is added to augment regular training.

In line with the AU policies, training is supposed to be iterative, but in reality this does not happen.\(^{26}\) As such, manuals on training are being developed gradually with the help of the APSTA and others. The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution

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\(^{22}\) AU Training Needs Assessment, 2013.


\(^{24}\) Interview, IPSTC official, Nairobi, Kenya September 2015.

\(^{25}\) For instance, the KAIPTC addresses some aspects of the ASF doctrine in its IPSO, Rule of Law and Crisis Information Management courses but the ASF doctrine is not really addressed in pre-deployment training.

\(^{26}\) This is partly due to the lack of clarity of the standby concept, which has led to different arrangements in different regions.
of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) developed the ‘ASF Civilian Dimension Policy Framework’ at the behest of the AU Peace Support Operations Division in 2006. This framework was a critical step toward the expression of the ASF civilian dimension concept and established the basis and broad parameters upon which all other work on the civilian component has taken place. ACCORD has also published two important books on the civilian dimension of the ASF in 2010 and the Civil Affairs Handbook in 2012 which have both been used by both the AU and UN to train civilian peacekeepers and develop policies for the civilian dimensions of AU missions.

Training for PSO Personnel

RECs/RMs are encouraged to establish and monitor training centres of excellence (TCEs) to build the capacities of their civilian, military and police components for deployment. TCE formats vary among regions. In the ECOWAS region, three centres of excellence have been designated to operate at the tactical, operational and strategic levels: the Ecole de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin Beye (EMPABB) in Mali, the KAIPTC in Ghana and the National Defence College (NDC) in Nigeria. However, in the southern and eastern Africa regions, single regional centres have been established for the same purpose - notably the Southern Africa Development Community Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (SADC-RPTC). Further, some RECs/RMs acknowledge the work of training institutions that are not classified as TCEs but support the RECs/RMs to provide training for the ASF. The TCEs therefore conduct specialized component-specific PSO and integrated training at their designated levels.

Training is delivered in several different settings. These include pre-deployment, scenario-based training and exercises, in-mission training and multi-lateral and bilateral initiatives. Pre-deployment and scenario-based training and exercises usually range from classroom activities to field exercises, simulations, and role-plays. Training differs among the different countries and training centres, though the same Department of Peacekeeping Operations standards prevail everywhere. Member states have the responsibility to conduct basic training for their military, police and civilian components augmented by complementary PSO training and any necessary training to get them ready. However, the AU Training Needs Assessment reveals that at the national level, teaching and training are conducted using traditional training institutions and guided by


\[30\] African Standby Force Training Policy, Paragraph 27(c).
national needs, doctrines and standards. This leads to differences in competencies. Some national military institutions, from recruit training schools to staff and war college levels, offer PSO training as part of base training. But the depth and intensity of this training is unknown.\footnote{Op. cit., AU Training Needs Assessment.} Therefore, it is important that PSO training be fully integrated into national training curricula to prepare personnel for relevant assignments. Alternatively, these gaps can be filled by the UN, the AU, RECs/RMs or TCEs to support the implementation of training needs.

In addition to their areas of expertise, civilian personnel apply for PSO training themselves through their organizations and when they are rostered. The recently completed AMANI II field training exercise was a useful introduction to a PSO environment for the integrated training audience. It also helped to sharpen participants’ competencies in the simulated field. The AU, through the APSTA, utilized the expertise of TCE personnel, some of whom have been instrumental in piloting the civilian peacekeepers training course which was piloted in February 2016 at the KAIPTC. The TCEs are expected to submit profiles of trained personnel through their RECs/RMs to be included in the AU roster. In reality, this process faces several bottlenecks, chief of which are the politics around them and the challenges encountered at the RECs/RMs level in terms of the operationalization of their databases.

Whose Standards? The Politics of Agreeing on Shared PSO Training Standards

Generally, in the PSO field, the UN standards are more widely used by TCEs in Africa because they are easily available and accessible. This is not surprising as many of the PSOs in Africa are UN-led and the AU is still in the process of developing its norms, doctrines and frameworks on PSO training. As the AU seeks a more enhanced role in PSOs, it will have to do this more proactively. In addition to existing norms, the AU PSO frameworks must focus on the grey areas of peace enforcement that are usually not addressed in detail in other peacekeeping training. This will involve deeper collaboration and coordination with the UN to avoid duplication and unnecessary tensions.

Training Quality

The research orientation of many PSO training institutions in Africa helps to yield related field research which in turn informs and improves their training content. This involves an initial training needs assessment to determine the current security context and capacity needs, which then informs training content, design and delivery. Through this process, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the NDC, the IPSTC, the SADC-
RPTC, the ACCORD, the Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) and the KAIPTC have each produced several reports, manuals, policy documents and articles which have been used for both pre-deployment and in-mission training. For instance, the outcomes of ISS research on policing in peace operations was used for in-mission training in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan in 2013\(^3\) and the KAIPTC used research on sexual abuse and exploitation in West Africa to pilot a course on the topic. Additionally, the ACCORD and the ISS have publications like ‘Conflict Trends’ and the ‘African Security Review’ which provide analysis on a wide range of critical security issues.

**Training Access**

Some training centres have adopted the concept of mobile training teams, having recognized the limitations of on-site instruction, in order to reach a larger audience. The IPSTC, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Peace Support Training Centre, the CCCPA, the KAIPTC, the ACCORD and the ISS all use this method. The Institute for Peace and Security Studies and the KAIPTC offer graduate degrees in conflict, peace and security that equip a wide range of personnel with important knowledge on peace and security issues, thereby providing a ready resource for PSOs.

It is also worth noting that many training centres have harnessed information technology to improve access to their courses. The Peace Operations Training Institution digital platform has been useful in according the centres the opportunity for participants to improve their peacekeeping knowledge in general and specialised areas. Some training centres have also embraced the recently developed National Training E-learning Platform which was designed for them and to which they have free access. Both initiatives offer further opportunities for the AU training content to be developed and uploaded to guide and complement training at the training centres.

As peace and security training becomes more fashionable and rewarding, more training centres may emerge to cash in on the ‘goldmine’, raising the risk of duplication. The AU and RECs/RMs must thus regulate their training centres and streamline their operations.

**Monitoring and Evaluation of PSO Training**

Assessing the impact of any training intervention is imperative; it helps to document lessons learned process and to inform future training programmes. Training centres use different methods to assess the impact of training on participants. These range

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\(^3\) Leijenaar, A. (2013) UNMISS UNPOL Capacity Assessment. UN paper.
from embedded M&E units at the KAIPTC, the IPSTC, the CCCPA and the NDC to mobile evaluation as is the practice at ACCORD and FDRE-PSTC where experts are sent into the peacekeeping missions to assess how their trainees are utilising the skills and knowledge acquired from courses. The feedback is then analysed and used to strengthen existing courses and pilot new ones. Generally, participants are evaluated at three different levels: on-site daily evaluation (by trainers), off-site post-training evaluation (by both alumni and employers) and periodically by mobile evaluation teams. The IPSTC, the ACCORD and the CCCPA, among others, use mobile evaluation teams to track the impact of their training on missions. In addition, online alumni platforms are being used by some of the TCs to continue the discussions long after the course is over.

In a departure from regular training M&E, the KAIPTC undertook an impact assessment of peacekeeping training in West Africa in 2014 whose key findings reveal that peacekeeping training has enhanced PSO competencies and contributed to mission effectiveness. These moderate successes indicate that PSO training is yielding some gains and underline the need for greater investment and comparative assessments to enrich future training interventions.

Funding and Sustainability

Financing is a major challenge for PSO training as most training centres rely heavily on donors though new methods of income generation are increasingly being sought to promote long-term sustainability. Since the mid-1990s, donor initiatives like the Norwegian-funded Training for Peace programme have supported the ACCORD, the ISS and the KAIPTC with police and civilian research and training. The European Union (EU), the United States, Germany, Canada, Finland, Japan and Denmark also regularly fund many of the courses offered by the training centres. The AUs peace facility, itself heavily donor-dependent, has so far not been able to offer such support as envisaged. Most training courses are free for personnel as most applicants are unable to afford self-funded courses without support. This raises concern about the long-term sustainability of PSO training. It also has implications for the kinds of training that can be developed as donor interests will continue to shape the direction and content of training in Africa. The challenge for African training centres will be how to remain sustainable and relevant.

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Challenges and Conclusion

As Africa stands poised to be more assertive in its peace and security endeavours, training is a key underlying factor in shaping the future of PSOs on the continent. Yet the approach to training as envisaged by the ASF doctrine cannot materialize as long as there are discrepancies in the interpretation of the training policy on the continent. Additionally, the coordination and collaboration between the AU, RECs and TCs are largely ad hoc and needs to be improved. Further, the platform offered by the APSTA remains underutilised in mobilising support and providing clarity and direction on AU training doctrines and policies. PSO training has evolved over the years to respond to the changing nature of conflict with many TCs currently following the UN standards in the training of personnel. To better equip personnel to operate efficiently in AU mandated PSOs, it is critical that they are exposed to the necessary doctrines, skills and knowledge to improve mission effectiveness and success. This means a concerted effort by the AU, RECs/RMs and TCs to ensure that optimal training is achieved.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are offered:

a. Enhanced adoption and adaptation of the ASF doctrines into TCs training curricular to support the operationalization of the ASF. The AU, RECs/RMs should also play a more visible role in the TCs. This can commence with Memoranda of understanding with the TCs that will enable mutual collaboration on contextual issues.

b. TCs must think of ways to become financially sustainable in the long term, this will include generating funds from other sources outside the TC and targeting and getting more support from private entrepreneurs and businesses.

c. The APSTA platform offers opportunity for the structured organization and dissemination of training policies and content and should be more rigorously used by all stakeholders.

References


Emma Birikorang

Abstract
The chapter assesses the future of deploying peace support operations within the framework of the African Standby Force (ASF). It discusses these developments against the reality of peace and security challenges in the region, deliberating on whether the ASF is capable of responding to security threats in Africa. Tracing the background to the ASF, it highlights the peace and security challenges in the region that necessitated the institutionalization of mechanisms to address these concerns, such as the African Peace and Security Architecture, within which the ASF situates itself. The chapter also discusses the composition of the ASF, its benchmarks for operationalization, and the challenges the African Union (AU) faces in trying to make the ASF achieve full operational capability. The chapter also offers some recommendations for further improving the ASF’s effectiveness and its future as the framework within which the AU deploys peace support operations in Africa.

Introduction
In the immediate post Cold War period, a number of events occurred that precipitated renewed co-operation in Africa. Africa had become one of the most unstable regions in the world, having experienced bloody and violent civil wars in Liberia, Somalia, Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Angola. Even for countries that were spared the carnage of civil wars, their internal political arenas were highly unstable and characterized by military dictatorships and one-party political systems, resulting in abuses of human rights and fundamental
individual freedoms in many countries, including Ghana, Nigeria, The Gambia, Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, and South Africa.

The first significant response by African states to these crises was the signing of a non-binding document in May 1991 at the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). The CSSDCA was a civil society initiative spearheaded by the African Leadership Forum, which was established by former President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. The Kampala Document, which emerged from the conference, was only reignited at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit in 1999 through which a series of initiatives and further meetings at the heads of state, ministerial, and ambassadorial levels culminated in the transformation of the OAU into the AU. Before this period, however, the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution was signed in 1993. It was expected that this mechanism would provide African leaders the necessary framework for collective action and co-operation in the area of security and development at the regional level.

This chapter begins by tracing the background to the ASF, highlighting the peace and security challenges in the region that necessitated the institutionalization of mechanisms to address these concerns, such as the African Peace and Security Architecture, within which the ASF situates itself. The chapter then discusses the composition of the ASF, its benchmarks for operationalization, and the challenges the African Union (AU) faces in trying to make the ASF achieve full operational capability. It also highlights some inherent weaknesses within the AU which have been inimical to the progress of the ASF. The chapter finally offers some recommendations for further improving the ASF’s effectiveness and its future as the framework within which the AU deploys peace support operations in Africa.

**Background**

After the OAU was transformed into the AU in 2000, the AU, together with the sub-regional organizations strengthened their focus on issues of peace and security. The African Peace and Security Architecture thus constitutes the totality of the measures instituted by the continental body to address issues of peace and security in Africa. These structures are contained in the 2000 Constitutive Act of the AU, and the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC). In what constituted a radical departure from past norms and practice, under Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act and Article 4(j) of the PSC Protocol, the AU bestowed upon itself the right to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide,
and crimes against humanity. This set the tone for a new approach, which required the appropriate instruments and institutionalization of corresponding norms. These instruments are provided for under Article 9 of the PSC Protocol, and comprise the Panel of the Wise as a diplomatic measure, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) to predict potential instability and prevent conflicts, the African Standby Force (ASF) and Military Staff Committee as a peacekeeping and preventive deployment measure, and the Peace Fund. The significance of these pillars is that they provide an entry point for all kinds of intervention in conflicts, from mediation and diplomatic efforts by the Panel of the Wise, to conflict prevention and early warning by the CEWS, and rapid military intervention through the ASF, with a Peace Fund to provide the backbone to these interventions.

Whereas in previous OAU frameworks, decisions were taken by the larger group of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, under the new architecture, decisions were to be taken by the PSC composed of only fifteen members to be elected on the basis of equal rights. To ensure continuity, members of the Council were to be represented at all times at the headquarters of the AU. Under Article 9 of the PSC Protocol, the fifteen-member body was mandated to take initiatives and actions that it deemed appropriate with regard to situations of potential conflict, as well as those that had already developed into full-blown conflicts. The PSC was also required to take measures necessary to prevent a conflict for which a settlement had been reached from escalating. The protocol thus gave discretionary powers to the Council to act in the interest of the Union and member states and provided it with the required entry points and modalities for action.

The PSC performs functions in the following areas:

- Promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa.
- Early warning and preventive diplomacy.
- Peace-making, including the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and enquiry.
- Peace support operation and intervention, pursuant to article 4(h) and 4(j) of the Constitutive Act.
- Peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.
- Humanitarian action and disaster management.
- Any other function as may be decided by the Assembly.

It is thus within this framework that the ASF gets it mandate.
The African Standby Force

While the OAU had, in the 1960s, debated the possibility of an African High Command, it was the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) mission in Liberia that gave the OAU the needed impetus to take its own processes forward to build a standby regional capability. In 1993, a key development took place within the OAU which was the signing of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution. According to Cilliers and Potgieter, by the time that the Mechanism was formally adopted, the OAU’s pivotal experience with military observation operations in Rwanda had convinced member states that limited observer missions and small operations were indeed possible.1 This possibility was given a further boost with the deployment of the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) operation in Liberia in 1990. Yet, it is instrumental that while these operations pointed at the possibility of military interventions in member states, the deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia and the challenges that confronted that mission gave an indication that regional peacekeeping missions, while possible, were not easy to manage, and therefore extra caution was required when attempting to plan for such interventions. However, knowing that this possibility existed, and seeing how quickly ECOMOG was deployed in Liberia might have prompted regional leaders that with careful planning, it should be possible within a few years for the AU to deploy a peacekeeping mission under a well prepared ASF.

However, it is important to note that the original idea of a standby force faced opposition from some member states of the organization, as they perceived the concept as implying a substantial loss of sovereignty, that the cost of having such a military structure was prohibitive, and that it would inevitably be bedevilled by other problems such as manpower, equipment and weapon standardization, logistics, unified training, deployment of troops, and the appointment of the Supreme Commander.2

As a result, attempts at establishing such a force failed because their institutional setup was not able to resolve these tensions and was thus considered a threat by many states.3 Member states at the OAU, at the time, having fought for their sovereignty and territorial integrity, were apprehensive about giving up such privileges through an ASF that could be deployed into a member state without that state’s permission. These apprehensions were reflective of the practical tensions that permeated the ECOWAS missions in Liberia.

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and Sierra Leone especially, which were deployed without the belligerents’ concerns (in Liberia), and which sometimes pitted Anglophones against Francophones. Based on some of the challenges of ECOMOG enumerated above, it was important for the AU, in the development of the ASF concept to avoid those same pitfalls through the setting up of appropriate frameworks which would be satisfactory to member states.

Consequently, the ASF was to be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian, police, and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. The ASF, as one of the pillars of the PSC is expected to perform functions in the following areas: observation and monitoring missions; intervention in member states in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a member state in order to restore peace and security; preventive deployment; peacebuilding, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization; humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian populations in conflict areas; and any other functions as may be mandated by the PSC or the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

In May 2003, the African Chiefs of Defence Staff adopted the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee which sets out the specificities regarding the operational tasks of the ASF, the timelines to achieve full operationalization, the requirements from the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms, and the level of cooperation required of the AU, the RECs, and the UN. Significantly, it highlighted most of member states’ concerns with respect to logistics, equipment and weapon standardization, unified training, deployment of troops, funding, and personnel requirements.

The framework document sets out the deployment timelines to be informed by six types of missions and possible scenarios:

(a) Scenario 1: AU/Regional military advice to a political mission, which has a deployment requirement of 30 days from mandate resolution.

(b) Scenario 2: AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission, to be deployed within 30 days.

(c) Scenario 3: AU/Regional observer mission to be deployed within 30 days.

(d) Scenario 4: AU peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions and peacebuilding, to be deployed in 30 days.

(e) Scenario 5: AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low level spoilers; the military component is expected to be deployed within 30 days while the other components like the political and civilian are to be deployed in 90 days.

(f) Scenario 6: AU intervention, such as in grave circumstances of human rights abuses and genocide. This force is to be deployed in 14 days with a robust military force.

The deployment timelines, especially for the fourteen-days of Scenario 6, as Cilliers suggested, are ambitious by any standard, and are made particularly demanding by the multinational and standby character of the ASF, which makes it more difficult to train, operate, and deploy.5

The ASF and the Principle of Subsidiarity

This challenge could perhaps be overcome if, as envisaged, some of the missions are to be managed alone by the RECs with the support of the AU. Even though there is one ASF, it is critical to note that the RECs still maintain some level of autonomy, while still aligning their structures and contributing to, and abiding by the approved guidelines of the AU. The RECs were expected to develop self-sufficient regional brigades, independent of the continental framework. However, the brigades could be called upon as part of the ASF and be deployed in any member state of the AU. The advantage of sub-regional brigades was that those RECs with fairly developed brigades such as ECOWAS, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and, to some extent, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development could be relied upon to take the lead in interventions, thereby building the peacekeeping capabilities of the others. For RECs such as ECOWAS and SADC, the building of their peacekeeping capability resulted from many years of sub-regional peacekeeping interventions, in which challenges, experiences, and lessons learned informed and influenced the establishment of their regional brigades.

West Africa and Southern Africa experienced almost two decades of conflicts in some member states and were compelled to develop structures and legal frameworks regarding peacekeeping interventions. It was upon these already-existing structures that the AU frameworks were based, and it became relatively easier for these RECs to meet the AU benchmarks within the set time frame. East Africa and the Central African region, while also experiencing conflicts were more hesitant to develop common frameworks for military intervention in their member states.

However, inasmuch as there are both advantages and disadvantages to dependence on the RECs, what is clear is that the standby framework is only as strong as the sub-regional structures. These structures are as mutually beneficial both to the AU and the RECs as they are reliant upon each other for success in building the peacekeeping and conflict prevention capability of the region. For the AU, if it is able to channel all the various efforts together, it will increase its significance to member states, while the RECs will also gain better access to one another (they previously worked independently and had little or no contact with each other).

These efforts are all geared toward preparing the AU and the sub-regions to be able to respond appropriately to conflicts in member states in support of the norm of the right of the AU to intervene in a member state in respect of grave circumstances such as genocide and crimes against humanity.

**Roadmaps toward Full Operationalization**

In acknowledging the difficulty of establishing the ASF, the policy framework conceded that ‘there are clear, significant and fundamental gaps between the capabilities needed to realize the AU goals and current capacity. The main areas of concern being lack of political will and readiness; lack of financial resources; lack of equipment and logistical capacity; and in some areas, lack of training. For these reasons, the full development of the ASF will need to be viewed as a longer-term project.’ This necessitated the development of the ASF in phases through which different roadmaps were designed to monitor progress.

The key objective of Roadmap I (2005-2008) was the creation of the necessary policy documents which would underpin the work of the ASF. Key among these were the development of common doctrine, command, control, and communication and information systems, as well as the development of standard operating procedures, common training standards, logistics frameworks, and an evaluation mechanism. Thus Roadmap I sought to respond to future challenges of poor communication between mission headquarters and regional brigades, and to ensure that all brigades underwent common training in order to facilitate inter-operability among country contingents and regional brigades.

The ASF Roadmap II (2008-2010) sought to further continue developing and fine-tuning the policy documents. In addition, it emphasized the development of the Formed Police Units, logistics policy, medical policy, protection of civilians guidelines, and strategic lift. In addition, the development of the civilian and police components, as well as
individual, regional, and continental training were expected to be developed during this phase. Considerable efforts were invested and progress made to operationalize the ASF. Therefore, in 2010, the ASF was assessed through regional exercises and the AMANI Africa I Command Post Exercise was deemed as being at initial operating capability. This meant that while the five RECs/Regional Mechanisms and the African Union Commission are able to deploy and manage a standby force, enhancements were still required in force composition, planning, procedures, training, communications, and logistics before the level could be raised to full operating capability.6

Even though the ASF had been expected to be operational in 2010, many of the benchmarks for operationalization, such as pledged troops and the civilian component had not been met by the RECs by this timeline. Therefore, a third roadmap running from 2011 to 2015 was proposed. It was guided by the outcome of the review of the Amani Africa I, through which it was decided that in order for the ASF to achieve full operating capability, further work needed to be done on the development of the civilian component, the communication framework, operating procedures, logistics, and general support arrangements. Another AMANI exercise was thus expected to be conducted to validate the ASF to full operating capability by 2015.

### Operationalizing the ASF

In trying to determine the operational readiness of the ASF, a number of exercises were conducted by the AU. The major exercises were AMANI Africa I and AMANI Africa II. AMANI Africa I Command Post Exercise, which was conducted in Addis Ababa from 20 to 29 October 2010, ‘provided the climax to [a] two years training and capacity building cycle designated to evaluate the effectiveness of the African Union Commission, through the Peace Support Operations Division, to employ the ASF for an AU mandated peace support operation’.7 It focussed mostly on validating policies and processes at the continental strategic level. It also provided objective evidence to support proposals for further organizational and operational developments of training, procedures, and multidimensional capacities of the ASF.8 This implied that while some progress had been made toward operational readiness, the exercise demonstrated that the ASF could not deploy in its capacity at the time.

AMANI Africa II, which took place in South Africa from 19 October to 7 November 2015, was therefore expected to demonstrate the deployment of the ASF, practise

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7 www.peaceau.org
8 www.peaceau.org
and validate a mission headquarters, as well as validate AU headquarter functions in peace support operations. Importantly, the ‘requirement for Amani Africa II Exercise as stipulated in Roadmap III was to evaluate the ability of the AU to mandate, deploy, sustain, and recover, first: a Scenario 6 Rapid Deployment Capability under Article 4 of the Constitutive Act; and second, to expand the deployment by mandating a Scenario 5 AU mission.’ The African Union Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety, and Security, decided subsequently in January 2016 that the ASF had attained full operational capability. This decision was premised on the successful conduct of the AMANI Africa II Exercise.

Does a declaration of full operational readiness in a field training exercise indicate that the rapid deployment capability of the AU is fully functional and capable of deploying within fourteen days with a robust military force? While full operational capability is important and necessary, it is often the politics of intervention in AU member states by RECs or the AU itself that hinders rapid deployment. Moreover, command post exercises and field training exercises, while necessary to test operational readiness, are nowhere near reality. Issues of communication, coordination, cooperation, and logistics remain. These issues were present during the exercise. Therefore it is important that the AU does not rest on its laurels and applaud itself for a successful exercise. It is important that the issues that are identified in the after-action review are addressed. In addition, inasmuch as African states are diverse, their conflicts and insecurities are equally diverse.

Therefore, the operational design of the ASF should recognize the different ways in which the AU works with regions and member states, noting that no single operational model can satisfy all deployment requirements. In addition, the six deployment scenarios and timelines that are highlighted in the ASF Policy Framework are outdated and do not reflect the reality of the security threats presently facing the region. For example, have the AU’s experiences in Somalia informed any aspect of the ASF development and learning? Moreover, within which of the scenarios could the AU-authorized Multi-national Joint Task Force on Boko Haram and the AU-authorized Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army be situated? This implies that the ASF model as was envisaged several years ago needs to be revisited to take into consideration emerging security threats. From all indications, the ASF model was developed to respond to threats of civil wars, genocide, and political crises in member states.

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9 www.peaceau.org
Furthermore, the AU has to clarify the role of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC). The ACIRC was an initiative that was borne out of the AU Summit in 2013. It was expected, as its name indicates, to provide quick and immediate responses to conflicts and crises in the region. Ironically, it was created by the AU to circumvent the problem of slow responses to crisis in the region, either as a result of slow decision-making or mandating procedures, or the lack of provision of logistics or resources to AU missions in Africa. This rapid response by the ACIRC would be occasioned by the fact that it would operate directly with the AU, instead of going through the RECs as is the case with the ASF. Secondly, because member states participate voluntarily, ACIRC would be self-funded, and not require substantial funding from the AU. Thirdly, to avoid the problem of slow mandating and decision-making by the AU, the lead-nation concept was designed, whereby the ACIRC would be deployed through the initiative of a lead-nation, albeit with AU approval. The lead-nation concept was contained in the ASF policy framework, in which, for regions which are lagging behind with the establishment of the peace and security protocols and mechanism, the AU encouraged potential lead-nations to form coalitions of the willing as a stop-gap arrangement. In addition, the concept of the lead-nations was recommended at the AU level to Scenario Six (intervention) type operations.

It is, however, baffling how the states contributing to AU/ASF operations could be deemed to be more rapid when these are the same states contributing to the slow mandating process of the AU. If these states have rapid response capability, why would they not avail this to the AU or the RECs? If the bottlenecks lie with the AU, it might be useful for the AU and the RECs to reconstitute their structures to enable this ‘Coalition of the Willing’ to be subsumed under the AU. Moreover, it is difficult to comprehend how a parallel structure was being created at the same time that the AU/RECs were working toward operationalizing the ASF. This had the potential to impact on the success of full operationability of the ASF. It would have been more useful to channel these resources, energies, and logistics toward one endeavour.\(^{11}\)

**Conclusion: The ASF: the Future of Peace Support Operations in Africa?**

Since the ASF was established, the AU has embarked on a number of peacekeeping missions which have had varied successes. These are the AU Mission in Sudan, the African-led International Support Mission to Mali, and the AU Mission in Somalia. Yet these missions faced operational challenges, such as logistics, command and control, resource constraints, and lack of training standardization among troops. Since the ASF

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\(^{11}\)While the AU has indicated that it will no longer channel resources toward the ACIRC following the ASF’s attainment of full operational capability, these resources could have been better spent developing the ASF.
has been certified as fully operational, member states should commit to it, in order to ensure that when called upon, it would demonstrate that after more than ten years of planning, the AU and its RECs are in a position to deploy and maintain a peace support operation in Africa.

References


The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) is an internationally preferred centre of excellence that provides globally-recognized capacity for international actors on African peace and security through training, education and research to foster peace and stability in Africa.

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